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The experience of the British soldier throughout the Twentieth Century may seem 
to be well covered in new military histories, however there is a conspicuous gap in 
the literature. The Korean War is one of the most globally significant conflicts of 
the past century, over 80,000 British personnel served in Korea and 1,109 were 
lost or killed in action. Yet in the year of the conflict’s 70th anniversary, the 
experience of the men who fought there has been largely overlooked. This thesis 
makes an important contribution to knowledge by examining the experiences of a 
previously unstudied cohort of British veterans who served on the frontlines of 
Britain’s biggest ‘Forgotten War’. By analysing oral testimonies and recollections, 
this study recentres the experience of individuals to its rightful place in the 
narratives of the Korean War and also sheds new light upon wider British Society 
in the mid-Twentieth Century. This in turn brings studies of the Korean War more 
into line with the wider body of new military histories. With the inclusion of material 
from men who served as Regulars and Reservists, as well as National 
Servicemen, this work also adds to existing scholarly work in the field which has 
focused predominantly on the experience of conscription. In doing so this research 
demonstrates firstly that the experience of men who fought in Korea is not uniform 
and does not fit neatly into either a Cold War narrative or as a continuation of the 
Second World War. Instead it shows that the experience of Korea could be 
reflective of the narratives of past conflicts whilst remaining a unique in its own 
right. Additionally, this thesis also shows how the Korean War never developed its 
own narrative tropes in popular memory and failed to make a lasting impression 
with wider post-war society. The most prominent theme of Korea in popular 
memory was that of being an archetypal ‘Forgotten War’, which this thesis shows, 
has also led to a reliance in veterans’ recollections on comparison with other 
conflicts. This study also demonstrates that veterans of Korea were keenly aware 
of their collective status of being forgotten, which also plays into their reactions to 
the war and their identity. The agency of these men is made clear through their 
individual testimonies, showing that not all men who served in Korea did so 
reluctantly or without choice, and that they formed their own opinions and 
reactions to their situation. Thereby this work opens the door for an even greater 
understanding of the most significant conflict of the early post-war era, as well as a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
 
Private Maurice Micklewhite  
In 1952, on a combat patrol between opposing lines in an unknown valley of the 
war-torn peninsula that was Korea, a nineteen-year-old private of the Royal 
Fusiliers known as Maurice Micklewhite, was engaged in what was one of the 
most significant post Second World War conflicts to date. Maurice Micklewhite, or 
Sir Michael Caine as he would be later known, is perhaps Britain’s most famous 
veteran of the conflict that was the Korean War. Sir Michael, like many of Britain’s 
celebrities from that generation, was a former National Serviceman and a veteran 
of overseas combat. When he appeared on The Michael Parkinson Show as part 
of a special one-off interview, it was unsurprising to hear amongst the witty 
anecdotes and jokes, a brief recollection from his time in the armed forces. What 
was surprising however, was the content of the story he told. It was not what one 
may expect from an old war story and it was certainly not a portrayal of events 
which would typically have been told from more well-known conflicts, such as the 
Second World War. However, what he did say has deep ramifications for any 
understanding of the war in Korea: 
There were four of us, each one was dumber than the other one, the officer 
was bloody stupid, because he says to us, I’ll give all of you a fiver if you go 
up the line, to the Chinese line and help take a prisoner. I said ‘Up there? 
with you? Are you insane?’ I said I’m already a mug enough. I was out 
there, fighting communism, for capitalism and I’m being paid four bob a 
day!1 
The audience laughed, but what appears on the face of it to be a simple anecdote 
for comic effect, is in fact a kind of witness testimony of his experience and one 
which can add a great deal to our understanding of the Korean War. Korea is not 
 
1 Sir Michael Caine, on his service in Korea, ‘Michael Caine, Interview Part One- 
Parkinson- BBC’, BBC Studios, YouTube, 




in the pantheon of Britain’s great conflicts, like the World Wars, the Falklands or 
other such conflicts. That much is evident from the very fact that Sir Michael could 
tell his story so irreverently. Unlike the entrenched view society has developed of 
the World Wars, particularly the subject of combat, which must be approached 
with a reverent respect, Sir Michael was able to joke to an audience about his 
fighting experience. Would a typical soldier of the Second World War for example, 
have been able to tell an audience so openly, that they refused an order and were 
almost bribed to fight the Nazis? Would they even be willing to make a joke of the 
Allies fighting the Axis as Sir Michael did of ‘capitalism fighting communism’? The 
fact is that Korea is simply not viewed in the terms usually applied to warfare in the 
Twentieth Century. Unlike the trenches of the First World War or events such as 
D-Day during the Second World War, there are no cultural tropes and relatable 
touchstones for Korea. For these reasons the Korean War is remarkable amongst 
Britain’s Twentieth Century conflicts. Despite the ferocity with which it was fought 
and the fact that it was one of the defining conflicts for global politics in the 
Twentieth Century it is so often dubbed ‘the Forgotten War’ in popular media. It is 
not forgotten in the sense that it is unknown; the build-up to the war’s outbreak, the 
tactical and strategic manner in which it was fought and the indelible impact it had 
on geopolitics, the Cold War and the situation in Korea today, have all been 
considered at length over the years. However, the conflict never developed any 
relatable cultural narratives, tropes or attachments in wider British society and with 
the exception of a notable few, the everyday boots on the ground experience of 
the soldiers who fought in the largest post Second World War conflict has been 
largely ignored. The result is that the narratives in soldiers’ retellings is often 
dependant upon relation to other more well-known conflicts. In these cases, 




experiences to what they believe are more relatable elements from other conflicts, 
from the environment to their personal circumstances. Some recounts do remain 
distinctly more centred around Korea, yet they are often more fluid and open to 
retelling even in terms of individual stories. When the story Sir Michael told on 
Parkinson was included in a written memoir, which came some years later, it had 
been remoulded and doubtless edited through several filters by the time it reached 
publication and serialisation on BBC Radio 4: 
The closest I got to death and it is an incident which still haunts my dreams 
from time to time, was a night time observation patrol in no man’s land. 
Three of us, my Platoon Commander, Robert Mills, a wireless operator and 
me. We were sent down the valley, faces blackened with mud and covered 
in mosquito repellent, right up to the Chinese lines. It was Madness […] 
Bobby Mills, who was the son of a General, had an idea, ‘I know’ he said, 
‘We’ll grab ourselves a Chinese prisoner! I’ll give you a fiver each!’ ‘Are you 
off your fucking head?!’ I hissed back.2 
There were three people instead of four, more specifics were given and the 
language was decidedly bluer, however, the general semantics of the experience 
remained. This demonstrates that even with the inconsistencies in objective details 
or exact records, which can occur as memories change, individual’s 
understandings of the experience generally remain the same. Through the ways in 
which veterans retell their experiences, it is still possible to find an understanding 
of an individual’s experience as they themselves saw it. That is the power of oral 
testimony and life writing. It has the capacity to reveal individual experience in a 
way that adds to understanding, because it does not just tell us what happened, 
but what people thought about what was happening and how they remember it. 
The Korean War is an historical event which remains sorely underexplored in 
these terms. While Sir Michael Caine may be irregular in that he was the only 
soldier of the Korean War to become a major Hollywood star, able to give his 
 





testimony before a live audience and national television, Maurice Micklewhite, the 
National Serviceman from a working-class background serving his year in Korea 
was not. The young National Serviceman was typical of the British soldiers who 
saw active duty on the Korean peninsula.  
Course of the War 
The broad strokes of the conflict are relatively simple to follow. The war itself 
began at dawn on the 25th of July 1950. With heavy Soviet and Chinese backing, 
North Korean, (DPRK), armed forces crossed the border which lay along the 38th 
Parallel with overwhelming numbers; the armed forces of South Korea, (RoK), 
were decimated, losing nearly 80,000 troops in less than a week.3 The United 
Nations Security Council reacted by issuing Resolution 83, signalling that North 
Korea was in breach of world peace and called for an urgent military police action 
to push DPRK forces back to the 38th Parallel.4 From there, the war followed three 
major stages. First was the breakout and a rapid ‘roll back’ of the overstretched 
North Korean Forces. This stage of the war was highly mobile and saw large scale 
engagements reminiscent of the events of the Second World War. This included 
the Battle of Incheon, which was a larger amphibious assault than even the 
Normandy landings of June 1944. The second phase of the war began in the 
winter of 1950, with Allied forces nearing their border, the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), began a massive counter attack, which saw UN forces 
pushed back over the 38th Parallel. Seoul, the Southern capital, changed hands 
many times. Ultimately, due to defensive actions such as those at the Battle of the 
Imjin and Kapyong, the PLA was unable to effectively rout UN forces and following 
 
3 ‘The Korean War: The Outbreak, The United States Army Centre For Military History, 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20100612073344/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/KW-
Outbreak/outbreak.htm], Archived 12th June 2010, last accessed, 29th September 2019.  




weeks of attacks and counterattacks, the frontlines again stabilised around the 38th 
Parallel. This time, UN forces implemented a policy of holding the line along the 
38th parallel as originally stated in Resolution 83, rather than pressing home the 
attack and as a result the next stage of the war was hallmarked by a long 
stalemate which lasted until the ceasefire of 1953. An armistice agreement finally 
came into effect on the 27th of July 1953, with a ceasefire sounded by buglers of 
the Durham Light Infantry. Officially, there was no cessation of hostilities and 
technically, the conflict remains unresolved to this day. The fighting between June 
1950 and July 1953 led to nearly 4 million deaths on both sides, the vast majority 
were civilian.5 However, unlike the World Wars, the Vietnam conflict or even the 
Falklands War, the fighting that occurred in Korea has largely faded from wider 
society’s memories.  
The outbreak of the Korean War was met with a spectrum of reactions amongst 
the British public and it was not immediately clear what British involvement in the 
conflict would look like. Worries about entangling the already war weary nation in 
another total war were common amongst the public. Similarly, early advise to the 
government suggested that the threat to British interests posed by the Korean 
situation was ‘remote, indirect and not immediate’.6 Nonetheless, on the 5th of July, 
in line with the United Nations’ resolution on the matter, Prime Minister Attlee first 
announced to the commons that Britain would be supporting the Republic of 
Korea, though this was initially limited to naval forces.7 Twenty-two Royal Navy 
 
5 Ibid; ‘Casualties of the Korean War’, Ministry of National Defence of Republic of Korea, 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130120040603/http://www.imhc.mil.kr/imhcroot/data/korea
_view.jsp?seq=4&page=1], last accessed, 29th September 2019; Bruce Cummings, 
The Korean War, A History, (2011), P. 35 
6 Mass Observation Archive (Henceforth MOA), 9-1-A, Public Opinions of the Korean War, 
June – July 1950; Bodleian Library, MS Attlee 103.7, Foreign Office Memorandum 
‘Korea’, 1st July 1950.  





vessels already in the Far East region, including the aircraft carrier HMS Triumph 
and two battleships, HMS Belfast and HMS Jamaica, were rapidly dispatched to 
the Sea of Japan to provide naval and air support to United Nations forces.8 This 
was swiftly followed by an initial commitment of 27,000 British troops, including the 
hastily assembled 29th Brigade, however, the true number of troops that ended up 
fighting in Korea was much higher. Due to a lack of official statistics from both the 
government and the British Army, estimates of the true number of British troops 
who served in Korea vary massively, generally somewhere between 40,000 and 
over 100,000.9 Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, in his official history of the War put the 
number at 81,084, however it is unclear whether he included Commonwealth 
forces in that count.10 In any case, the British Army would go on to experience 
some of the bitterest fighting of the post Second World War period and lost at least 
1078 soldiers in battle. The average British Soldier of the Korean War is a difficult 
concept to characterise individually. The troops who arrived in Korea came from 
many backgrounds and had varying levels of military experience. Some were 
seasoned veterans of the Second World War, many of whom but not all, were non-
commissioned officers and officers. Some were volunteers or reservists and still 
more were National Servicemen, with no prior experience of frontline combat. The 
latter group was so significant for the Korean War that it has often been framed as 
a ‘National Serviceman’s war’. As with so many elements of the conflict, it is 
dependent upon contexts such as the time and place in question, however 
regardless of how one looks at it, the National Service contribution to Britain’s war 
 
8 ‘British Commonwealth Naval Operations During the Korean War – Part VII’, Royal 
United Services Institution Journal, 99:593, (1954), P. 102.  
9 Grace Huxford, The Korean War in Britain, Citizenship, Selfhood and Forgetting, 
(Manchester, 2018), P. 2 & P. 22; ‘Britain’s Forgotten War’, BBC News, 20/4/2001, 
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1285708.stm], last accessed 4th April 2019.  
10 Anthony Farrar- Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume II, An Honourable 




effort was significant. Some estimates of the National Service contribution to 
Britain’s forces in Korea place the number of men at up to sixty per cent of some 
battalions.11 Similarly, estimates of the total number of National Servicemen in 
Korea as a whole would place the figure at around 20,000 individual soldiers.12 
Therefore, throughout the entire war, just under half of the British contingent was 
composed of National Servicemen, so whilst not quite a majority, it is easy to 
understand how their place in the conflict has become so prominent.13 Regardless 
of a soldier’s status in the army, be it National Serviceman, reservist or volunteer, 
any man deployed to Korea was supposed to have been in service for 12 months, 
be over nineteen years old and, after the 29th Division, be volunteers.14 They 
fought in diverse military scenarios, practically a world away from home, but for the 
most part the experience of those who engaged in the largest post-war conflict has 
been largely overlooked, under-analysed and remains absent from the narrative of 
Korea and Twentieth Century warfare. 
Methodology 
Yet for the men themselves who fought on the far-flung peninsula, Michael Caine 
included, their experiences are anything but forgotten. Many of these men have in 
fact, recorded their oral testimony and what these records provide has implications 
not just for the history of the Korean War, but also for much wider investigations 
into Twentieth Century military history. This study seeks to explore and frame the 
experience of these men, through a rigorous analysis of oral testimonies from the 
soldiers themselves. Aside from simply bringing the techniques of oral history to 
 
11 Trevor Royale, The Best Years of Their Lives: The National Service Experience 1945- 
63, (London, 1989), PP. 186- 187.  
12 Jason Timothy Fensome, ‘The Administrative History of National Service in Britain, 
1950- 1963’ (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2001), P. 15. 
13 Richard Vinen, National Service: Conscription in Britain, 1945- 1963, (London, 2014), P. 
286. 




new ground, there is much to be discovered about the Twentieth Century soldier 
beyond Korea. This is firstly because oral testimonies from Korea veterans are still 
relatively untouched in academic discourse and provide us with fresh evidence 
with which to approach the study of warfare. Secondly, because the Korean War 
did not develop such a strong cultural narrative as other conflicts, veterans of the 
war continually rely upon referencing and framing their experiences within the 
context of other conflicts, revealing both new information on Korea and at the 
same time fresh perspectives on the narratives of other conflicts. Essentially, we 
discover what the men who fought in the 1950s perceived of both their own 
situation and what they perceived to be of similar context from other wars. Thirdly, 
veterans of Korea are not constrained by expectations associated with their own 
conflicts narrative. To again reflect back on Michael Caine’s interview with Michael 
Parkinson, the context of Korea allows us to see talking points about conflict 
generally which are obscured in the context of other wars. The social and political 
implications of the First and Second World Wars, for example preclude a great 
deal of discussion of many critical aspects of a soldier’s experience. These 
conflicts have become far more entrenched in British culture, to the extent that 
many aspects therein have become almost sanctified. The narrative of the great 
struggle against fascism would make publicly recounting a story of disobeying a 
direct order and even floating the idea of needing a bribe to fight the Nazis a very 
taboo subject in an interview about fighting in the Second World War. Similarly, 
there is an expected reverence to other areas of the World Wars. Whilst joking 
about life on the frontlines of Korea may be perfectly acceptable, Michael Caine’s 
story, told as a joke but which ended in brutal close combat, would raise eyebrows 
if it were from the First World War trenches.15 However, because of the lack of 
 




attention paid towards Korea, Michael Caine was able to tell this story openly on a 
national talk show. This will also allow us to see for instance, the opinions on the 
conflict of men who were conscripted into National Service, without the due 
expectations that the war they were enlisted for was as vital to national survival as 
the World Wars. Similarly, there are other elements of taboo which are overcome 
such as the act of killing. As it will be shown, men who fought in Korea spoke of 
killing the enemy there with far less reservation than those who had fought in 
European wars. They viewed their enemy differently, for many various reasons. 
This was a view predicated on the fact that the North Korean and Chinese soldiers 
they faced were in many ways alien to the British troops. This was a multi-faceted 
view, predicated on race, the politics of the war and the circumstances in which 
the majority of fighting took place. Unlike the relatable enemies of the World Wars’ 
Western Fronts, the view which emerged of the Chinese and North Koreans was 
one of an impersonal enemy combatant, with no emotional connotations. All these 
factors combined resulted in recollections of combat which allow us to see more 
clearly the experience of soldiers regarding the act of killing generally, without their 
perceived social reservations.16 Additionally, there is an extent to which the 
forgotten nature of the war, or at least its perception, allows veterans to give oral 
testimonies in more individual detail than one who had fought in a more well-
known conflict. They go further to tell their own stories but also relate them to what 
they believe the listener may know. A soldier who fought at Normandy can just 
brush off the details as they believe them to be well known, but a soldier who 
fought in the Pusan breakout will explain more clearly what the situation was like. 
What this all demonstrates is that this study, though focused on a lesser known 
 
16 Juliette Pattinson, Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operations 




conflict, can indeed reveal important elements of soldier’s experience in a wider 
field of oral histories.  
Oral history itself has been the primary and ideal methodology of studying under-
represented and disregarded groups in the historical narrative since the late 1970s 
and as a result it is now a main focus of new military history. Interviews and 
materials collected from these unrepresented groups, in this case, Korean War 
veterans, present many new angles and narratives from those more typically 
recorded at the time. Official unit diaries for example, may report the daily activities 
of a company, but they cannot reflect the opinions and emotions of the average 
infantrymen and the only way to acquire this information is to seek an oral history 
approach. Despite the prominence of oral history over the last forty years, one of 
the main criticisms it faces is still that oral history, by its subjective nature, can 
never provide any kind of objective truth. It is argued that the way in which 
subsequent and personal experiences have shaped, twisted and altered memory 
make individual recollections and accounts overly biased reflections of the past 
and are therefore dubiously reliable as sources at best. Whilst the notion that oral 
history sources are indeed subject to the rigours of memory, to use this as a 
criticism of analysis rather misses the point. The line was drawn under this as far 
back as 1979, with Luísa Passerini’s ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus Under Italian 
Fascism’, which summarised oral history not as a venture in finding facts and 
‘objective truths’, but as an ‘expression and representation of culture’.17 As Ron 
Grele put it, oral history tells us ‘not just what happened, but what people thought 
happened and how they internalise what happened’.18 In short, oral history is not 
about precise objective details and more to do with what and how the interview 
 
17 Luísa Passerini, ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus Under Italian Fascism’, History 
Workshop Journal, 8:1, (1979), P.84.  




subjects felt about their own personal experiences and their reflections upon it. It 
can indeed uncover new evidence, but it can also, with careful analysis, provide us 
with a richer and more profound understanding of the past and how it is 
remembered culturally. It should also be said to this point that the intrinsic nature 
of memory to oral history has in fact given rise to an entire sub-discipline within the 
wider scope of oral history itself. There are more culturally centred studies, that is 
to say works which focus on the experience of individuals with little heed paid to 
memory other than to note its natural bias, such as Elizabeth Robert’s A Woman’s 
Place, or more specific to recent military history, Emma Newland’s work Civilians 
Into Soldiers.19 However there are also works which approach memory head on 
such as Daniel James’s Dona Maria’s Story, which explores the mannerisms of 
memory and how their analysis can lead to a better understanding of how 
experiences are remembered.20 This study will for the most part follow the former 
of these patterns, accepting that there are of course natural biases in memory, but 
holding that this does not take away from their value as sources. Some mention 
must be given at this point to the debate against the use of oral history to 
understand the past, generally these criticisms of the discipline stem from a 
distrust of memory as a reliable source and from a worry of ‘overly democratising’ 
history towards underrepresented groups such as women, workers and minority 
groups.21 However, these are issues which have been long settled in the general 
consensus of oral history which has, since its revival in the 1970s, simply accepted 
that memory can be problematic from an objectivist stand point, but that it does not 
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degrade the value of the source for analysis. In short, whatever debate there was, 
is long since settled.  
One of the first obstacles in examining the experience of the soldier in Korea is 
that the war has relatively little source material associated with it in comparison to 
the earlier conflicts of the Twentieth Century. In many ways, this is unsurprising, 
the Korean War, despite being a major conflict in its own right, was a fraction of 
the scale of the Second World War. Although a number as high as a hundred 
thousand British troops may have served in Korea, over three-million men saw 
active deployment between 1939 and 1945.22 Serving in the Second World War 
was a mass phenomenon. Even those who served at home in military or civilian 
roles played a part in the eventual allied victory.  
This was not true of Korea, which simply never received the same level of 
attention as directed to the World Wars, both in popular culture and memory but 
also in terms of the collection of archival material and so relatively fewer efforts 
were made to record information in the same scale.23 Despite this there are indeed 
excellent resources that provide avenues of investigation into the lives of the men 
who fought in Korea. There are of course, the usual unit diaries and personal 
papers in the Imperial War Museum and various regimental museums as would 
exist for the World Wars, however, these sources have severe limitations and 
problems for a study of this kind. Firstly and perhaps as a result of the 
overshadowed nature of Korea in proceeding decades, these kinds of documents 
were simply not retained in the same quantities and exist in far smaller numbers 
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as their counterparts from other conflicts, insufficiently so for this kind of study on 
their own.24 In instances where these letters do exist, they primarily represent only 
a fractional cross section of the British Army contingent deployed to Korea, mostly 
officers ranging from Lieutenant upwards. Unit diaries, where they are available, 
tell very different stories from personal diaries, which were forbidden as an 
intelligence risk for soldiers in Korea. Unit diaries from Korea for the most part 
contain only the day to day administrative records for their subjects, vehicle 
requisitions and deployment orders are noted, but the everyday lives of the 
battalion’s men are either absent or only marginally included. These sources are 
certainly valuable, but a far richer and larger pool of resources are available in the 
form of oral histories. The primary archival source from which this study is drawn is 
the extensive oral histories collection of the sound archive of the Imperial War 
Museum. As a part of the museum’s continuing project of recording and digitising 
the recollections of those who experienced warfare, over 268 individual recorded 
interviews of Korean War veterans can be found in the IWM’s digitised archive at 
the time of writing. These interviews were mostly collected by the IWM between 
the years of 1985 and 2006, however there are individual recordings that exist 
beyond these dates, going as far back as 1970 and forward to 2012. Of course, 
whilst this represents a fraction of the number who fought in Korea and no oral 
history collection can ever fully represent such a large number of people, the 
interviews do include a wide range of men from across the range of ranks, ages 
and personal histories. From National Servicemen at the minimum age to deploy 
to Korea, to older and experienced troops, reservists, non-commissioned and 
commissioned officers with previous service. These soldiers came from across 
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Britain and were from diverse social backgrounds. Most of these men were 
seasoned career soldiers, others National Servicemen, some were from affluent  
backgrounds, others joined the army straight from borstals. This is significant 
because it allows a wider image of Korea than the assumption that it was mostly a 
National Serviceman’s War. The views of National Servicemen are indeed 
represented, but so too are the voices and recollections of Regular soldiers and 
Reservists who may not have shared the same experiences or held the same 
views and opinions as National Servicemen. That being noted, the IWM’s specific 
research agenda at the time of collecting these recordings was not to singularly 
record the experiences of the men who fought in Korea. Reflecting this, the 
interviews themselves, are primarily concerned with recording the chronological 
events of a subject’s career, rather than personal experience and emotional 
reaction. Yet, there is an extent to which these elements are somewhat beneficial. 
For a start, it means that veteran’s emotional responses and stories of their 
experience are not directed by the interviewer in the same manner as if they had 
been the precise agenda of the interview. Similarly, the importance of personal 
experience to the interviewees, is such that it still shines through. A further 
advantage of the IWM archive was that it precluded the need to conduct fresh 
interviews for this study. The collection of such a large body of fresh interviews 
would not only have been tremendously difficult and intensive in terms of time and 
resources, but would have also brought all of the issues associated with 
conducting then interpreting one’s own interview. Coming to the IWM archive from 
an external point of view allowed for the analysis of the sources from a more 
impartial stand point. There was no way to probe for a deeper meaning or to seek 
the answer one may have wanted to hear; the recordings exist as they exist. This 




collection. Hundreds of hours of material and recordings from the Imperial War 
Museum’s digitised sound archive have been analysed, as well as recordings from 
the National Army Museum’s sound archive and transcripts of veteran interviews 
have been extensively analysed.25 Additionally, reference has also been made to 
veteran’s memoirs and life writing, such as the work done by David Green and 
Ron Larby.26 Although these works, which will be discussed further, do not 
represent a perfect window into the universal experience of the British soldier, if 
such a thing exists, but they can help support oral testimony in various ways. They 
represent a more polished and filtered version of the same personal stories as 
come through in oral testimonies, further helping to shed light onto the experience 
of troops. Through rigorous examination and analysis of all these sources, this 
work will demonstrate what the experience of the Korean War was for the men 
who fought there. It will demonstrate that the conflict, for British soldiers, was a 
distinct entity, with its own peculiarities and continuities in experience. It will also 
show that life for the British soldier on the ground was more centred on day to day 
activities and smaller parts of life than grand Cold War narratives and strategic 
elements of old military history. 
Literature  
Obviously, this research does not stand alone and there has developed in recent 
decades, an impressive body of ‘new military histories’, upon the shoulders of 
which this work stands. The use of oral histories, life writing and recovery history in 
this body of work is anything but new, having been the prevalent approach to 
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academic military history for more than four decades. However, before moving on 
to cover the writings amongst which this study seeks to place itself, it should be 
considered that although there has been little of this new school academic 
discourse regarding the Korean War specifically, the conflict has been subject to 
study in more traditional terms. Histories of the Korean War have generally been 
more in line with the typically empirical narratives of older schools of military 
studies, or what Robert Citino termed ‘Drum and Trumpet’ writings.27 For the most 
part, these have been almost entirely centred on strategic studies, the causes of 
the war and its place within wider geopolitics of the Twentieth Century. These 
works usually start with an examination of the war’s causes, tracing them from the 
Japanese occupation of Korea, to the Allies’ trusteeship post 1945, to the invasion 
of the South by the North in 1950. Some of the most notable authors in this 
tradition are Max Hastings, Bruce Cummings and General Sir Anthony Farrar- 
Hockley, who wrote the official history of the War in the 1990s.28 Hastings work in 
particular is considered an excellent overview of the entire conflict, examining the 
war from its origins, through the major stages of the conflict and into the peace 
process. However, comparatively little attention is given to the experience of the 
troops who were fighting the battles detailed, except to give minor context or 
background. In all, these works form a very top down, commander’s eye view of 
the Korean War. Even Farrar-Hockley’s comparatively late official work was more 
in keeping with older military narratives, detailing the high politics behind the war 
and military manoeuvres, rather than reflecting the experience of men on the 
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ground. All in all, like most of the older school of military histories, these works are 
perfectly serviceable to give an impression of what happened in Korea, but do very 
little to explain what it was actually like for soldiers. This was predominantly the 
case with almost all military history, until a new school of thought emerged. 
Early major works in new military history came in the 1970s, with authors who 
sought to go beyond the ‘drum and trumpet’ commander’s tales of old military 
history and place the experience of the individual service person at the centre of 
the narrative.29 Historians such as John Keegan, John Ellis and Eric Leed began 
examining and analysing the first-hand accounts of soldiers and they helped to 
give rise to a sea change in military studies. Keegan’s Face of Battle and Ellis’s 
later The Sharp End are still regarded as relevant and hugely significant, as well 
as moving pieces in the field of soldier’s experience.30 These works were followed 
by others such as Eric Leed who similarly revaluated the position of aspects of 
individual experience and interwove them into narratives of various conflicts.31  
The innovation these authors made, was to take an oral history approach to first-
hand accounts from what they described as ‘the poor bloody infantry’ and develop 
a picture of their experience.32 
Their key findings were that the old school narrative of military history was simply 
inadequate to explain the daily experience of the infantryman. By taking a new 
approach, they found that soldiers’ experiences were often defined by their 
separation from home, the proximity of death, the closeness of comradeship and 
the ambivalence of society to their experience. None of these factors were present 
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in old top down narratives, as Keegan put it, ‘There was nothing about rum, or 
nervous breakdowns, or bullying in Clausewitz’.33 In the broadest terms, what this 
research hopes to accomplish is to do for the infantryman’s experience of the 
Korean War, what these works did for the infantry of the First and Second World 
War. At present, there is very little in terms of new military history applied to the 
Korean War, with the exception of Grace Huxford’s The Korean War in Britain, 
which focused primarily on wider society. As such, there has been no other work 
which has focused specifically into the context of British Soldiers who fought in 
Korea. In these terms, this study is unique and more importantly, opens up 
tremendous new ground for further expanding oral historical investigation into the 
Korean War and other such ‘forgotten’ conflicts.  
Of course, there are also other developments in the field of new military history 
which this work stands alongside and adds to in more specific ways.  
One of the key authors in areas of military history pertinent to this study is Joanna 
Bourke, whose work expanded the field to explore notions of identity, emotion, 
masculinity and interpersonal relationships throughout the First and Second World 
Wars and the Vietnam War.34 Bourke produced works which showed a graphic 
and unromanticised view of life for men on active military service. One of the key 
additions Bourke made was to recentre the act of killing as a characteristic 
element of frontline experience. The ways in which men responded to and coped 
with intimate killing were central to military service and could be as bloody and 
horrific as the act of killing itself. This study builds upon Bourke’s conclusions in 
several ways. It will demonstrate that the act of fighting and killing was indeed 
central to soldiers’ experiences of the Korean War, though it will also show that the 
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day to day coping mechanisms of troops were far more mundane and everyday 
than some of Bourke’s findings. Similarly, as will be shown, the act of killing itself, 
whilst central to the experience, seems to have been far more impersonal for 
veterans of Korea than in Bourke’s examinations of the World Wars. Of course, 
killing was not the only area of military life which was expanded upon by new 
military history and alongside Bourke, came several other works which began to 
examine and analyse emotional responses and masculinities in soldiers. One of 
the key arguments of Bourke’s work is with regards to masculinity and how military 
experience was often starkly different from the expected understandings of 
masculinity at the time. This study will similarly show that in the social environment 
of Korea, soldiers also took to caring for each other in ‘mothering’ or otherwise 
parental ways as part of the coping mechanisms of daily life. The social life of 
soldiers in Korea, between each other and their families at home, was just as 
much a part of life as their prescribed military routine. Other works have also 
investigated this social and masculine aspect of life in different groups during 
wartime. In 2008 Martin Francis’s work The Flyer, tackled the experience of a 
group which was very well represented in their wartime narrative, the RAF airman 
of the Second World War.35 Francis developed a fully rounded analysis based 
around the daily, personal and domestic lives of aircrew, as well as the traditional 
considerations given to military service. He concluded that the relationship 
between the ‘flyer’ and fear, aggression, loss and other elements of life reveal 
ambiguities between the reality of everyday experience and the expected 
understandings of masculinity.  
One of the key factors in the experience of the Korean War was the process of the 
war being forgotten. As Leed covered the ambivalence of society to the post-war 
 





veteran, this work has found that the same occurred for the veterans of Korea.36 
This part of the study looks more closely at the post-war representation of Korea 
and the veterans who fought there. Similar oral history studies exist covering the 
cases of other groups whose representation is not aligned with their post-conflict 
experiences. Penny Summerfield and Corinna Peniston-Bird, whose work 
Contesting Home Defence, examined amongst other things, the memories of men 
and women who served with the Home Guard and how they were represented 
throughout the Second World War and beyond.37 Whereas Summerfield and 
Peniston-Bird found that popular memory has indeed reflected public attitude 
towards the Home Guard, this study will demonstrate that popular memory 
became almost completely detached from the experience of the soldiers who 
fought in Korea. Similarly, in terms of representation, Linsey Robb, Juliette 
Patterson and Arthur McIvor’s work, Men in Reserve, found that the image of the 
‘soldier hero’ of the Second World War overshadowed and challenged the 
experience of civilian workers. This study found that the same effect was felt by 
the younger generation of men who would become the main body of soldiers 
fighting in Korea. Of course, many soldiers in Korea had previously fought in the 
Second World War, however, National Servicemen and newer recruits, 
continuously framed their experiences in relation to the mythos emanating from 
previous conflicts. This became increasingly evident in the years since the conflict, 
in which Korea veterans struggled to find recognition amongst the remembrance 
dedicated to the World Wars.  
It may be evident that what now exists is a wide field of work dissecting service 
persons’ experiences, encompassing virtually every aspect of the individual in 
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many conflicts.38 However, despite the disparate nature of the field, the experience 
of British Soldiers in Korea remains almost completely unexplored. One of the few 
historians who has covered British troops in Korea is Grace Huxford, whose work 
on the Korean War in Britain explores the social and cultural impact of the conflict 
on British society and in particular the effect of soldiers being sent to fight in the 
conflict so shortly after the Second World War had ended.39 Huxford’s work used a 
wide range of sources, including Mass Observation reports and even an 
examination of the Imperial War Museum’s sound archive to study the wider 
impact of the war on British society. Huxford was able to chart the perception of 
the conflict in British popular perception in the first true social history of the Korean 
War demonstrating the place of the conflict in a more apathetic light than its 
reputation in the Cold War narratives would hold. However, the primary focus of 
Huxford’s works is upon wider British culture and society as opposed to the 
frontline experiences of British soldiers. This study instead looks at similar trends 
from the other side of the world, examining the experience of the troops in Korea, 
rather than on the home front, for want of a better description. Additionally, this 
work will take a much closer look at the personal experience of the veterans in 
post-war society, rather than society itself. One of the important additions this 
study brings to the recent literature of the Korean War is the inclusion of 
testimonies from soldiers of various backgrounds and roles. Alongside the notion 
that the Korean War was a forgotten conflict, there is also a tendency to 
overemphasise the role played by National Servicemen in the conflict. This is a 
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trend which is not only present in popular narratives of the war, veterans 
publishing and even more recent historiography have tended to place a 
heightened emphasis on the presence of National Servicemen in Korea. This has 
led to what could be described as an overshadowing of the experiences of 
Regulars and Reservists who in fact made up the majority of the British contingent 
in Korea. This is not to undermine the significance of the contribution of National 
Servicemen to the war effort, rather it seeks to address the point that although 
Korea is often described as ‘The National Serviceman’s War’, National 
Servicemen were in fact a minority in the conflict, albeit a sizable one. 
In doing so this research differentiates itself from other recent pieces in the 
historiographic field of work, such as those by Grace Huxford and Vinen, in two 
key respects. Firstly, the otherwise excellent works produced by these authors is 
more focused on society in the UK through the paradigm of the National 
Serviceman in the Korean War. Their work, while addressing the individual 
experience of the soldier in Korea, uses it more for the perspective it gives of 
British society. The focus in both cases is not on the experiences of the soldier, 
but on life and society in 1950s Britain. While this work also uncovers important 
insights into wider British society in its course, its focus if far more on the soldiers 
themselves serving in Korea, rather than society on the home front. This is a 
significant addition to the body of literature on the Korean War as it is the first such 
work to centre first and foremost on the experience of the individual soldier in 
Korea. Moreover, by looking more widely at a cross section of British soldiers from 
across society and of different statuses within the army, this study further 
highlights the individual experiences of these men and reveals to a greater extent 
their own agency, opinions and reactions to the conflict in which they fought. By 




British participants in the Korean War, this work not only highlights that not all men 
fighting in Korea were there against their will, but it also directly challenges the 
notion that Korea was overwhelmingly a ‘National Serviceman’s war’, which has 
somewhat clouded popular memories of the war and further undermined the 
memory and the significance of the contribution made by Regular and Reservists 
to the conflict. Additionally, by examining this wider cross section of troops, this 
study is able to give a much more diverse range of views and opinions than those 
pieces which focus on National Servicemen alone. Solders with previous 
experience of conflict for example, would naturally have different opinions of Korea 
than National Servicemen deploying for the first time.   
A closer approximation for this study would be the work done by Emma Newlands. 
Newlands’ book, Civilians into Soldiers, focused an oral history approach on the 
conscripts and recruits of the British Army during the Second World War.40 
Through the paradigm of the body, it followed the experiences of these recruits 
chronologically from their initial enlistment through the processes of training, which 
transformed civilians into active service soldiers and on to their confrontations with 
wounding, death, fear and the coping mechanisms developed along the way. 
Newlands’ work used many of the same approaches as this study, drawing upon 
the personal testimonies of soldiers, as well as official records and sources, to 
argue that even within the confines of training, the experience of the Second World 
War recruit was not a simple case of army regulations, drill and discipline, but was 
one in which men were able to pursue their own agendas, developed their own 
bodily reactions and coping mechanisms, in some cases, in spite of army doctrine. 
Many of the conclusions drawn by this study coincide with those made by 
Newlands. This is perhaps unsurprising, given how little time had passed in 
 




between the focus of Civilians into Soldiers and the time of the Korean War. This 
study will detail how in those five years, little had changed in practical terms for the 
ways in which the British army trained its soldiers, despite attempts on paper to 
promote new ideologies and policies. Men were drilled, trained and disciplined in 
much the same way in 1950 as they had been in 1945, down to the same 
uniforms, equipment and in some cases, the same instructors. As may be 
expected, recruits responded in many of the same ways as described by 
Newlands. In the case of combat motivations and reactions to becoming National 
Servicemen, it may be expected that a fervour to fight the good fight in the Cold 
War, or liberate the nation of South Korea had become a key motivation, we 
instead see that just like the Second World War, individuals again pursued their 
own agendas and held their own interests.  
Consideration should also be given to a smaller, but also important body of writing 
on the Korean War, which exists in the form of works created by veterans and 
former servicemen as chronicles of their own experience and the war in general. 
As will be explored later, a major aspect of the experience of Korea veterans after 
the war was their efforts to take ownership of their status of being ‘forgotten’. With 
the formation of veterans’ groups and societies in the 1980s such as the British 
Korean Veterans Association (BKVA), former soldiers sought to co-construct their 
own literary perspective to the histories of the war. This coincided with the growth 
of new military history literature and developed adjacent to it as a distinct body in 
its own right. Between published memoirs, such as David Green’s Captured at the 




facilitated by the likes of the BKVA, the community of veterans has formed their 
own historiography of their experience.41  
In some instances veterans’ groups organised the collection of interview material, 
such as Stephen Kelly’s book British Soldiers Of the Korean War, which exists as 
a collection of veteran’s oral testimonies, similar to the BBC People’s War Project 
and the Imperial War Museum’s own collection of interviews.42 This body of 
veteran community writing has had a varied relationship with the body of academic 
history which developed alongside it. Some elements of it were created to provide 
additional context to older style military histories, existing as smaller parts of the 
grand narratives found in Hastings’s and Farrar- Hockley’s work.43 Others, like 
Green, sought to explain and examine ‘their Korea’, often with reference to wider 
narratives, but importantly putting their own experience at the centre of the 
broader historical account.44 The latter are particularly useful for studies like this 
one for exactly this reason. In attempting to reinsert their experiences into the 
narrative of what they perceive to be a forgotten war, veterans and their works 
provide a personal and candid voice that is relevant to this study, that being the 
experience of Korea as it was perceived by the soldiers themselves. The benefits 
of this are twofold: they open a window onto the soldiers’ time in Korea itself as 
they remember it, whilst also detailing their experience of Korea becoming the 
‘forgotten war’ in the narratives of subsequent years.  
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The first chapter of this study, ‘Life Before the Frontlines’, explores soldiers’ 
experiences before they reached the frontlines of the Korean Peninsula. 
Importantly, this chapter examines the beginnings of military experience from the 
perspective of regular volunteers and reservists as well as National Servicemen to 
give a more rounded view of their lives in training in Post- Second World War 
Britain, and on to their deployment to Korea. Through the recollections of these 
men, this chapter sheds new light on army life and wider British society in the post- 
war years. It will also show that although fewer than five years had passed 
between the end of the Second World War and the British Army’s deployment to 
Korea, there had supposedly been a significant shift in the ideological motivations 
behind the army’s training regime, most notably with the implementation of 
National Service. In keeping with its post-war commitments, the army of the late 
1940s and early 1950s sought to deliver a new generation of ‘citizen soldiers’, 
ready to serve in a new Cold War setting. This was a version of the notion subtly 
but significantly different from what had existed during the Second World War. 
This chapter examines the extent to which this change was merely political spin 
and how much it actually affected the experience of post-war training for the men 
themselves. Similarly, the differing initial reactions to joining the army will be 
explored, revealing wider post-war society’s varying appetites for further conflict. 
One of the key points of this chapter demonstrates is that even within the 
mechanisms of recruitment and National Service, new soldiers still maintained a 
level of agency and had far more diverse opinions of army life than the narrative of 
mass recruitment may lead one to believe. Analysis of recollections shows that 
whilst there were indeed recruits and National Servicemen who were pessimistic 




service, many individuals were happy to pursue the opportunities that army life 
provided. What stands out is the individuality and diversity of opinions on army life 
from National Servicemen, demonstrating that these men were primarily 
concerned with their own personal circumstances and agendas. This will show that 
amongst National Servicemen, there was little conformity to the patterns of the 
changes seen in post-war British Society and little fervour to become the army’s 
idealised soldiers. Recalled reservists and former soldiers returning to the ranks 
were similarly out of step with overarching notions and ideals of service. Some 
soldiers voluntarily re- joined the army for their own personal reasons, but those 
who were forcefully recalled were largely unenthusiastic at the prospect of 
returning to army life. From this we shall see not only the personal experiences of 
these men, but also how many people viewed a return to conflict in post- Second 
World War society. From here, the everyday methods of army control and 
uniformity over a former civilian’s life are highlighted through the lens of the men 
who experienced it first-hand. How civilians were made into soldiers through tight 
regulation of their every moment and movement from the second they arrived at 
their training depots. Methods of implementing control over soldiers’ minds and 
bodies did not reflect any social or political changes in post-war Britain and were 
mainly a continuation of what had occurred throughout the Second World War. 
Men’s bodies were completely subject to army control, in terms of physical health, 
controlled through rigorous fitness regimes and diets, as well as tight restrictions 
on the soldier’s time and space in the world. Following this, the social interactions 
of the men now in uniform but not yet deployed will be explored. National Service 
brought a wide diversity of men from various social backgrounds into close contact 
and this section will analyse how they sought to project their masculinity and 




Finally, this chapter illuminates the sorely underexplored matter of the experience 
of soldier’s deployment itself. Although for the most part there was little 
enthusiasm for the prospect of fighting in Korea surprisingly, some soldiers viewed 
the conflict as an attractive posting. In terms of travel and deployment, Korea was 
very much more akin to a far-flung colonial conflict and in most cases, British 
soldiers aboard aged troopships and commandeered German steamers had to 
endure an arduous crossing of six weeks or more. Conditions aboard these 
vessels were far from uniform but ranged from tolerable at best to vile at worst. 
This part of the men’s war, hitherto disregarded, is both microcosmic of the 
experiences of army life in general and significant to understanding the wider 
experience of a soldier in Korea. 
The second chapter of this work focuses exclusively on one element of the Korean 
War which has indeed been examined in traditional military histories, but remains 
misunderstood from the individual’s perspective. The frontline environment of the 
Korean War was one which has traditionally been considered only as a 
background to tactical and strategic studies of the war, rather than the hugely 
significant element of a soldier’s experience that it was. This chapter shows that 
the frontlines were not simply the background to a soldier’s life, but were an 
indelible part of their world. Additionally, we will see how the overwhelming 
dominance of the First and Second World Wars in subsequent narratives shaped 
the ways in which Korea veterans related and remembered their own experiences. 
The battlefield environment of Korea, is shown to be something of a duality. In the 
traditional strategic sense, Korea was a wholly new environment for the British 
Army. The rugged, mountainous terrain of the valleys and hills of Korea was 
unfamiliar to the army, as were the extreme weather patterns of the peninsula. 




experience over the previous fifty years could quite compare to Korea. However, 
from the viewpoint of the infantryman on the ground, the battlefields of Korea 
echoed strongly, their perception of the experience of the fighting man in the 
trenches of the First World War. Aside from some obvious physical comparisons 
which become apparent in examining soldiers’ testimonies, it is evident that the 
men on the frontline were also framing their experiences in the popular memories 
of the First World War. Consideration is given to this point, specifically how the 
contemporary popular narrative of war was still dominated by ‘the Somme and 
Passchendaele’, and how these images became how men in Korea related their 
own experiences. There are also many specific elements of the environment this 
chapter covers. Death and the presence of the deceased was a common feature 
of the frontlines of Korea. Particularly in the later stages of the war where lines 
were occupied for months at a time. Veterans of Korea placed the presence of 
death centrally in their memories of the frontline environment, in what was a 
reflection of recollection from the World Wars. A surprising difference between 
memories of Korea and the earlier wars however, is the perceived absence of the 
dead between the frontlines, showing that there were further still elements of the 
Korean experience that could not be related back by veterans.  This chapter also 
explores the importance of soldiers’ daily routines in the environment. Maintaining 
not only personal hygiene, but also the state of the frontline environment itself also 
proved as important a detail as the fighting itself for many soldiers. Similarly, 
soldiers had to make great efforts to maintain the upkeep of their positions. Just as 
was the case in the First World War, soldiers had to spend a great deal of time 
creating, maintaining and repairing the earthworks which protected them. Finally, 
an overlooked, yet self-evident, part of the frontline environment highlighted by this 




of Korea posed. This is an element of life which is generally taken as a given in 
traditional military histories; yet this chapter will show that for the troops on the 
ground, the threat to their safety the environment posed was very much 
acknowledged in their everyday experience. For the troops fighting in 1950s 
Korea, the smaller elements of the frontlines, overlooked by traditional military 
studies, were as significant a part of their environment as the hills and mountains 
with which they were surrounded.  
The third chapter provides an examination of that most central aspect to a fighting 
soldier’s role in war, combat. However, this is not a simple analysis of tactical 
manoeuvres and engagements as is primarily the case in the majority of existing 
studies of the Korean War. Instead, this chapter examines fighting from the 
perspective of what John Ellis described as ‘the poor bloody infantry’.45 Naturally, 
killing and combat have been subject to a great deal of study in new military 
history, however, by examining the new perspective provided by the recollections 
of Korea veterans, this study provides not only more material to do the same, but 
also hitherto unrecognised points in the historiography. How soldiers viewed and 
have continued to view their North Korean and Chinese opponents for example, is 
a key part of understanding how their oral testimony can shed light on not just 
Korea, but wider studies of fighting in the Twentieth Century. Unlike in many 
soldiers’ accounts of killing on the European battlefields of the First and Second 
World Wars in which their enemies were mainly relatable, the opposition in Korea 
were alien to British troops. Racial attitudes, a general apathy to the cause of the 
war and the manner in which fighting predominantly occurred shaped British 
soldier’s view of the enemy to allow them to speak of killing and combat in much 
more open and less reserved terms. There were many factors of the combat 
 




experience which could skew a soldier’s view of their enemy to a more 
dehumanised perspective. Most of the large-scale combat in Korea took place at 
long range or in the dark of the night against enemies barely visible as individual 
people. Even when the enemy was visible, but a part of a human wave attack, the 
numbers involved could individuality of an enemy to more of a general concept 
than a person. Veterans of fighting in these scenarios were less weighed down by 
the emotional strain of killing someone they perceived as an individual and were 
therefore able to discuss their combat experiences more freely. Again, this allows 
this study to view the wider concept of military killing from a much more open and 
unreserved perspective which can be applied more generally than Korea. The 
same was also true of men who fought as part of an armoured crew, where the 
mechanised nature of their actions and role as part of a group separated them 
from the humanity of their task. Of course, this was different for British troops who 
engaged in close quarters combat with an easily visualised opponent. Men who 
encountered the enemy like this were far more likely to develop a far more 
emotional response to the acts of killing and fighting individuals than those who 
had been unable to see their enemy. Having examined how soldiers viewed their 
enemy during the act of killing, this chapter will then moves on to examine how 
soldiers reacted to the fear of being killed or wounded themselves throughout the 
conflict. All soldiers on the frontline were constantly aware of the dangers posed to 
them. Some soldiers were struck down by this fear, losing control of their nerves 
and even bodily functions. In other cases, some soldiers, particularly those in 
leadership roles reacted to fear by trying to set examples to those around them 
deliberately doubling down on their task at hand to keep their minds occupied. 
Another reaction was deliberate nonchalance about the dangers posed to their 




only affected others and would deliberately abandon armour, helmets and even 
the safety of their lines in spite of instructions. Such actions often dropped off 
when members of their units were killed or wounded themselves. This study will 
then takes a novel approach to examine what the experience of combat was like 
for men who were not deployed to fight directly on the frontlines. These were 
personnel who were usually ‘behind the line’ and were not serving in a combat role 
when circumstances forced them into battle. Although these instances were rare, 
analysis of how these men reacted to the dangers of the battle in Korea provides a 
great insight into wider knowledge of combat in general. Some of these individuals 
became entranced by the alure of surviving danger and transferred to frontline 
roles. Others developed a new deeper sense of fear for their own personal safety 
when confronted with the effects of battle close up and changed their view of 
fighting entirely. In all these cases, a new deeper understanding of fighting is 
revealed by the oral testimonies of the soldiers who fought there, which helps to 
shed light on the wider experience of fighting troops throughout the Twentieth 
Century. 
 
The fourth chapter will then explore the manner in which soldiers responded to the 
stresses of combat and life on the frontline through social contact. This chapter 
primarily focuses upon the social experience of soldiers in Korea and recentring 
this important part of their lives in narratives of the war. Additionally, this allows the 
chapter to unveil new insights into wider British society and its relationship with 
soldiers abroad during this time. In the past, the social elements of life on the 
Korean frontline have been considered secondary to ongoing events on the field of 
battle. In keeping with what has been achieved by new military history with regards 




which the social lives of the soldiers, their shaped group behaviour, group identity 
and human bonds, were just as if not more important to them as any other part of 
the war around them. Though soldiers had begun bonding in the earliest days of 
their military careers, their deployment to the frontlines made this process all the 
more important and to a very personal extent. The experience of close living on 
the frontline, surviving together in combat and the necessary cooperation required 
by the daily tasks of the army all helped to develop an intricate social structure and 
brought men from all social backgrounds closer together. There was no greater 
demonstration of this than the importance of close friendships and social groups to 
soldiers. Friendships were amongst the strongest and most important social 
mechanisms for dealing with the stresses of life on the frontline and soldiers 
ensured that they remained close to their friends whenever possible. Friend 
groups and mates were as much a part of soldier’s lives as their dugouts and daily 
routines and stuck together like childhood friends. They ate, lived and slept 
alongside each other for social comfort whenever possible and provided one and 
other with support. The kinds of close emotional and personal care these groups 
provided for one and other was hugely significant to their experiences. These 
behaviours ranged from ensuring that each man in the group had high morale and 
was cared for. Soldiers who were unable to integrate into a close social group 
found the stresses and insecurities of life in the trenches and dugouts of the 
frontline to be considerably more difficult and sought out emotional connections 
wherever they could. In some instances, social care was more parental than 
brotherly. In particular, the notion of communal ‘mothering’, where soldiers would 
adopt traditionally parental roles behaviours to look after one and other, is a 
phenomenon that was as common in Korea. Some soldiers, particularly officers 




similar manner to parents. They scolded poor behaviour, looked out for younger 
troops and ensured care was distributed. Soldiers looked up to these individuals 
and spoke of them highly, as if they would a parent. These behaviours were not 
always selfless, tank crews for example saw to it that their driver was cared for 
most as he had the most responsibility in combat for ensuring the groups safety. 
Regardless of the intent however, these social support structures were beneficial 
to soldiers for the most part but this was not always the case. This chapter also 
reveals the extent to which the identities and expected behaviours of society in the 
1950s played into an individual’s experience on the Korean frontlines. Group 
hierarchies and social dynamics and self-perception demanded that men behaved 
in certain expected ways.  Essentially, some soldiers were consciously adopting 
warped self-views in order to better personify the idea of a soldier to themselves. 
In either to portray any number of self-images, be they masculinity, courage or 
national identity, soldiers would deliberately hide their true reactions and emotions 
in order to reinforce an imagined self-image to their social group. We will see from 
this that even as far away as Korea, ideas about how an individual should behave 
in a British social setting were persuasive. The ways in which soldiers in Korea 
forged their social bonds will also be examined in this chapter. Group acquisition 
and consumption of drinks such as tea and alcohol acted as a social bonding 
exercise between soldiers. These activities provided both a direct coping 
mechanism to provide a comfort from the more difficult aspects of frontline life and 
also worked as social currency. As the British Army was one of the few forces in 
Korea still receiving alcohol as part of troops’ rations, it was in relative abundance 
and could be gifted as a reward, used to steady the nerves or simply traded for 
goods. Additionally, this chapter further examines how the social lives of troops on 




life in Britain. For soldiers in Korea, post and long-range communication was a 
very important element in their social routine, whether they were active letter 
writers or not. The methods of communication home and their respective 
importance to both soldiers and their loved ones in Britain formed an important 
part of the wider social experience. The post not only provided a social lifeline to 
families and friends, but its arrival prompted an opportunity for communal 
gathering as well. Even a month out of date, football scores and comics alike were 
shared up and down the trenches. This shows the importance of home to the 
soldiers in Korea and provide a deeper understanding of how the people of Britain 
were intimately linked to their loved ones serving abroad. A final point of this 
chapter is an analysis of the social activity soldiers conducted whilst on leave. 
Whether healing from wounds or recuperating from time on the front, men who 
took leave in Japan experienced a much greater freedom of social activities than 
was available to them in Korea. These activities could range from the mundane 
such as visiting friends or cultural trips, to illicit engagement with prostitutes. This 
reveals how the army’s attitudes to leave were shaped by not only fears of ‘social 
mixing’ and the possibilities of venereal diseases, but also by a strengthened 
desire to ensure the welfare of its soldiers away from the frontlines. 
Finally, the fifth examines the post- Korea experience of British soldiers. Like many 
aspects of the individual in the Korean War, this post-war history remains largely 
overlooked. Although Grace Huxford has written on the wider societal 
repercussions of how the Korean War came to be the archetypal ‘forgotten war’, 
the first-hand experience of the soldiers has yet to be considered by most 
scholarly writings.46 This chapter highlights how life for Korea veterans existed in a 
society already well accustom to re-integrating former soldiers, sailors and airman. 
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The unceremonious end of fighting in distant Korea was only eight years after the 
end of the Second World War and general attitudes to the war itself were largely 
apathetic. Given the proximity of the Second World War and society’s lack of 
interest in Korea, it is perhaps unsurprising that representations of the conflict 
were mostly overshadowed by media relating to the much more edifying victory in 
1945. In British popular culture and society at large, Korea was quietly forgotten. 
Having explored how this happened, the chapter examines what it was like for 
veterans to find themselves in this society, being forgotten first hand. Obviously, 
close friends and family were very aware of their efforts, but in the face of wider 
societal apathy, many men experienced huge difficulties reintegrating to civilian 
life. Again, in the cases of other conflicts, the social and emotional difficulties of 
ex-soldiers’ reintegration have been well covered. Michael Roper and Joanna 
Burke, amongst many others, have written at length on the return of the soldier 
from the First and Second World Wars.47 This chapter then shows that veterans of 
Korea, like the generations before them, also faced difficult social struggles in the 
face of a seemingly indifferent society; in many cases these men had been 
removed from their formative years and prospective careers by National Service, 
only to lose out on their return from action. Unresolved social issues were common 
and symptoms of what would be today classified as Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD), such as horrific and violent nightmares, were common in 
veterans for years, sometimes decades after the war’s end. These issues 
contributed to social isolation and difficulties for many, leading them to alcohol and 
substance abuse, without any formal support structures available to them. In these 
circumstances, it fell to family, friends and other veterans to support one and 
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other. Finally, this chapter demonstrates how veterans associations and 
organisations formed in the post- Korea years and sought to reclaim the place of 
their veterans in the narrative of the Korean War. A reoccurring theme of the post- 
conflict narratives of Korea is the extent to which the war itself and its participants 
were collectively forgotten by society. In response to and defiance of this, 
organisations such as the BKVA began to claim ownership of the moniker, as is 
evidenced in the body of work constituting veterans’ publishing. A further role of 
veteran’s organisations that this chapter will examine is their action in allowing 
veterans to revisit and re-remember Korea in peacetime. With help from the South 
Korean government, the effect these trips have on veterans and their attitudes to 




Chapter 2: Life before the Frontlines. 
 
The Ideologies Behind Training  
 
One of the most fundamental parts of the experience for all men who served in 
Korea was their initial contact with military life and training. At first it may seem that 
examining the experiences of men in training in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
would yield little new knowledge about army life or British Society, given how short 
a time had passed since the end of the Second World War and how training 
regimes had gone basically unchanged. However, what new recruits said of their 
initial time in training can actually give us a tremendous new perspective of not 
only the men’s experience, but also a new context to the early days of the Cold 
War in Post- War Britain. However, before looking into the individual opinions of 
the soldiers, there are overarching aspects of Post Second World War training that 
need to be considered. 
On paper, the very ideology behind training in the British army was quite different 
from how it had existed in the Second World War. There were two alternate 
motivations behind training following the introduction of National Service. Officially, 
the motivations behind army training and National Service were purely pragmatic. 
When the Labour Government introduced the National Service Act in 1947, it was 
stringently maintained as being vital for national defence as Britain’s ongoing 
military commitments around the world in the wake of the Second World War could 
only be met effectively with the reintroduction of National Service in peacetime. In 
a time hallmarked by military shrinkage, National Service was billed as being a 




political motivations.1 However, at a conceptual level, the reintroduction of 
obligatory service in the armed forces was a much more complicated matter. On 
the one hand there was a strong political motivation behind National Service. 
Aside from the military applications of National Service, there was a desire to 
develop a generation of young men entering the army into effective ‘civilian 
soldiers’. What this ideology aimed to create was characterised by the ideal of a 
serviceman who in their temporary posting as a soldier, became fitter, better 
educated and more effective in society and importantly, recognised their wider role 
in a societal context.2 This domestic and social implication of National Service 
became clear very early on, with some commentators describing the new body of 
recruits as a ‘Citizen Army in the old traditions’ as early as 1948.3 However, this 
side of National Service was less to do with using these men’s brief time to create 
an army of ‘citizen soldiers’, but rather to develop them through military service 
into better civilians later. High ranking members and former members of the 
government described National Service in terms of its use in domestic affairs, such 
as helping to maintain employment levels and its usefulness as a form of mass 
education.4 Indeed, the educational aspect of general military service was pushed 
to such an extent that the army created several Preliminary Education Centres. 
These centres were aimed at alleviating the problems caused by disruption to 
schooling by the Second World War, such as poor literacy amongst some recruits 
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and partially aimed at developing a sense of citizenship amongst their attendees. 
Discussion forums, engagement with political debates and a motivation that an 
understanding of British democracy underpinned the ‘modern thinking soldier’ 
were all elements used to develop National Servicemen into better civilians after 
their service had ceased.5 The other principle behind National Service was relative 
to ideas forming in the US. This was to create an army of ‘Cold War warriors’, a 
body of combat ready soldiers eager to defend British values in the face of a 
growing communist threat.6 This framing of ideologically motivated soldiers 
became especially apparent in recruiting alongside of National Service. In its own 
recruitment pamphlets, the British Army had begun to start framing it’s new post-
war form in terms of ‘giving the opportunity for service to Country and the Cause of 
Humanity’.7 The implication therefore, that the new opposition of communism 
represented a threat to country and the causes of humanity. This way of thought 
behind army training in the late 1940s, which carried on throughout the Cold War, 
was the desire to develop a strong-willed belief in soldiers that the general threat 
of global communism was as severe as that which had been posed by Nazi 
Germany. In this line of thinking, the soldier would be imbued to defend the 
somewhat vague idea of a ‘British’ or more generally ‘Western’ way of life against 
communism and represent what would later be termed a ‘Cold War warrior’. It 
could easily be argued that this ideal was successfully applied to the soldiers who 
ended up fighting the Korean War. The war was and still is legitimised to the 
British public as having been to defeat a wider global communist threat to the 
interests of Britain and her allies and was thereby framed as being in defence of 
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the British way of life. Indeed, some soldiers did reflect upon their enemy in terms 
of fighting communism.8 However, upon examining the recollections of the men 
who went through their training and their pre-war experiences, the reality of army 
life before deployment was far more pragmatic than political. On the whole, life in 
the British Army before the Korean War was much the same as it had been in the 
early 1940s. There were of course some differences, on a practical note John Ellis 
made the case that in terms of equipment, tactics and expertise, the British Army 
at the end of the Second World War was at a more sophisticated level than at any 
other point in its history thus far.9 Following the lessons learned throughout the 
1940s, the British soldier of the 1950s had to master complex equipment and 
small unit tactics in the field, whilst also demanding immediate discipline to 
command. At the same time, troops had to be proficient in the use of modern and 
advanced equipment ranging from self-propelled artillery to portable radios to light 
machineguns and grenades. In short, the levels of skill and training expected of 
the mid-century British Infantryman would have been completely bewildering to 
past generations of the army10. However, many of the practices required to 
implement this remained basically unchanged. Many aspects of army life remained 
completely unchanged and the army’s training policies remained much more 
focused upon simply making disciplined soldiers rather than pushing towards any 
specific ideals. The results of this were born out with news of the Korean War’s 
start. Most soldiers met the news of the war with various reactions, from an 
apathetic disinterest to an enthusiasm to see action, but only rarely from any 
desires to follow citizenly duty or to defeat the evils of global communism. In short, 
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the experience of soldiers training for Korea was more their own personal 
continuation of Second World War training, than a reflection of new post-war 
values.  
Motivations and Reactions Towards Service 
The initial experience of the Korean War soldier was not uniform and began in 
numerous ways. Some men had many years of service under their belts when 
they were martialled to Korea, others were new soldiers, enlisted or called up in 
the years during and immediately prior to the war itself. In the latter case, their 
experience of the Korean War began with their motivations for and reactions to 
first joining the army. What they describe of their time is reflective both of their own 
experiences and of how the new social rhetoric behind army training actually 
impacted the men themselves. Grace Huxford suggests that one of the defining 
traits of military training in the late 1940s and early 1950s was an attempt to 
develop a generation of post-war ‘civilian soldiers’ motivated by wider social 
changes in post-war Britain. She argues that this was evident in the very 
mechanisms of National Service itself and how it processed, quantified, utilised 
and cultivated men in compulsory service to become ‘citizen soldiers’.11 Of course, 
the term ‘citizen soldier’ is not a straightforward concept; it carries many different 
connotations to different people in different times and as such it can be difficult to 
understand what this meant in 1950 for National Servicemen during their basic 
training. Huxford suggests that the concept had evolved through the First and 
Second World Wars in Britain, away from a matter of purely national duties and 
civic participation as it had existed in the 19th century, to a more specific entity.12 
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The very nature of this system and its inherent goal was to train soldiers, who 
encompassed traditional ideas of soldierly duty whilst in service, improving upon 
their skill set as individuals for post-service life. To an extent this was driven by 
changing ideologies in post-war Britain. We can see across wider society that 
significant actions were being taken in the direction of public service, most notably 
the foundation of the National Health Service. However, although it is clear to see 
that ideas on public service and the duty of government organisations to its 
citizens were at large in post- war society, the impact these wider ideals had on 
the day to day experience of military life was less noticeable. Whatever the 
motivations were behind the policy, to the individual, the experience of compulsory 
enlistment was more to do with their own personal circumstances than any wider 
socio-political ideals. 
For National Servicemen, their call up and subsequent training represented less of 
an opportunity for patriotic duty and was more of a break from their planned 
civilian lives. Of course, not all individuals viewed their call up in a negative light. It 
is true that many men were resentful of the disruption to their young lives and 
some struggled with the loss of individuality in the face of regulations and 
uniformity. Others however, welcomed this as an opportunity, finding that National 
Service improved their current situation and prospects. What is conspicuously 
lacking in most accounts however, are any notions pertaining to the concept of 
becoming a citizen soldier and similarly absent is any mass fervour to counter the 
perceived threat of communism. If men reacted to enlistment without pretentions 
to being citizen soldiers or warriors of the Cold War, what were their motivations 
and reactions? For men like Joseph Strode, who ended up in the King’s Regiment 




tradition of serving alongside ones friends, rather than for a greater cause of 
citizenly duty:  
My Dad got me a job on the railways. It was a government job which is why 
I didn’t go into National Service when I was eighteen. If I’d gone then, in 
1948, I’d have probably missed Korea. I wanted to go, all the friends I had 
went into the army when they turned eighteen and I wanted to get in there. 
It was only a couple weeks after I left the railways that I got my call up 
papers.13  
Strode’s initial reaction to National Service and towards his reserved occupation 
on the railways, was resentment that he could not go in with his friends when he 
turned eighteen. He felt that he was being excluded from his friendship group and 
being left behind on account of his reserved occupation. Strode felt eager to join 
them in 1948 and that his occupation, which by nature of being reserved indicated 
it was an important duty, was holding him back and leaving him left out. This is a 
theme in keeping with the image of military service which had been built between 
the Second World War and the later period and represents an underappreciated 
continuity between these times. Linsey Robb’s work encapsulated how post-war 
representations of military service were tied into portrayals of masculinity and 
manliness, whereas men in civilian roles were left out of the wartime story.14 In 
essence, the roles of reserved occupations and the people employed in them, 
were quite literally left out. For Strode, it seems that this was precisely the case. 
Strode was more concerned with being alongside his friends and not being left out, 
than serving for serving’s sake. A similar case to Strode was that of William Clark, 
who was called up under similar circumstances but took a much more pessimistic 
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view of National Service on account of the low wages compared to his civilian 
prospects.  
I was called up in May 1950. I should’ve gone in 48, but because I was a 
Bricklayers Apprentice, you could put it back 2 years, so I was 20 when I 
did my National Service. I would’ve liked to have avoided it because the 
money was not much good.15  
Clark was more begrudging in his take on National Service than Strode. Both 
cases demonstrate a lack of citizenly soldier ideals, but whereas Strode actively 
wanted to join his friends after his reserved occupation, Clark wished he could 
have avoided National Service altogether. This is hardly surprising given the effort 
Clark had put into his apprenticeship, only to be forced into the army regardless 
and demonstrates how far removed some individuals could be from welcoming 
ideas of national duty.  
There were of course cases where an individual was made to feel the pressure of 
the notion of citizenly duty in order to sign up. However, the men in question still 
had to frame their response in personal terms. Malcolm Frost, having just left 
school in 1951, was looking to enter further education and found that doing 
National Service could provide him with an opportunity to further his pursuit of 
academia in spite of his lower grades: 
Leaving school, my grades weren’t quite what I needed to get to my 
university choice. So, I could do my National Service now, or defer it and go 
to teacher training college. The chap at Cambridge said to me they would 
not have accepted me straight from school anyway. He was a First World 
War veteran, he’d been wounded in a tank during the war. When I did my 
interview, I told him that after I did National Service, I’d like to go into 
education and his reaction was that it was ‘a fine call, get out and join the 
infantry and then we’ll take you on.16 
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In Frost’s case, starting National Service sooner was presented to him as an 
alternative to a teacher training course and a pathway to further academia. It 
would seem that the professor at Cambridge discussing Frost’s predicament 
considered National Service as something which would have elevated Frost to a 
point where he could be taken on as a student. What was therefore being 
presented to Frost was an outright example of how military service would make 
him more valued as a citizen, especially in the eyes of a First World War veteran. 
It is telling that this was presented to Frost by someone who had already been a 
part of the British military. The fact that the place at Cambridge was offered 
towards a period of National Service over Frost’s alternative of a teaching course, 
demonstrates the extent to which service was valued in a society where significant 
numbers of older generations had themselves been militarised. For Frost’s part, he 
did indeed start his National Service rather than defer it, however it was in order to 
facilitate the appearance of a citizen soldier, jumping through the hoop as it were, 
instead of genuine citizenly duty.  
Of course, there were some who did fall into the idealised image of the happy 
citizen soldier, however even in these cases personal matters were the priority for 
the man at hand. One such case was David Green, called up in early 1950, who 
was amongst the body of young men who actively looked forward to National 
Service. In his memoirs, he reflected on his life prior to National Service on his first 
day and the opportunity to improve upon it provided by the army: 
I looked back over the past few years, which certainly had their ups and 
downs. I reflected that today I was setting out on a new life and one into 
which I was determined to put my heart and soul. All those blots on my 
copy book, such as my recent spell in Gloucester Jail for theft, would be 
water under the bridge.17  
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For Green, the army provided a new life away from past mistakes and a meaning 
and structure, into which he could truly and determinately apply himself. Of course, 
this attitude was not unique to the generation of soldiers and National Servicemen 
who would end up fighting in Korea, nor is it a newly observed phenomenon. 
Denis Winter noted that as far back as the initial recruitment of Kitchener’s armies 
in the opening of the First World War, there were those men who responded to the 
demands of the army’s regime by aligning their goals with army life. In doing so, 
these men would find dignity and self-respect by becoming the ‘smart saluters, 
who might well become NCOs’.18 The difference in these cases to those observed 
by Winter, is that the post-war generation, especially before the outbreak of the 
Korean conflict, had no great war to fight. Even during the conflict, Korea never 
developed the great national callings seen during the First and Second World War. 
Yet for men like Green, their enthusiasm for army life did not require the zeal of a 
national emergency. So, do these happily conscripted men represent at last a 
significant step towards citizen soldiers? For the most part, they did not and this is 
evidenced in Green’s recollections. As much as he was willing to throw himself at 
being a citizen soldier, it was still for personal reasons, not duty driven. Primarily, 
Green was happy as it allowed him to avoid stagnation as a person. On this note 
he added, ‘Before I had received my call up papers, I had been growing 
increasingly unsettled and bored, constantly seeking something I could really get 
stuck into’19. From this, we can see that Green viewed National Service as a 
personal escape from boring circumstances, not a grand patriotic undertaking or 
even an adventure, but simply an alternative to what he was already bored of. 
What the views of Green and men like him show, is that in Post- Second World 
War Britain, most individuals had not yet entered into a ‘Cold War’ way of thinking. 
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Notable for its absence in all of these testimonies is a sense of patriotic gesture. 
There is little to no expression of a need to defend one’s country or fight the good 
fight as was seen during the Second World War and neither was there shown any 
great concern for what we now see as the early days of the Cold War. For the 
average new recruit into the British Army in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the 
context of the new and changing post war world as we see it now was simply 
secondary to personal affairs. This was also something evident in the testimonies 
of reservist troops and veterans who re-entered the army during these years.  
Veteran and Reservist Reactions to the Post-War British Army 
When the British Army ran its recruitment campaigns in the late 1940s, highly 
prominent was the pamphlet The Army, A Modern Career. The booklet published 
by the War Office and covered in cutting edge graphic artwork, proudly proclaimed 
it would be an Army ‘in which the most modern developments, not only in weapons 
and equipment, but also in organisation and administration, will find full place’ and 
‘above all, soldiering gives the opportunity for Service to the Country and to the 
cause of humanity and justice’.20 These are both prominent talking points in the 
narratives of creating citizen soldiers and furthermore, the booklet opens with a 
specific appeal to former soldiers who ‘served during the emergency and wish to 
re-join’.21 Clearly, the ideals aimed towards the development of citizen soldiers 
was also being directed at returning soldiers and veterans. If any great ideological 
change towards creating citizen soldiers had therefore occurred, it would have 
been evidenced in the recollections of those such men who had already served 
prior to the Korean War. However, in these cases, there is again a distinct lack of 
evidence to suggest such a change in army mentality ever occurred and for the 
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most part they serve to suggest a system of continuity, rather than a new shift in 
organisation and administration.  
In a prime case of continuity regarding motivations for serving, many veterans 
were happy to re-join the army simply to continue being soldiers. Lieutenant John 
Shipster, who had served with the Indian Army through the Burmese campaign in 
the Second World War, transferred to the Middlesex Regiment for just this reason:  
I joined the Middlesex very soon after returning from Burma to England, I’d 
been in the Punjab Regiment during the (Second World) War. I’d still, as 
always wanted to be a regular soldier and it was not possible for me to stay 
with the Indian Army, so I applied for a regular commission in the British 
Army. I attended a selection board and was then later given a commission 
in the Middlesex Regiment.22 
Shipster represents something of an archetypal career soldier, but not in the 
mould of a citizen soldier or for any Cold War ideology. For Shipster, his decision 
to re-enlist as an officer was more to do with remaining a soldier than with the 
sorts of citizenly duty the army was hoping to entice people with. He did not 
reference any desire to serve for country or the causes of humanity, but rather he 
just wanted to stay in an armed force. This is evidenced further by his clear 
preference would have been to remain with the post-independence Indian Army 
and only joined the British Army as the former avenue was closed to him. Other 
former serviceman, such as William Fox, were also motivated by older 
mechanisms, such as chasing a sense of adventure. Fox had attempted to 
volunteer as a regular soldier in 1948, however he was instead taken on as a 
National Serviceman, remaining in England throughout. Having finished his stint in 
National Service when the Korean War broke out, Fox readily volunteered:  
They asked for volunteers who had just come out of the army. I volunteered 
for eighteen months. For me, going to this place I’d never heard of on the 
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other side of the world, fighting under General MacArthur, it seemed like a 
marvellous adventure.23 
Fox wanted to re-enlist for a sense of adventure and to see a new part of the 
world, again, a very old thought process rather than any new social motivation.  
To an extent there was a significant number of reactions to returning which 
completely reject the ideas of national duty as citizen soldiers, particularly amongst 
men who were recalled to service. Thomas McMahon for example, was a reservist 
in 1950 who had formerly been a machine gunner and POW during the Second 
World War. Having survived the Siege of Tobruk, internment in the infamous 
Stalag POW camps, a death march to Czechoslovakia and several escape 
attempts, McMahon was called up as a reinforcement to Korea, despite his 
previous and lengthy service. Understandably, both he and his wife were very 
upset by the circumstances: 
I was on reserve, just waiting to finish my time with the army, I’d had 
enough of it. Then 1950 came and they recalled me for the Korean War. I 
had to go, I was on reserve, I were still a soldier, couldn’t refuse I had to go. 
It wasn’t just me but it was how my Misses felt, she was angry, because we 
hadn’t long been married.24 
Understandably, both McMahon and his new wife were very angry about his recall. 
This was not least because they had only been married for a short time when 
Thomas was sent to Korea. This lines up with another phenomenon Huxford 
describes in regards to family reactions to the outbreak of the war. For 
understandable reason, female family members were just as, if not more opposed 
to their husbands and sons being sent to Korea than the men themselves.25 In this 
case, the McMahon family’s strain was exaggerated beyond that by the fact that 
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they were newlyweds when he was called up. The obligation of a ‘citizen soldier’ 
was in this case was actively detrimental to his personal circumstances.  
For a small percentage of men, in such difficult circumstances, the answer to the 
call up in 1950 was to desert, or at least not to report for duty when summoned. 
Although desertion and absenteeism was nothing new in 1950, having been noted 
for centuries and actively recorded throughout the Twentieth Century, as might be 
expected, the onset of the Korean War did herald a significant increase in 
desertion rates.26 Parliamentary findings in 1950 showed that just over three 
quarters of deserters from the British Army were National Servicemen.27 
Furthermore, the Secretary of State for War, Antony Head, claimed that there were 
four hundred and thirty new men absent from duty in the year 1950.28 However, 
the numbers are not quite that simple to fully understand for various reasons. 
Whilst the rise in absentees in 1950 was still much more significant that it had 
been in 1949, when National Service was formally reinstated, the same statistics 
shown to the House of Commons also indicate that it was a far lower number of 
desertions than the army had suffered in 1948, when almost one thousand men 
were absent from duty.29 Additionally, the British Army’s official definition of 
deserter was not the same as an absentee. By military law, a deserter was defined 
as a soldier whose purpose was to remain away permanently from military 
responsibilities and would be treated much more harshly than an absentee. An 
absentee was considered to be someone who had temporarily left their post 
without leave, known as going AWOL and so would usually not be criminally 
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charged, though they would still face punishment.30 In short, not all of the men 
Parliament considered to have been absentees were in fact deserters and 
eventually returned to their posts.  
One man who fell afoul of the army’s approach to absenteeism and desertion was 
Ronald Pickering, then a soldier who had only just become a reservist days 
before. Pickering was mistakenly considered AWOL whilst he was returning home 
from his initial posting in Germany:  
I got home and there were all these letters, calling me back to active 
service. I wasn’t in the house a full day before these two lads, MPs [Military 
Policemen], show up. I tried explaining, but they said I’d had enough time 
putting it off and that I had to come with them right there on the spot or I’d 
be court-marshalled. I asked if I could at least wait until my wife comes in 
and explain it all to her and pack my things, but they wouldn’t have it. So, 
they march me off, down the station and put me on the next train leaving. I 
just got off at the next stop, about three miles on and walked home. I ended 
up staying three more days before I left and showed up in my own time, 
nobody seemed to notice.31  
Pickering details how he nearly experienced the more forceful side of military 
discipline due to the administrative error and how seriously AWOL could be taken 
by the army in such circumstances. Pickering was more disgruntled than outright 
angry, as McMahon had been and his reaction indicated how seriously he took the 
incident. In spite of the severity of the MPs, according to Pickering no one on the 
base seemed to have actually noticed his lateness and he resumed his service 
from there with no ill effect. Again, what is clearly shown in all of these cases is 
that personal circumstances were overwhelmingly more important to soldiers than 
either the context of the Cold War or any notions of post war citizenry. This may 
seem to be a statement of the obvious, however it must be remembered that the 
context of not only the Korean War, but also the wider Cold War has never been 
considered from these men’s points of view. Bearing the experiences of these men 
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in mind, it seems more than likely that individual concern about the Cold War was 
less significant than it may seem on a wider international level.   
The Implementation of Army Control  
In terms of what the British Army itself desired from its new source of recruits, it 
seems that it was more concerned with the practical realities of disciplining men 
and pragmatic training protocols over new social ideology. Regardless of their 
attitudes to enlistment and as had been the case in the previous World War, in 
1950 soldiers from all backgrounds in training faced a programme, designed not 
only to control their physical standards, but also their very life in terms of time and 
space.32 Regardless of whether a new recruit had been drafted as a National 
Serviceman, or volunteered as a full time soldier, the British Army’s first action with 
them was to strip away their individual identity as much as possible and impose 
their unit identity. Of course, in 1950 this was generally nothing new, though there 
were new elements which had emerged since the Second World War. One such 
example of this was the new policy on medical examination, known as the 
Pulheems system, adopted by all branches of the military since April 1948. This 
system graded various physical attributes of potential enlistees in numeric value, 
ranging from one to eight. Ben Perry found that his medical gradings blocked his 
request to join his preferred service. ‘I really wanted to join the Royal Navy. I was 
sent to Worchester for my medical and I was temporarily accepted, but eventually, 
along came this letter saying my classification was rejected and I was instead 
being called up to the army’.33 From there, Perry ended up in the General Service 
Corps, where the numerical grading of his person became more extreme. ‘They 
assessed you, but it depended upon what they were looking for at the time. They’d 
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give you maths to see how thick you were and then they’d make you assemble 
bicycle pumps or door locks, that sort of thing’.34 Perry’s account shows how much 
the soldier’s early experience was dictated by grading and assessment. 
Essentially, the army could not decide what to do with him until he had been 
thoroughly assessed, from basic health to mathematics and even how quickly 
Perry could assemble simple machines. In other cases, the army was far less 
stringent and picky than it had been for Perry. As was the case with Joseph 
Strode’s medical: ‘I fainted at my medical, which wasn’t a good start. We were all 
standing in a line and I started sweating and collapsed. Anyway, I got through and 
they sent me off to Chester for my basic training’.35 Despite the obsessive 
collection of data regarding a new recruit, their experience would indicate that it 
was all irrelevant in the end, as they were remodelled from recruits into soldiers. 
 
One of the first forms of control the army exerted over individuals was drill. Just as 
they had during the Second World War, in the time of the Korea army training 
manuals still stated that ‘in order for a soldier to reach his maximum potential, he 
will thus become competent to play his full part in the teamwork of his sub-unit in 
battle.’36. Some of the techniques used by the army to achieve this are detailed by 
Newlands at length.37 The use of uniform, drill, team sports, group responsibilities, 
all fostered a controlled group identity. From a soldier’s first moments in the army, 
drill and uniformity were used as a primary component in encouraging collective 
discipline. As much as the monotony of drill created the learned instinct to 
automatically follow orders, vital for military coordination, it also required a state of 
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group trust and created a sense of group pride. In this sense, drill was as much a 
part of military identity as any uniform or standard. Ron Sullivan, recalled how he 
developed a particular fondness for drill and uniformity during his training, 
specifically how it fostered group co-responsibility: 
Drill was fantastic I loved it. When we were on parade, they’d always say, 
‘well done Sullivan’, because my uniform was always pressed and 
immaculate […] The thing with the drill and all of it was that we were thirty-
one men and it made you act as one. If on inspection the sergeant came, if 
one of you was bad, it was all of you was bad. He don’t get punished, you 
all get punished. 38 
There are implications that can be gleamed from Sullivan’s reflection on drill, 
particularly the group responsibility regarding uniform and presentation. If one man 
was bad on the drill square, the whole group received punishment. Aside from the 
element to which this created group responsibility, it also placed the welfare of 
others in the interests of the individual. In essence, this incentivised soldiers within 
a unit to interact, encourage and support each other.  
Once a group identity had been created, the nature of how men were mixed into 
regiments composed of individuals from around Britain had a great effect on how 
they behaved. Even in the early stages of training, this was a strong motivator for 
changes in social behaviour. Sullivan for example, recounted how his experience 
of mixing with others in the barracks changed his attitudes towards education. In 
the thirty-man group, he found that having to work closely with people with higher 
levels of education had a profound effect on his own self-view and encouraged 
him to volunteer for the army’s remedial education courses:  
I could read and write but not all that good and when I joined the army and 
from the first minute, I was mixing with guys who’d, well they’d not been to 
university, but had good schooling and could read a book and understand it 
and write nice letters. I looked at them and I thought, ‘God, I’ve wasted so 
much time, I need to get cracking’. So suddenly I was mixing with different 
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types of people, people who were getting nice parcels from home, nice 
cakes we’d share or whatever and I thought I need to be like them.39 
What his account tells us is that once he was made to interact closely with people 
who had a higher level of education, he became very conscious of how his own 
education was holding him back and limiting his ability to integrate with the group. 
The implications that suddenly he was ‘mixing with people who were getting nice 
parcels’, indicates that by changing his educational position, he was better able to 
align his social interactions with people he considered more educated. In doing so 
he was apparently successful in improving his relations with these people and that 
he was able to partake in social bonding activities such as sharing gifted food. Of 
course, the desire to integrate into a social group is nothing new in wartime, or 
even particular to British troops. Peter Cooke noted American soldiers in the First 
World War exhibiting similar behaviours. This included the old trope of denying 
promotion to remain in the same social group as one had been trained in.40 
However, the need to shape one’s social behavior to fit in with the group was not 
limited to educational status or training.  
Another area of British Army life which saw little change between the Second 
World War and the Korean War was the emphasis training placed on health and 
fitness. The reasons for this are relatively self-explanatory, as it was always in the 
army’s best interests to maintain healthy soldiers who were physically ready for 
the necessities of frontline combat, both in terms of physical fitness and diet, all 
British soldiers had to experience the often gruelling processes of Physical 
Training (PT), in order to meet the army’s basic levels of fitness. In the 1950s, as it 
had in the Second World War, the army would push new recruits to their physical 
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limits as often as possible in order to prepare them for the eventualities of battle. 
However, it was not limited to simple route marches and drill. Physical fitness had 
become a complex and engineered matter long before the need to train men for 
Korea. The British Army had been refining its process for building men’s fitness 
since the inter-war years. Physical fitness and nutrition during training had been 
refined to a set level by the Second World War, with recruits being given between 
four and five thousand calories of food and strict exercise every day. However, to 
accommodate for vast numbers of National Servicemen from a wide background 
of health and the general concept of a ‘people’s war’, the army had stepped up its 
efforts in terms of getting soldiers fit.41 This policy is best demonstrated in the 
establishment of Physical Development Centres. These special camps were 
implemented in order to raise those men considered well below the army’s normal 
standards up to a basic level of fitness. By carefully controlling recruits’ diets and 
physical training, the army was able to train almost any civilian off the street, even 
those it would previously have passed up on, to a high standard. The Physical 
Development Centres remained active in the 1950s, demonstrating that the army 
still pursued the ideal of physically improving their entire intake for the Korean 
War’s generation of soldiers. The stated goal of the army’s fitness regime at this 
time was to ‘raise recruits efficiency and render them fit for more strenuous and 
active employment’.42 
Soldiers in 1950 were met with the practical realities of this policy almost 
immediately upon their entry to the army. David Green recalled how, before even 
 
41 M. Harrison, Medicine and Victory: British Military Medicine in the Second World War, 
(Oxford, 2004), P.6. 





reaching the barracks on his first day as a National Serviceman in 1950, his intake 
witnessed the effects of PT on other training soldiers: 
Our driver began to slow down as we passed a bunch of about forty lads of 
our age, running three abreast, with a very athletic companion at their side. 
He was shouting out encouragement, such as, ‘Get the lead out of those 
bloody legs boys! Only another five miles to go!’. The whiteness of their 
bodies emphasised the look of strain on their faces. This sighting had the 
effect of straightening out a number of backs and a mental reassessment of 
one’s own body and its capabilities.43 
Before dissecting the rest of the statement, it is worth noting that the transport 
carrying Green and the rest of his fellow recruits had slowed down to pass the 
soldiers on PT. Coupled with the instructor shouting out to the runners as they 
passed seems to indicate a show was being made of it for the sake of the new 
recruits. The soldiers were being run in a large group, line abreast, echoing the 
ranks and files of a drill formation and doubtless with the same intention of 
reinforcing the group mentality amidst the strain of the run. Green describes the 
instructor as noticeably athletic, contrasting to the men who were ‘strained white 
with exertion’. Clearly the instructor seemed keen on highlighting the difference 
between himself and the men at his command, who were struggling, by shouting 
what Green sarcastically describes as ‘encouragement’. The instructor insinuated 
that what was difficult for the group was easy for him, implying that they should 
‘get the lead out’ and that there were ‘only five miles to go’. This appears to be a 
textbook example of ‘Drill bashing’ or negative reinforcement by which the 
instructor is goading the men to do better and prove him wrong, whilst still 
maintaining both a physical and literal superiority. The effect on the new recruits 
seems to have been amplified by this. Green, who believed himself to have been 
made fit by his ‘love of sports and job as a labourer’, suddenly found himself 
‘reassessing his own body’s capabilities’44. Green’s worries about PT proved to be 
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well founded when he and his friends found themselves on the same route march 
not long afterwards: 
Every Saturday, we did that same three mile run around the hills […] It was 
a killer and we’d come in falling all over the place, to the slave driving jeers 
of our super-fit instructors, […], I can hear my friend Pete now: ‘Jesus 
Christ, what are they doing to us? The sadistic bastards’.45 
Green and his friends were pushed to their limits by the cross-country aspects of 
their PT. His unit would return to barracks every Saturday ‘falling all over the place’ 
with exhaustion, only to be met with jeers and mocking from the already fit 
instructors. The difficulties some of Green’s fellow recruits faced are demonstrated 
by the harshness of the words his friend had for the instructors, calling them 
‘sadistic bastards’ and suggesting that it was a pointless and torturous task with no 
obvious point. Of course, as with many facets of the troops’ lives, PT was not 
experienced or indeed implemented in a universal manner. Ron Sullivan, during 
his initial basic training, seemed to thoroughly enjoy PT throughout his training and 
indicates that weekly route marches and cross- country were not universal 
practices: 
We never really did any cross-country runs in our basic. We seldom got out 
of the barracks actually. I did do an assault course, but that was much later. 
I liked PT. I was fit back then, really fit, even though I only played a bit of 
football, it was all we had back then. But when I went in the army, I was 10 
out of 10. I could do the runs and I could do anything else. You’d do your 
climbing up ropes, jumping over the horse, running around that sort of thing. 
All the time, arm stretch arm stretch, knee stretch, all getting you fit, getting 
you moving.46  
According to Sullivan, the gruelling cross-country route marches experienced by 
Green were a rarity throughout his basic training with the Royal Artillery’s Training 
Regiment. It would seem that the training of an artilleryman focused less on the 
need for long distance endurance than an infantryman. More telling is the 
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difference in approaches taken by the instructors in Sullivan’s regiment. The 
artillerymen spent most of their PT on camp and ‘seldom left the barracks’, in stark 
contrast to Green’s weekly route marches through the hills. Sullivan describes a 
greater range of the exercises PT consisted of, including ‘climbing up ropes, 
jumping over the horse, running around that sort of thing’. Although Green does 
not mention any of this, it does not mean this sort of training was limited to 
Sullivan’s experience. Rather it indicates that the difficult marches were the more 
prominent part of Green’s experience on account of their difficulty. Conversely, 
Sullivan seems to have actively enjoyed PT with the Royal Artillery, something 
which he credits to his fitness before joining. While Green doubted himself on first 
joining the Army, Sullivan considered himself ‘very fit’ and ‘10/10’ from playing 
football. This enabled him to, do anything the army asked of him in terms of PT, 
again contrasting with Green who would ‘fall about’ after PT. In both cases 
however, the end goal of the army’s policy on PT became apparent in both men’s 
experience. In Sullivan’s words, it was all about ‘getting you fit, getting you 
moving’. Of course, a soldiers’ physical development was not limited to their 
exercise, but also in the army’s control over their diet. 
The food intake of the average British soldier was an understandably significant 
part of their experience in training. Of course, this too was given much attention by 
the army, having long realised that, for want of a better term, its soldiers marched 
on their stomachs. Diet and nutrition had been one of the champion concerns 
when training soldiers in the Second World War. Emma Newlands discusses in 
detail the lengths taken by the army throughout the 1940s to effectively feed and 
nourish its new recruits. This included the establishment of no less than twenty-
four cookery schools, in which catering experts from civilian backgrounds 




Manual of Military Cooking and Dietary.47 The general result of this was that 
soldiers training during the Second World War were more or less happy about 
their food situation, mostly considering it to be ‘sufficient for a sense of 
wellbeing’.48 For the most part, this sentiment carried over to the generation of new 
recruits training before and during the Korean War, as the army continued with 
similar guidelines on nutrition. However, one major difference in this otherwise 
continuous experience is the state of food consumption prior to entering the armed 
forces. Unlike the Soldiers who joined up during the Second World War, the men 
whose formative years were during the World War experienced one of the worst 
household diets in Twentieth Century Britain. For those growing up in wartime, the 
average annual intake of proteins, fruits and vegetables had dropped significantly 
from before the war.49 Even in the years following the war, limited food stocks, 
rationing and the world wide effort of recovery meant that even by 1950, the 
average British individual was only consuming approximately 68.4% of the protein 
intake of pre-war levels.50  
This is a different matter for army personnel, who received 22lbs more protein per 
head annually than their civilian counterparts, which whilst still less than the pre-
war average, was a significant enough figure to be appreciated by some troops.51 
Sullivan certainly noticed how much more food he was receiving in comparison to 
what he was used to in civilian life. ‘Well the difference was with being in the army, 
you always got that bit more than what you did at home. I wouldn’t say it was great 
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food, but it was enough and well presented’.52 Although Sullivan did not think the 
food was particularly nice in any way, he clearly noticed how he was receiving 
more and better presented food than he had been as a civilian. Frost had a 
similarly positive memory of the food; however, he also had some suspicions as to 
what additives had been placed there in the interests of controlling the body: 
Then we went down to breakfast, which was quite substantial, the food in 
the Army was pretty good. It was palatable, tasted good, it wasn’t thrown at 
you, […] but the bromide thing was not a rumour, I don’t care what anybody 
says, it had a taste, there was definitely bromide in the tea.53 
Frost, like Sullivan, noted how substantial food in the army was, as well as it being 
good tasting and palatable. However, he also thoroughly believed that the food 
and drinks were being spiked with bromide. It had long been a rumour amongst 
soldiers that the army was going to such lengths, particularly with bromide, in 
order to suppress sexual drive.54 Even in 1950, this was not a new phenomenon in 
soldiers’ experience. The suspicions Frost held towards the contents of his tea had 
been a long enduring myth within the British Army, dating back to well before the 
Second World War. However, the reality of the situation is likely very different. 
Peter Ferris in 1993 and later Newlands, both make the case that that the resulting 
lowering of sex drive in soldiers during their training was far more likely due to an 
increase in strenuous activity, a controlled lifestyle and a lack of privacy.55 This 
was also the stance taken by the Royal Army Medical Corps when it addressed 
the rumours in 1956, stating that it was ‘active and varied pattern of army life’ 
which left little energy for sexual desires, rather than the addition of bromide.56  
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Regardless of the truthfulness of the bromide myths, they certainly played a role in 
a wider part of many soldiers’ experience in training, that being the ways in which 
the army managed their interactions with civilians. The end result of all the drill, PT 
and discipline throughout basic training was the creation of a unit of soldiers out of 
a wide variety of individuals. For a good number of these men, the end of basic 
training was a moment of great pride and achievement, despite it only being the 
technical start of their military careers. Green reflected upon how he had tearfully 
watched as his unit arrived for a parade: 
They swung into view. With bayonets fixed and arms swinging in perfect 
unison, they looked a million dollars. At once I saw how that rabble had 
become an immaculate, well-drilled platoon who marched with the swing of 
trained soldiers […] If at that moment those lads had been marching into 
the hell of Monte Cassino, I would have been there with them.57 
We can see how the rigors of basic training had, in Green’s view, moulded a 
‘rabble’, into an immaculate, well-drilled platoon.58 The history of his regiment had 
also been imprinted upon him by NCOs and lectures, being keenly aware of the 
‘hell’ the unit had gone through during the Second World War at Monte Cassino all 
the way back to the Napoleonic War.59 This further highlights the unifying effect 
basic training had upon these soldiers. Green was fully prepared to follow the rest 
of these men into just such a hell, which of course eventually he would in Korea. 
However, for the new recruit, there was still a considerable way to go before they 
departed for the distant conflict. 
Social Interaction amongst ‘Citizen Soldiers’ 
One thing that remained largely unchanged from the Second World War for 
soldiers training for Korea was the mixing of a large number of people from hugely 
different social backgrounds. This was particularly true for National Servicemen, 
 
57 D. Green, P. 11 
58 Ibid. 




as the very nature of the system brought young men from different backgrounds 
into the same training camps. The practical implications of this as National Service 
was implemented, was a militarisation of an entire generation, almost regardless 
of background and resultantly a huge mixing of people from various social 
positions.60 Frost remembered how he witnessed the effects of this first hand when 
he was recruited in the 1950s: 
When I joined up, I found there was an enormous spectrum of people that 
were brought together. In my intake we had the Bishop of Norwich’s son 
and at the other end of the spectrum we had lads from the east end of 
London who’d come in from borstal. You arrive as a civilian basically, but 
within a very short time you realise that you’re going to be told exactly what 
to do and exactly how to do it.61 
Frost saw a great variety of people from vastly different backgrounds being 
integrated into the army’s system. The whole class range appeared to be 
represented in Frost’s intake and Frost’s own assessment of his new barrack 
mates shows how aware he was of both the geographic and class differences 
between these men who had been placed together for basic training. Yet 
immediately, the army removed these parameters from the men, thus indicating 
the practical side of uniformity. This diverse group of which Frost was a part were 
now having their civilian social identities removed and all being directed and 
commanded in the same way, being told ‘exactly what to do and how to do it’. 
These effects could have altogether more tangible effects on soldiers’ experience. 
As was often the case, many of a soldier’s best friends could be made in the army. 
With the mixing of people provided by National Service prior to the Korean War, 
men from starkly different backgrounds became fast friends during their basic 
training. David Green met the man who would eventually become the dedicatee of 
his memoir on the train to Bulford Camp, sharing nothing in common except that 
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they had both been called up at the same time: ‘There was something about Pete 
that made me feel we would be mates. As we talked on, the feeling became a 
conviction and by the time the train drew up we had already become fast friends’.62 
Whereas Green had been something of a troubled youth who had already been 
incarcerated once, the man he would become best friends with was an apprentice 
printer from a middle class background.  
The military environment into which these men entered had been permeated by 
ideas of manliness and masculinity going back well before the time of the Korean 
War. Graham Dawson makes the suggestion that within British society, army life 
was seen as the epitome of masculinity.63 As well as the primary aim of discipline, 
basic training naturally sought to encourage and develop virtues such as strength, 
courage, endurance and of course aggression. In this environment, it was almost 
inevitable that new soldiers would attempt to perform these virtues of masculinity 
before their fellow recruits. In some predictable ways, this was manifested in 
displays of sexuality before others. Green noted one such example on his first day 
on camp, ‘As we shuffled into the NAAFI, one lad started passing remarks about 
the girl wiping the tables. ‘Not a bad bint that, I bet she does alright.’ he asked her 
in front of everyone, ‘Lately Love?’ thankfully, she took it as a joke’.64 The soldier 
Green described, engaged in a performance designed to assert a particular image 
of masculine virility over both the girl in the NAAFI and his fellow soldiers. He 
clearly tried to project this image of himself along the line of other recruits, in a 
show to reassure all present of his masculinity. These displays were of course, not 
unique to the post-war era. Newlands recognised how soldiers used displays of 
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virility to assert their masculine identity throughout the Second World War, in 
various different career positions and on various occasions.65 However, Green’s 
experience, as well as showing a continuity between the two periods, also 
indicates that such behaviours were commonplace from the very earliest moments 
of a soldier’s training.  
The need to display a masculine self-identity however, did not only extend itself to 
a soldier’s self-image and many individuals were subject to the effects of this. To 
an extent it was natural that placing such large and diverse groups of young men 
together could result in friction. Bullying mainly took the form of physical acts of 
dominance over other recruits. In these instances, acts of physical aggression in 
return were usually enough to see off the problem. Bill Crook recalled how he dealt 
with such an instance during his training by physical retaliation: 
The only trouble I had was a fight. He was a bully to everyone this chap, he 
came in one night and threw water over me, so I whacked him and put him 
on the floor. I was slung in the guardroom but he didn’t do anything else 
after that.66  
Crook was able to establish that he was not able to be dominated physically and 
was therefore able to dissuade any further bullying. However, some instances of 
bullying extended beyond personal and physical disagreements and bled over into 
the realms of self and group identities. Sullivan encountered both physical bullying 
and fierce anti-sematic hostility during his time as a recruit and found that it was 
far harder to deal with the latter than the former:  
In the Army, you always had the bullies. When they did come in, they didn’t 
pick on me so much, because I didn’t get nice parcels sent to me, but if they 
knew one of the guys had got a parcel, they’d bully him. I remember one 
guy tried it on with me and I said ‘I don’t give a shit what you do, but just 
remember one thing, you have to go to sleep’ and he more or less left me 
alone until they all found out I was Jewish. I got called all sorts, ‘Jewish 
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Bastard’ and that sort of thing, it wasn’t just the new recruits, it was a few of 
the other ranks. It eventually got so bad that it was one of the main reasons 
I changed my name from Solomon.67 
Initially, Sullivan experienced physical bullying of both himself and the men in his 
barracks. The motivation for this seems to have been to steal the parcels men 
were receiving from home. This demonstrates how more aggressive soldiers could 
instigate a pecking order to simply steal the goods for themselves. It would also 
seem that these acts were at least partially motivated by a need to project 
dominance over the new recruits. When Sullivan stood up to the bully who ‘tried it 
on with him’, the fact that he showed no fear and threatened revenge won him a 
temporary reprieve. Sullivan handled the more physical aspects of bullying well; 
however, when it became widely known that he was Jewish, the rest of his 
barracks turned on him as one group. He recalled how the bullying came from all 
ranks and not just the new recruits; in effect, he was singled out for having a 
different religious identity than the majority of his peers. Eventually, Sullivan was 
forced to concede to the pressure and resorted to changing his name from 
Solomon to Sullivan in order to better conform to the rest of the group. The fact 
that the group identity projection had a more profound impact on Sullivan than the 
physical bullying, enough to force a change of his personal identity, demonstrates 
just how significant group identity was in the social lives of new recruits. Although 
the mixing of various people from different backgrounds did see friendships and 
comradery form, these were based off of circumstance of a shared sense of civic 
purpose. In the wider scheme, men still sought to project their own self-image over 
one another and suppress identities they did not find to align with their own.  
 




Deployment and Travel  
Before any British soldier set foot in Korea, there was the matter of traveling 
across the globe to the embattled peninsula. The manner in which British troops 
journeyed to Korea is an area which is somewhat underexplored in terms of their 
individual experience. Although it is relatively well recognised that the journey in 
old steamers and troop transports was not always pleasant, many more personal 
aspects of the trip are generally ignored. The experience of deployment however, 
began before soldiers even left their home barracks and postings, upon their 
selection or volunteering to go to the war. As with many elements of the military 
experience, this could be varied and irregular. At the very outbreak of the war, 
there was initial uncertainty within the ranks as to whether British troops were 
going to be involved in the fighting.68 This was made worse by the rumour and 
secrecy surrounding the topic. Colonel Reginald Jeffes, then stationed with the 
27th Brigade in Hong Kong, was one of the first British officers to be informed of 
the decision to send troops to Korea and recalled the unusual manner in which he 
was told of his unit’s deployment: 
I used to play golf with the Brigadier from Headquarters. He rang me and 
said ‘Reggie, there’s to be no golf today, we’re going to Korea next Friday’. 
The whole thing was top secret, we couldn’t afford to let word get out. I 
went along the Battalions to do an equipment check and there was all this 
commotion and excitement and we couldn’t tell the men anything, though 
naturally most guessed what was going on, they knew they were going 
somewhere.69  
It did not take long before news of Britain’s role in the conflict became public and 
reactions were mixed. Initially, there seems to have been some enthusiasm 
amongst National Servicemen at the prospect of going to fight, however this may 
have been short lived. Lieutenant Anthony Perrins recalled how enthusiastically 
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National Servicemen with the Northumberland Fusiliers responded when asked to 
volunteer for deployment: 
We were asked to get as many National Service volunteers as possible to 
sign on for 3 years and remain with the Regiment as it went to Korea. We 
started a big campaign and did extremely well. As you can imagine young 
men love the idea of going to some Godforsaken place which nobody had 
ever heard of, go off to war, it was wonderful. Very exciting. And we did 
very well indeed, we got an awful lot of volunteers. No sooner had we done 
that, than it was announced that there was an age cut off and the net result 
was that most of the people we had got to sign on, proved to be too young 
under the new age limitation, because the government didn’t wish to have 
the embarrassment of having very young men killed or wounded. In due 
course, all the appetite for it was all forgotten and we went back to normal.70 
Lieutenant Perrins’s account demonstrates that for many young soldiers serving 
their National Service duties in Britain, being sent off to fight in mysterious Korea 
was an exciting and adventurous prospect, as evidenced by the response his 
volunteering campaign achieved. However, Perrin’s testimony also reveals the 
mixed response shown in wider society to the war and how voluntary fervour could 
be short lived. As he stated, the government were not keen to have young 
National Servicemen to be seen dying in Korea and resultantly he was unable to 
take most of his volunteers. Clearly, this shows that there was some significant 
resistance to the conflict in wider society. The time this provided for his men also 
shows how quickly the appetite for fighting wore off. Perrins recalled how after the 
interlude caused by the age cut off, the appetite amongst his men to volunteer 
dropped off as Korea seemed less and less appealing. Richard Vinen made the 
argument that Korea quickly came to be seen by most as ‘a uniquely unattractive 
and unappealing posting’ for National Servicemen.71 Indeed, even many career 
soldiers were unenthusiastic at the prospect of fighting in Korea. Sergeant 
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Thompson, then stationed with the Leicestershire Regiment in Hong Kong, 
alongside the regiments making up the 27th Brigade, remembered how few men 
from his unit initially volunteered for service in Korea: 
Colonel Hutchinson broke the news to us that the 27th Brigade were going 
across to Korea and because some of their battalions were understrength, 
they were looking for volunteers from us to help bring them up to strength. 
They assembled us on the volley ball courts and announced it all and of my 
entire forty-five-man platoon, I think only about five or six men came 
forward.72 
Thompson’s unit’s reaction is telling. Of his sizable platoon, only a few men 
volunteered, this means that around forty of the forty-five were happy to remain in 
Hong Kong rather than see service in Korea. This would seem to support Vinen’s 
idea that most of the British Army was unwilling to go to Korea; however, a not 
insignificant number of Korean War veterans indicate that when stationed in 
mundane duties throughout Britain, the Empire and occupied territories, Korea 
could seem very appealing.73 Especially in the early stages of the conflict, once 
knowledge of the Korean War was more widely known but before the Chinese 
intervention, many soldiers viewed it as an opportunity for adventure, which 
appealed to them far more than the prospects of more mundane postings in 
Britain. Lieutenant Gary Smith explained to his parents that he viewed Korea as a 
safe adventure, rather than a frontline tour. ‘It is a wonderful opportunity to travel 
which I doubt I would have otherwise had […] I expect that everything will be all 
over by the time I get there, except for policing’.74 Smith explained to his parents 
that the war in Korea was a ‘wonderful opportunity to travel’ to a new part of the 
world, which echoes a great deal of the rhetoric behind many soldier’s wishes for 
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army life. David Green’s experience was very similar and he signed up to serve in 
Korea with very little hesitation, in the hopes of a well payed adventure:  
My friends and I signed the dotted line immediately. It never crossed our 
minds that we’d be fighting with live ammunition against men trying to kill 
us. Our minds were full of the idea of a luxury cruise to the Far East and the 
thought of those geisha girls. Needless to say, the extra one pound 
eighteen shillings a week was beyond our dreams [...] The truth was I 
couldn’t wait to get on my way.75 
Green describes how he hardly considered the dangers of fighting in Korea. 
Instead, he seems to have paid more thought to the romanticised ideas of the Far 
East and hopes of seeing the world and adventure. Other men likewise sought 
postings to Korea, but more as an escape of current army life than for adventure. 
Ron Page recounted how forty men from his unit, straight out of continuation 
training, were selected as reinforcements for what they correctly suspected was 
Korea: ‘I didn’t really mind actually, I felt that perhaps it’d be something more than 
repetitive barrack room soldiering. I couldn’t say I held a lot of fear at the time and 
I felt as if we were finally getting on with something’.76 Unlike Green, Page was 
sent in 1951, after the Chinese had invaded and it seemed that he was aware that 
it was now a more dangerous situation. Yet, in spite of his concerns he still found it 
preferable to life in barracks. This view was not confined to new recruits either. 
Other soldiers echoed this statement, believing action in Korea was better than 
boring duties elsewhere. Roy Rees had been transferred away from the 
Northumberland Fusiliers. Eventually he returned with his new battalion to Britain 
following a posting to occupied Germany and found public duties in the UK 
unbearable: 
We returned from Germany and we were given public duties, guarding up 
Buckingham Palace and the Bank of England and all that. It was all utter 
bull! Polishing your boots in little circles and being a bloody batsman to 
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some officer and I got a bit sick of all the bullshit. I wanted to go back to my 
parent regiment, so I put in a transfer. This RSM took a look at me records 
and told me ‘I’ll put you in the first draft I can get you on’.77  
Rees’s levels of dissatisfaction with the prestigious role in public duties extended 
beyond mere boredom. To him, the menial tasks of maintaining a flawless uniform 
for the public and acting as a ‘batsman for some officer’ represented what he 
termed as ‘utter bull’. Rees clearly felt very strongly about how his time was being 
practically wasted, however, despite his strong feelings on the matter, this seems 
to be only part of his reasoning. Rees wanted to return to the Northumberland 
Fusiliers, his parent regiment, the 1st Battalion of which was fighting in Korea. For 
Rees, his motivations were more complex than boredom with ‘bullshit’, he also 
wanted to be serving alongside what he deemed as his ‘parent regiment’ and put 
in a transfer accordingly. Both Rees and Page’s testimonies indicates that 
alongside more complex reasons, the mere break of boredom was enough to 
dissuade fear of combat and fighting in the eyes of many soldiers, something 
which they both reiterate. It would seem therefore, that Vinen’s supposition that 
Korea was a wholly unattractive posting in the British Army, is at least partially 
inaccurate, as some men saw it as a good alternative to boredom elsewhere.  
The journey itself to Korea was far short of the luxury cruise some men had hoped 
for.78 When the war broke out, the British Army was actually quite well positioned 
across the globe to deploy forces to Korea. Although the majority of infantry forces 
were mustered in Europe, British bases in the Far East, particularly Hong Kong 
and the American occupation of Japan, made for ideal staging ports to land troops 
on the Korean Peninsula. The result of this for the individual soldier was a long, 
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slow sea journey to reach these ports, followed by an equally gruelling rail trip to 
the frontlines. Throughout this process, the army never released the men from its 
systematic control of their bodies. Their health, timetables and physical positioning 
were still kept under strict control. Some battalions, especially those of the 27th 
Brigade already stationed in Hong Kong, had relatively short journeys, however, 
some units were summoned from as far afield as the Caribbean.79 The journey to 
Hong Kong, then onto Japan and Korea, was always by ship, primarily in aging 
designated troop transports.80 More fortunate troops, travelled on requisitioned 
liners, many of which were taken as reparations from Germany at the end of the 
Second World War. However, in both instances, the journey meant cramped 
conditions, sleeping in hammocks and constant army control. Private Charles 
Sharpling described the typical experience of crossing from Britain to Korea when 
the Gloucestershire Regiment was sent to Korea having just arrived from Jamaica: 
We’d been earmarked for Korea and that was that. We embarked on the 
Windrush and it was a slow six weeks and it wasn’t brilliant because we 
were in hammocks and pretty crowded, Quite a few cockroaches and what 
have you and a lot of the lads were seasick but I was alright. Straight to 
Korea from Southampton. We landed at Pusan and from there we went up 
to Daegu, Deigon, Kaesong, we went up to Seoul, the capital and we ended 
up, when the North Koreans collapsed, right up to Pyongyang. They put us 
on a train with those bloody awful wooden seats, god it was 
uncomfortable.81 
Sharpling describes his journey from Southampton to Korea as being ‘a slow six 
weeks’ and emphasises the lack of comfort, being crowded into hammocks, with 
conditions bad enough to support the ship having a cockroach infestation. From 
there, Sharpling recalls how they landed In Korea without having stopped, which 
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was in fact a rarity for ships going to Korea, as most stopped in Hong Kong or 
other British controlled ports. The travel in Korea consisted of a run on ‘bloody 
awful’ trains until they reached the front. One point of note is how Sharpling 
describes how he was able to overcome seasickness. Particularly when it came to 
being sea sick, the experience of the sea crossing was a matter of chance. Some 
were able to weather it with relatively ease despite the age of their vessels. Private 
Norman Woods sailed out on the oldest troopship in British service, the Empire 
Trooper and found conditions to be bearable: ‘It took us six weeks to get from 
Southampton to Hong Kong. It wasn’t too bad, except that most of us were seasick 
until we acclimatised’.82 Others though were less fortunate and sea conditions 
resulted in a much more difficult experience with seasickness in the cramped 
confines of the vessels. James Lucock of the 1st Battalion of the King’s Regiment 
described how terrible his journey to Korea aboard the Astoria was in 1953: 
The Astoria, it was a flat-bottomed boat. What an experience, it was terrible. 
The ship was packed like sardines. In fact, if we had been sardines, they’d 
have had the RSPCA out. I’ve never been so sick in all my life […] Going 
through the South China Sea everyone was being sick and confined within 
this small space. It was horrendous.83  
Repeatedly using words like ‘terrible’ and ‘horrendous’, Lucock recalled how the 
worst part of the sea crossing for him was the sea sickness, which he describes as 
the worst sickness of his life. Clearly, the conditions of being confined aboard a 
ship like that were bad enough to leave a lasting image in Lucock’s memory of the 
crossing and for the rest of the men aboard his ship. However, the entirety of the 
experience of the crossing cannot be defined simply by the conditions in which the 
troops travelled. The experience of soldiers on the crossing was also a very 
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human one, as would be expected when men are confined together in such close 
conditions for several weeks.  
Social life In Transit 
A number of British Soldiers on their way to Korea made fast friendships with the 
men with whom they shared the confined space of the ship’s holds. William Hiscox 
recalled how he ‘met one of his best friends’ as a result of sharing a cabin.84 
However, life on board the ships was not always socially positive. Theft of 
personal goods and equipment was rife on-board ship, Hiscox stated that ‘you 
couldn’t leave your kit about for a minute because someone would nick it’.85 It 
seems from Hiscox’s account that the close confines also produced negative 
behaviours between the men, in this case stealing. However, negative social traits 
could also go beyond acts of slight and come to a head in open violence. Lucock 
recalled how tensions aboard the Astoria led to fighting and insults. ‘Some lads got 
into scraps and fights. We were onboard with the Royal Norfolk Regiment who 
didn’t like us, they thought we were stroppy scousers and we called them 
‘swedes’’.86 Lucock recalled how tensions between the different units on the ship 
led to fights and name calling. It seems these fights were along almost tribal lines, 
being between men from different units and how most of the hostility was between 
the different battalions. Given the close proximity of men from different units, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that hostility, aggression and other elements of hyper-
masculinity could come to the surface so easily, just as it had throughout recruits’ 
time in training. Green, for example recalled a Second World War veteran, 
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bragging about his sexual exploits back in ‘’44’ as they passed Naples.87 However, 
the environment of the crossing was not entirely cultivating of hyper-masculinity in 
the same way as training. Lucock also went on to describe how more tender 
emotions could also be laid bear with such little privacy between men. ‘I was 
crying in my sleep most nights and fellas were getting letters from home and 
crying, getting homesick. When we would stop, the letters would come on and lots 
of poor lads got ‘Dear John’ letters’.88 Joanna Bourke had noted of men in the First 
World War that the imminent prospect of going into combat and ergo the possibility 
of death brought forth more powerful emotional responses to hardship and it would 
seem that Lucock’s experience would be a textbook case of this.89 In the confines 
of the Astoria, men were faced with the fact that they were inexorably heading to 
war and did not hide their emotional responses. As Lucock stated, the worse 
states of crying were brought about whenever post was brought onboard ship after 
docking. Clearly this demonstrates that soldiers in transit were not in an emotional 
vacuum with each other and still maintained an emotional connection home.  
Continuation of Army Control 
With so many men in transit, the army never relinquished its control over their 
bodies, yet this proved to be much more difficult and was done in a strange 
duality, between strict control over men physically, but with less control over their 
time and between strict guidelines and relaxed enforcement. After morning 
inspection and PT, soldiers were pretty much given the rest of the day to do as 
they wished.90 Food rationing was even less strict than it had been throughout 
men’s training. Woods recalled how much easier luxury food was to obtain in 
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transit: ‘When we left England, sweets and cigarettes were rationed and when you 
got on the boat they weren’t, you could have as much as you liked, which suited 
me because I had a very sweet tooth at the time!’.91 Although Green and Woods 
indicate that some elements of control were more relaxed, in that their food intake 
and free time were no longer as strictly monitored, other aspects of life were still 
subject to strict control. At all times, men’s general behaviour was under constant 
scrutiny. Green received a charge for having wet blankets on inspection: ‘I snuck 
one night on deck to get away from the smell of vomit and was soaked by the 
cleaning hose. There was no disguising it before the 10 o’clock inspection, a fairly 
rigorous affair. I was docked two days’ pay for it’.92 Simply by not sleeping 
alongside his fellow soldiers and allowing a piece of equipment to become wet, 
Green was docked two days’ pay and put on charge. In his case, Green was being 
punished for not behaving as the rest of his unit had, despite there being no rule 
otherwise. Other instances were more straightforward. Lucock recalled how men 
were punished for actions they had taken, even when they were on their own time 
during shore leave: ‘Some of us got drunk in Singapore. The six or seven lads I 
was with all ended up in the ship’s nick at the bottom of the boat’.93 For Lucock, 
the army exercised its control over men’s behaviour even in their free time. 
Because they had exploited their release and become drunk on shore leave, they 
were arrested and thrown into the ship’s brig. Clearly, even if the army was less 
stringent about free time, they were still strict when it came to how men acted on 
said time. To this end and as had been the case throughout the Second World 
War, the army was keen to make soldiers avoid any source of ‘dangerous 
bodies’.94 A primary area of concern for the army in this regard was how to prevent 
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men engaging in sexual activities once they were on shore leave and temporarily 
beyond the army’s direct control. In a direct continuation of the experience of the 
Second World War, men being shipped to Korea were subject to extensive 
lectures and training on the dangers of Venereal Diseases (VD). Echoing the 
experience of the previous decade, Roy Martin recalled the lengths Medical 
Officers went to dissuade men from sexual promiscuity once on shore: 
We’re all stood in a line and the Medical Officer comes along with a little 
thing and lifts your dick up and inspects everything and I thought that was 
pretty grim. They were very concerned with VD on the boat, it was all VD 
this and VD that. Some of those films were bloody horrible, it put me off sex 
for life. One of them showed you this fella and they had to put this umbrella 
thing up his willy, that was very grim and it really put you off. But a lot of it 
still went on over there still. They were worried about men going with 
whoever in Hong Kong and bringing it to Korea, hence the inspection.95 
The inspection Martin recalled bore all the hallmarks of the army’s control over the 
men’s bodies, regimenting them into drill like lines for the rather humiliating 
inspection. Martin emphasises the unpleasantness of the situation, repeatedly 
calling the whole thing ‘grim’. From his account, the officers aboard his ship were 
hugely concerned with preventing the spread of VD and the unpleasant inspection 
was only the initial phase of this. As Newlands noted during the 1940s, 
propaganda was a powerful tool in attempting to control men’s attitudes towards 
sex and Martin recalled how little was different in his experience.96 He describes 
how the bombardment with information, ‘VD this and VD’ that and especially a 
graphic depiction of the treatment for gonorrhoea, ‘put him off sex for life’, clearly 
indicating the extent to which it affected him personally. Despite his own 
discomfort however, it seems the army’s attempt in this field were only partly 
successful, as he describes how ‘a lot of it still went on over there’. In short, it 
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seems that there was only so much the army could do to dissuade men from 
acting on instinct, after they had been confined aboard ship for so long.  
Conclusion 
At the end of their journey, British soldiers found themselves on a distant, 
embattled peninsula, a world away from home. They were trained, equipped and 
about to engage in the largest conflict of the twentieth century outside of the World 
Wars. However, had their experience from enlistment to arrival in Korea made 
them the idealised citizen soldiers as policy makers had hoped?97 If we look at the 
connotation as it was understood at the time through Huxford’s definition as citizen 
soldier’s characterised by a serviceman cognisant of his place in a social context 
and a broader motivations for his service, it appears army training failed to do 
this.98 From their initial enlistment, men sought their own interests above any 
broader social implications of their service. Where people did give over to the 
process of becoming a soldier or National Serviceman, it was because of close 
social pressures, such as wanting to serve alongside friends, or to escape a 
difficult life for better opportunities, rather than a broader motivation. For most 
others, an apathetic and war weary view made service in Korea an outright 
inconvenience at best. Although this may seem to be a statement of the obvious, it 
serves to clearly demonstrate that the ideas permeating British politics and 
motivating wide social change did not necessarily have an impact on the average 
individual.  One area where the army did succeed in training was in its goals was 
in controlling the individual and inducting him into a cohesive group mentality. As it 
had done in the Second World War, the army was able to exercise control over the 
physical appearance and movements of its soldiers.99 Through men’s reactions to 
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uniformity and drill, as well as the army’s full control over their time-space the army 
was able to develop soldiers effectively to its own mould. Soldiers generally 
responded positively to their training regime’s emphasis on their health and 
fitness, although through the process, the army maintained a strict outlook towards 
the men. This environment proved to be difficult socially. It promoted hyper-
masculine traits, such as physical dominance and bullying; however, it was not a 
social vacuum and men were able to express their own sense of self when 
possible. The ultimate end-point of recruits training was the transition to the 
Korean frontlines. British troops faced a microcosm of their training experience as 
the army’s control over them and their social spheres were compressed into 
crowded troop ships. What would follow for British soldiers was active service 
amongst horrific fighting and some of the most difficult terrain ever faced by the 
British Army. As they arrived, many soldiers reflected on the distance they had 
journeyed and just how remote their position could seem. Captain Charles 
Chester, watching the carrier which had brought him to Korea leave Pusan 
harbour, reflected upon this: ‘It was sad to see the boat go, I remember thinking for 
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Chapter 3: Life in the Frontline Environment. 
 
The Duality of the Environment 
When he was interviewed by the Imperial War Museum in 1999, Sergeant Major 
George Patterson gave one of the most telling accounts of the frontline 
environment that had been recorded from his war: 
I left the command post and slogged through the mud in the trench to get to 
my dugout, which was only a wee little thing, just a bed and a light. I was 
looking forward to reading some of my letters that I’d just received from 
home. I’d just laid down when there was this whoosh and this scramble of 
black and white and grey. I thought it had been a rat but then in the corner 
was this spotty white and black and snarling object, a Leopard! It had 
chased a rat into the light in my dugout. Oh, the sight and sound of it, I was 
petrified. It ran back out and I was very scared I must say.1 
Patterson’s recollection of going back through the frontline trenches to his dugout 
could easily be mistaken for the infamous battlefields of the First World War, that 
is until he was confronted by a mountain leopard. Whilst the encounter with the big 
cat may have been somewhat rare, in many ways Patterson’s reflections typified a 
soldier’s experience of the Korean frontline environment and reveals a great deal 
about the narrative power held by the World Wars over the Korean experience. To 
the soldiers on the ground, Korea was both a reflection of the Twentieth Century’s 
earlier conflicts, yet it also had its own unique challenges for British troops fighting 
in its environment. What is apparent from the testimony of the men who made it to 
the frontlines of Korea was that the environment in which they fought was 
something of a duality. It was both familiar and unusual, a reflection of past 
conflicts and something new and strange. Geographically, it was a new 
environment for the British Army. Korea’s rugged, unfamiliar terrain and extreme 
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weather patterns were a far cry from the majority of the army’s experience over the 
previous fifty years and was a shocking break from expectations developed from 
the Second World War. From a strategic point of view, the Korean environment 
seemed so alien to British Army doctrine that major adaptations had to be made to 
operations. A prime example of this was how the army had to completely rethink 
how their armoured units operated in Korea only a few months after their arrival. 
The Centurion Main Battle Tanks had been developed and deployed according to 
the army’s experience on the European fields of the Second World War and were 
the backbone of Britain’s armoured contribution to the United Nations task force. 
As such they were designed and operated according to doctrines developed for 
combat in European environments, however by January of 1951 the otherwise 
excellent vehicles proved ‘quite unsuitable for operations in Korea’ in their role as 
infantry support, due primarily to difficulties with the mountainous environment.2 
Most fighting took place in mountainous terrain and places where there were few 
roads wide enough to accommodate the Centurion. Additionally, where roads 
could accommodate the vehicles, their 52-tonne weight caused significant damage 
to the ground itself.3 As a result, Centurions were switched to artillery support 
roles, amongst a myriad of other major adaptations the army had to take to the 
Korean environment. From a strategic standpoint, Korea was certainly a new 
challenge for the British Army, however, this does not represent the whole picture 
of the experience of environment. As with many elements of military histories, the 
concept of the environment is usually applied to represent the shape and contours 
of a map. It is a strategic concept, concerning the difficulty of manoeuvring armies, 
logistical issues and coordinating plans. In this respect, the mountainous terrain of 
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Korea, with its extremes in weather was indeed something quite unusual for the 
British Army. However, for the soldiers themselves within the environment, it was a 
more nuanced experience with both unexpected challenges and reoccurring 
phenomena from past conflicts. If we approach the concept of the environment 
from the perspective of the individual, we see continuities from past conflicts 
emerge in their narratives. Soldiers experienced foxholes and mud flooded 
trenches, behind a blighted no man’s land, scarred with craters and human 
remains. On a superficial level, a soldier’s immediate vicinity was a continuation of 
the First World War experience. However, they also had to deal with mountains, 
cliffsides, extreme weather conditions and even in Patterson’s case leopards 
amongst other challenges which made Korea its own prospect.  
Reflections of the First World War in Soldier’s Experience  
A key point which surfaces in veterans’ testimony was the perceived similarity 
between the environment in which they were fighting in Korea and their notions of 
the First World War. What becomes particularly apparent when listening to these 
men’s’ descriptions of the environment on the Korean frontline is how vividly 
reflective it becomes of descriptions of the Western Front. This is unsurprising as 
one of the major similarities and elements of continuity in the environment of the 
Korean War from past conflicts was the re-emergence of large-scale trench 
warfare. This is despite the considerable time and geographical difference 
between the 1914-18 battle front and the battlefields of Korea. Primarily, this is 
because for the troops fighting in 1950s Korea, the defensive trenches and 
foxholes were as significant a part of their environment as the hills and mountains 
into which they were dug. Yet the physical similarity of the frontline environment 
between Korea and the First World War is not the sole reason for the comparisons 




imagery of First World War Europe to relate their experiences of the Korean 
environment, rather than on other more contemporary world events. Possibly the 
most obvious comparison in hindsight to the combat environment of Korea would 
be the Far-Eastern Front of the Second World War. Fighting in regions like Burma 
and Malaysia may today seem like easy comparisons to make to Korea. Like 
Korea, the Far- East was subject to monsoons and high humidity and the fighting 
style of the Chinese and North Korean forces echoed the tactics of the armies of 
Imperial Japan. Yet, from the point of view of the men in Korea this comparison 
quickly becomes problematic. Firstly, there is the simple geographical difference 
between Korea and the regions in which the Far- East Theatre of the Second 
World War took place. Although Korea was also a recipient of heavy seasonal 
rains, the peninsula is much cooler and drier than the Far- East and South Pacific 
regions. Although summer temperatures on the Korean lowlands can approach 
those of the tropics, Autumnal and Winter temperatures were far lower. Similarly, 
Korea is much more mountainous than the Far- East theatres of the Second World 
War. Although the Far- East regions of the Second World War certainly had a 
great deal of verticality, the average elevation of Korea, which is 70% 
mountainous, is much higher. Additionally, there is also an element to which the 
average British Soldier in Korea simply was not aware of how similar the 
circumstances of the conflicts were. To a large extent the Korean War and the 
Second World War in the Far- east existed in cultural isolation from each other. 
Although most soldiers in Korea had an understanding of the wider Second World 
War, either as a veteran themselves or as the younger relative of someone who 
was, very few soldiers were veterans of both Korea and the Far-East. To an 
extent, the Far-East was already something of a ‘forgotten war’ by the time of the 




East, The Bridge Over the River Kwai, was not shown until 1956, more than two 
years after the last combat engagement for British soldiers in Korea. Similarly, to 
the difference in geography, The Bridge Over the River Kwai, depicted a hot, 
tropical experience of building railways for the Imperial Japanese, not the cold, 
rocky mountains of Korea.  For these reasons, the Second World War in the Far-
East never became a cultural touchstone for Korea veterans in the ways that the 
Western Fronts did. For the most part it was either too different or simply too 
unknown to the men in Korea to become a relatable theme in their own recounts of 
service. The generation of soldiers who would go on to fight in Korea grew up in a 
time when the popular imagery of warfare was defined by representations of the 
First World War. Even throughout the Second World War when many National 
Servicemen who fought in Korea were young boys, the popular concept of frontline 
warfare was that of the 1914-1918 Western Front. In fact, so dominant was the 
First World War in the popular imagery of the time that even during the Second 
World War, the primary reference for soldiers was to the former conflict. G.D. 
Sheffield highlighted how soldiers on various fronts throughout the 1940s 
continually brought their experiences into line with the frame of reference provided 
by folk memories of the First World War. The reason for this was the weight of the 
popular memories of the First World War set the benchmark for the nature of war 
throughout the Second World War.4 For soldiers in Korea, not only was there a 
genuine physical similarity to the 1914-18 trenches to link their experiences to the 
former conflict, but also the same body of popular memory to create the same 
benchmark. Understanding how the frontlines of Korea stagnated into trench 
warfare is also very important in understanding how British troops came to view 
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their surroundings in First World War terms. During the earlier phases of the war 
when United Nations forces were rolling back North Korean invading forces from 
South Korea, the war had little resemblance to the Western Front of the First 
World War. During this phase of the Korean War, the frontline was more or less in 
constant advance, pausing only briefly before rapid breakouts through North 
Korean fortified lines such as those along the Naktong River.5 These and similar 
breakouts, such as the amphibious landings at Inchon, were very similar to the 
manoeuvres of the Second World War, such as Normandy and the Rhine 
Crossing, however, this phase of the Korean War did not last indefinitely. As the 
war progressed and especially after the Chinese Invasion, the fighting eventually 
became static along the 38th Parallel, British troops found themselves increasingly 
defending fortified defensive lines of trenches. For the soldiers on the frontlines, 
life in these trenches appeared similarly to their perception of life in the First World 
War, in the same way as the static environments listed by Sheffield. Sergeant 
Edward Bulley of the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry reflected on how the 
environment he and his Company occupied in on the frontline in 1952, was 
precisely what he imagined the trenches of the First World War to be like: 
There were miles and miles of trenches; it was just like the 14- 18 war. We 
were sitting in the trench during a shelling, we got shelled quite regular. We 
were having a bit of a brew up and one shell landed just on the parapet just 
above us. All the mud, dirt and that came in.6 
Sergeant Bulley begins with an immediate surface level comparison between his 
frontline position and the ‘14-18’ war, specifically the ‘miles and miles of trenches’. 
From this we can not only sense the scale of the defensive lines British soldiers 
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were dug into in Korea, but we can also see that the link between trench warfare in 
Korea and trench warfare in the First World War was one very obvious to the 
soldiers in Korea, at least in the hindsight which has developed since the conflict 
ended. Bulley also discusses being shelled during his time in the trenches and 
how it occurred regularly, again themes synonymous with the experience of 
soldiers who fought on the Western Front. Other soldiers besides Bulley were 
quick to make the comparison too. Driver William Hiscox summarised the state of 
the war upon his arrival on the frontline in 1951. ‘I think I got out there about the 
time when they was just straightening up the line. They’d decided we weren’t 
going to go any further so now we was just going into trenches like the Great 
War’.7 As Hiscox immediately links his view of the environment to the Great War, it 
is clear that at least some British soldiers were aware of the elements of continuity 
between trench warfare in Korea and the First World War.  
Death in the Trenches 
Sadly, in many ways the similarities between the First World War and the Korean 
Frontline were not imagined or created in retrospect. One of the more haunting 
continuities between the trench environments of 1918 and those in Korea was the 
presence of half-buried dead. At Passchendaele in 1917, Lieutenant Richard 
Dixon of the 14th Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery, described how the corpses of 
the battlefield would become a horrific part of the frontline environment as they 
went unburied: 
All around us lay the dead, half in and half out of the ground. Their hands 
and boots stuck out at us from the mud. Their rotting faces stared blindly at 
us from coverlets of mud. Skulls grinned at us. All around stank 
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unbelievably. These corpses were never buried for it was impossible for us 
to retrieve them. They had lain, many of them, for weeks and months.8 
The image of rotting and forgotten corpses mangled by shell-fire jutting out into 
trenches is synonymous with the horrors of First World War Trench life. Michael 
Roper, lists an example of a young private ‘Finding an arm and shoulder beneath 
a sandbag’, further illustrating the closeness of death in the trenches.9 In the given 
battles of Sheffield’s examples of Second World War static combat, there had 
been little time for such horrors to be fully realised in the defensive 
emplacements.10 Similarly, during the Second World War, there were also frequent 
occasions where men were forced into close contact with the dead on the 
frontlines. In principle, the policy of the British Army following on from the Second 
World War was to remove bodies from the field as soon as possible to negate any 
negative psychological effects upon British troops. Emma Newlands discussed 
how the army had come to better understand the importance of removing bodies 
during the Second World War and specifically the negative impact the sight of 
bodies could have on frontline troops.11 Following from lessons learned during the 
prior conflict, the British Army of the 1950s was well aware of the effect the sight of 
dead bodies could have upon soldiers’ mental health.12 At the highest levels of 
command, it was also considered paramount to minimise the contact soldiers had 
with the dead in order to maintain high morale.13 During the Second World War, 
this was enforced by the use of a Graves Unit to recover bodies from the frontline 
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and have them buried according to strict regulations. This policy remained virtually 
unchanged in Korea, with the exception that instead of a British Graves Unit 
working to sanitise the frontline, the responsibility was handed over to an 
equivalent U.S. unit. Bodies were recovered to a brigade level much in the same 
way as had been done in the Second World War, however after this point, they 
would be placed under American arrangements in British and Commonwealth plot 
at a United Nations Cemetery.14 However, as was often the case during both of 
the World Wars, there were instances where it was simply not possible to remove 
bodies from the frontline environment. The Battle of the Hook for example, which 
was an ongoing engagement from 1951 until 1953 involved trenches and 
defensive lines being taken, retaken and reused as they had been throughout the 
First World War’s Western Front. British soldiers were forced once more to 
experience human remains in their everyday occupied space. Sergeant Major 
George Patterson describes how men of the Black Watch’s A Company lived with 
American remains in their trenches at the so-called ‘Piccadilly Circus’ sector, 
where British and American lines met near Kaesong: 
There was a place we called Piccadilly Circus, where our trenches met. At 
this place there was a foot jutting out into the trench. We took it as a good 
luck symbol, used to give it a tap as we went past. Eventually, the smell 
began to pong a bit and on further inspection we found an old collapsed 
dug out, with four Americans inside. Mind it wasn’t a pretty sight because 
they’d been there for some time.15 
Patterson describes how at a busy intersection between British and American 
positions, a mostly buried body, uncovered only at the foot was present in his 
trench. Just as in the First World War, the soldiers occupying the trench seemed 
almost unfazed by the gore, to the extent that it was considered a macabre sign of 
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luck to ‘tap it’ going past. This is also somewhat reflective of soldiers’ experience 
of death in the Second World War. Newlands recounts examples of British troops 
in the Italian and North African theatres similarly adjusting to the dead, even 
finding practical uses for corpses such as signposts or even temporary furniture.16 
It seems that in Korea, the practical aspects of the war forced the men in contact 
with the dead to become similarly adjusted, although not immune to the 
connotations of dead bodies. To follow up Patterson’s example, the eventual 
decomposition of the corpse lead to the discovery of a collapsed dugout from 
earlier American occupation, containing the further decomposed corpses of four 
U.S soldiers left beneath the mud just as Dixon had described of bodies at 
Passchendaele. One of the leading fears of the trench environment of the First 
World War according to Roper was the threat of such collapsing dugouts.17 The 
memoirs of the First World War he discusses indicate that although soldiers were 
thankful for the protection and domestic spaces the dugouts offered, they could 
also become a soldier’s tomb in the event of a direct hit.18 It is apparent from many 
sources that the fear of being buried alive or ‘blown in’ in a dugout was both 
prevalent and well-founded in the First World War, mentioned even by Wilfred 
Owen in letters home.19 It seems that this was another element of commonality 
between the experience of trench warfare in the First World War and Korea. 
Hiscox described how one of his comrades in 120 Battery reacted to simply being 
stationed in a dugout on the line during the static fighting in 1953: 
They put three of us in a machine gun post. And this one bloke who was 
with us, he wouldn’t go to sleep, he was in a hell of state. And when the 
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Sergeant come to see if we were getting on, he’d actually got the Bren gun 
down, cocked it and was shouting ‘Don’t move!’ He was in a terrible state, 
he really was. I spoke to him afterwards and apparently as a kid he’d been 
buried alive, in the bombing in London. Trapped for a day or so 
underground. It’d be a horrific experience wouldn’t it? They sent him home 
not long after that.20 
What Hiscox describes of his friend shows not only how a fear of being trapped in 
a dugout, affected the man’s mental state, but also part of the root of his fears and 
how the army addressed them. The soldier Hiscox shared the dugout with was 
clearly unnerved simply by being in the enclosed space. The environment upset 
the man to the point where he removed an emplaced machine gun to threaten a 
Sergeant approaching, illustrating just how tense the experience of a confined 
space must have been. Hiscox also discovered that the man had a particular 
reason to be uncomfortable in dugouts, as he had been buried alive during the 
Blitz in the Second World War. This serves as a stark reminder that many of the 
generation of British soldiers too young to have served in the Second World War, 
had already experienced the effects of conflict before arriving in Korea. One final 
point to take from Hiscox’s account was the extent to which Army policy towards 
mental health had changed in the time between the First World War and Korea. 
Instead of being put on charge, the man was evacuated from the frontlines.  
Although encounters with the dead were commonplace within the trench lines 
themselves, one surprisingly lacking element of the Korean no man’s land which 
sets it apart from the First World War was the relative absence of dead and 
wounded outside and beyond the trenches. It is hardly a stretch to state that the 
presence of dead bodies are a key feature of no man’s land as described in the 
popular memories of the First World War.21 However, partly due to the significantly 
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lower number of soldiers engaged in the Korean War and partly due to different 
approaches to leaving casualties on the field of battle, the no man’s land of Korea 
was a place relatively empty of bodies. Sergeant Major Paterson described how 
Chinese and North Korean troops were fastidious about removing wounded and 
dead soldiers in battle. ‘One thing which was remarkable about the Chinese was 
that somehow they almost always took back their wounded and their dead during 
the fight. They didn’t want us getting any information off them. It was very rare 
after a battle to find any dead Chinamen’.22 This is not to say that death was 
completely absent from the no man’s land environment, rather that it was 
considerably less common that it had been in the First World War. Patterson 
suspected that Chinese troops were keen to remove any bodies from no man’s 
land, as they were sources of intelligence. This makes sense considering how 
much time British troops actually spent in no man’s land. As for the lack of allied 
dead, in principle, the policy of the British Army following on from the Second 
World War was to remove bodies from the field as soon as possible to negate any 
negative psychological effects upon British troops.  
Hygiene on the Frontline  
The rapid removal of the dead brings into focus another important element of a 
soldier’s life in the frontline environment, hygiene. The issue of hygiene was also 
another consistency between the World Wars and the environment of the Korean 
frontline. Soldiers in the British Army spent a good deal of their everyday time 
ensuring their positions and personal hygiene remained at a good standard even 
in the frontline trenches. Troops experienced the army’s policy of frontline hygiene 
in Korea in much the same way as it had during the Second World War. Newlands 
recorded how the Army Hygiene Service ensured field hygiene units visited troops 
 




on the front frequently, ensuring clean water for bathing reached soldiers 
regularly.23 Soldiers in the Korean War also received such visits and their reaction 
to the arrival of hot water shows just how valued it could be for the men in the 
trenches. John Davison was a gunner with the 16th Field Regiment of the Royal 
Artillery and he expressed how grateful troops were to have access to ablutions: 
Periodically, about once a week or so, we’d have a lorry come up from 
behind the line and take us back for a bath, it wasn’t much, it were just an 
oil drum on pickets really, just basic, but having hot water on tap was really 
great for us, especially in the winter.24 
Davison shows that it was still important for the army to ensure it had good access 
to clean hot water behind the lines, even if it was in a basic manner. Davison even 
admits that what he was given access to was only a weekly bath in what he 
describes as half an oil drum, however it seems he and his fellow soldiers 
appreciated the access to hot water all the same. Specifically, he states how ‘great 
for us’ it was to have hot water on tap during the winter, which suggests that in the 
cold months of the year, the service was especially valued. Other soldiers found 
improvised ways to maintain cleanliness in the line, Sergeant Bulley found that 
soldiers were actively maintaining access to ablutions with improvised ammunition 
packs. ‘We could always keep clean, all the ammo packs and everything came in 
boxes and we always had water, so somewhere someone was always boiling 
some on a fire made from the boxes’.25 Other areas of personal hygiene were 
more difficult to maintain in the trenches. The first thing that William Hiscox noticed 
meeting his mortar battery for the first time on his arrival in the trenches, was how 
long the men’s’ hair was: 
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What struck us immediately was the length of their hair. We’d never been 
allowed anything like that before, but it seemed like they were more lax 
about it on the front. You could tell they’d been on the front for a long time’26  
This indicates that soldiers on the front itself were able to be more relaxed in 
certain regards of their hygiene than others, revealing how the army’s policy of 
strict control over the individual’s appearance was also relaxed. The contrasting 
attitudes towards personal appearance and hygiene between soldiers serving on 
the frontline and fresh troops highlights the extent to which the army had 
succeeded in controlling men’s bodies throughout their training. The fact that 
Hiscox was surprised at the length of hair on the frontlines for example, shows just 
how radical this image appeared to one fresh out of training.  
However, this was not the case with general cleanliness in the trenches.  
One detail of continuity in static warfare was the amount of general ‘housekeeping’ 
soldiers performed in their positions on the frontlines.27 Patterson’s account of the 
trenches near Kaesong included a complaint about the amount of general cleaning 
work required in the trenches after taking over from an American unit in 1953: 
Every time we moved into a new position, we always seemed to have a 
tremendous amount of cleaning work to be done and we were never 
allowed to leave a position without it being in absolutely tiptop condition for 
the unit taking over from us. This didn’t always happen when we took over 
from another unit.28 
Patterson implies that a good deal of time was required simply to keep the 
trenches in a clean and acceptable state. He implies that the trench the Black 
Watch was taking over from the U.S Army unit was not in a condition he would 
allow his troops to pass on and furthermore he discusses how his men ‘always 
had a tremendous amount of cleaning to do’. This is consistent with experiences of 
soldiers in the First World War. As Roper discusses, ‘housekeeping’ activities 
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could take up to a third of a soldier’s daily routine in the First World War trenches. 
Even the particular nature of Patterson’s complaint about taking over a trench in a 
poor condition was reflected by soldiers in the First World War. Harold Oxley of the 
Middlesex regiment made an almost identical complaint in 1918 at the Battle of 
Lys:  
We found when we took over the French trenches in the Kemmel area they 
were not kept in the cleanliness one would expect to find taking over from a 
similar infantryman to another infantryman. They were dirty and weren’t in a 
similar condition to ours as regards to keeping clean.29 
Patterson states that other units ‘didn’t always’ leave the trenches at the Hook in 
the conditions he would allow of his own unit, while Oxley states that French 
trenches were ‘not kept in the cleanliness one would expect to find taking over 
from a similar infantryman’. In both cases the key element of continuity is that both 
men found that when relieving another unit in the frontline trenches, the standard 
of cleanliness was less than they would consider acceptable from their own men 
and in particular that they would not feel comfortable leaving the trench in a similar 
condition. Keeping the trench environment clean was hugely important in both the 
Korean War and the First World War to prevent the spread of vermin, which were 
just as present in Korea as they had been on the Western Front. It is no 
exaggeration to state that the mythology of the British Army in the First World War 
included the infamous problems of rats in the trenches and from Sergeant Bulley’s 
accounts, it seemed the problem was also to be found in Korea: ‘We used to get 
quite a lot of rats, running round the bunkers. I remember one night there was a rat 
going up and down the logs above my bunker and I managed to get him with a 
bayonet, they could be a real problem’.30 Bulley’s description of having to kill rats 
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in his dugout with a bayonet is something which could have come straight from the 
descriptions of the First World War, showing that vermin were equally a much a 
problem in Korea as they had been on the Western Front. However, the fauna in 
Korea could prove to be more hazardous than their French or Belgian equivalents, 
at least in the minds of the soldiers. A bigger problem than the First World War lice 
for soldiers in the trenches of Korea was the presence, or at least fear of local 
mites. The U.S Army reported numerous fatal cases of illness borne from the 
Korean trombiculid mite in on the front and it would seem British troops were 
aware of this and became very cautious.31 Ronnie Taylor of the Durham Light 
Infantry described the fear these mites represented and how they affected men’s 
behaviour: 
The real problem was the mites. You had to be very careful of drying your 
blankets on the ground or around bushes, because they carried a mite. You 
were better off hanging them in the lines. Bites from these mites were fatal, 
I heard the Americans lost quite a few men to that.32 
Not only does Taylor mention the specific actions men took to avoid being bitten, 
in this case drying the blankets inside the lines rather than in the open, but he also 
mentions the fact that he was aware of U.S casualties from them. The concerns 
held by British soldiers of the threat of insects in the environment, was also 
reflected on an official level. Orders and training were given on the frequent 
deployment of the insecticide DDT. It was recommended that DDT be sprayed at a 
frequency of around once a month in areas where British troops were likely to 
encounter flies, bugs and other insects such as mites and ticks.33 The deployment 
of DDT and the preventative measures mentioned by Taylor, as well as the 
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relatively low number of British troops in Korea compared to the U.S Army, help to 
explain why there were few known British casualties due to mites. However, the 
fact that these measures were deployed and the soldiers’ opinion of the mite 
threat, suggests that it was perceived to be an environmental hazard, even if the 
reality was less dangerous. Nonetheless, the way in which soldiers remained 
conscious of mites and lice despite relatively few cases indicates that they were 
still drawing comparisons between their own experience and their perception of life 
in the First World War Trenches.    
Maintaining the Frontline Environment 
Such actions in keeping the frontline clean were part of a daily experience that 
extended to physically maintaining the trench network. Just as in the First World 
War, the trenches of Korea were a man-made environment and therefore required 
maintenance. A key part of the experience of life in the First World War trenches 
was the creation, maintenance and repair of the earthworks to protect soldiers. 
Dennis Winter described how the process required to maintain trenches on the 
Western Front required tremendous effort from a large body of men from the 
second it was completed.34 The key themes of his summary involve the constant 
problems men faced maintaining a trench in the face of shell fire, weather and 
mud. Although his focus is on the First World War’s Western Front, examination of 
accounts from Korea indicate that soldiers in the 1950s viewed this as a common 
thread in the experience some decades later.35 In 1953, Private Robert Page was 
with the A Company of Black Watch during their time in positions around Kaesong 
and went on to describe the difficulties the terrain of Korea created for troops 
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digging and entrenching their positions that were remarkably similar to those of the 
First World War: 
We were always digging, reinforcing and making the positions stronger 
because we were taking over trenches which were hopeless towards shells. 
You had your pick and an entrenching tool, which was like a small pick 
y’know. Sometimes it was easy to dig but in the rainy season you got this 
thick mud, like porridge. Other times it was rocky and that was damned 
hard work. It depended position to position.36 
From Page’s description, we can see how much maintenance the trenches 
required in order to keep the defences in good order. Page states that his unit was 
always ‘digging, reinforcing and repairing’ the trenches, which also had to be 
remade to improve their resilience to shellfire. Page’s description of the constant 
work required for keeping the trenches up to scratch in the face of shells, mirrors 
almost exactly the experience of men in the First World War. Even the tools used 
in the process were practically identical to those carried by sappers on the 
Western Front.37 Winter outlined how a very similar process was involved digging 
the trenches of the Western Front and keeping them repaired and weatherproof.38 
However, the manner in which the experience of troops may differ, is in the far 
harsher weather of the Korean Peninsula. Sergeant Major Patterson reflected on 
how the monsoon season impacted the lines around the Hook sector and the 
effects of how the trenches themselves could be rapidly overrun by mud: ‘With the 
monsoons breaking all through the early part of the year you were really sloshed 
about. Mud would fill the trenches, you were up to the ankles as it was, but even 
with good drainage it’d be up to your thighs like that in minutes in the heavy 
rains’.39 Of course, flooded trenches were not unknown in the First World War, 
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however, Patterson’s description of the trenches filling with mud and water to 
waste height in minutes seem to indicate that the heavy monsoons from the Sea of 
Japan presented something unique to the Korean trench experience, even if 
soldiers in Korea did not seem to believe so themselves. Another area of trench 
maintenance that was markedly different in Korea than the fields of Flanders, was 
the location of the trenches. For the most part, United Nations positions were sited 
along the tops of the steep hills and inclines of the Korean terrain. Although the 
battlegrounds of the Western Front could vary, they were generally flatter than the 
geography of Korea, which was significantly more mountainous and rugged. 
Ronnie Taylor spent part of his time in Korea manning overhead wire systems to 
bring materials up to the trenches and described both the situating of trenches and 
how materials were taken up to them: 
A lot of our positions were up high, it was called skyline defence. We’d be 
dug-in on the forward slope and on the reverse would be all the roads and 
tracks to get up to them. We used to rig up overhead pulleys and things 
with the Koreans. They’d help bring up the meals on the pulleys from the 
back and lug all the ammunition and anything that was needed to us up 
these steep hills. If you had casualties, they’d stretcher them down to where 
you could get an ambulance or a helicopter to a field hospital or something 
like that.40 
From Taylors description, we can see how the immediate rear of the trenches 
occupied by British forces, though up steep slopes, were much better provided for 
logistically than the infamous mud fields of First World War imagery, which were 
constantly plagued by supply problems. Despite the increasingly complex network 
of supply lines and railways the British Army were able to construct between 1914 
and 1918, shortages of supplies, reinforcements and ammunition were common 
on the frontline due to the slow pace at which logistical lines could advance over 
newly captured ground. Especially during advances, supply lines were simply 
bogged down in environmental conditions where wheeled vehicles and trains 
 




became impossible to manoeuvre. Not until the very final months before the 
armistice was the British Army in a position to reliably supply the frontline to its full 
demands and even then vast stretches of the front were as far as fifty miles ahead 
of the closest reliable railway heads.41 Conversely, Taylor describes how in 1952 
with the help of the Koreans and overhead pulleys, they were able to bring fresh 
rations and other supplies up to the trenches very quickly, as well as recover 
casualties very quickly, even using helicopters to evacuate wounded men, 
something very much impossible in the First World War. This level of logistics 
presented a break from what would commonly have been believed about trench 
environments by soldiers even in the Second World War. Sheffield quotes a 
soldier wounded fighting in Normandy as believing he would have died on the field 
had it been the First World War.42 However, it would seem that due to the 
improved logistical systems and the hilly terrain of Korea, the trench environment 
was actually a much safer experience than it had been in the First World War. 
Despite these differences however, soldiers in Korea still held their experiences in 
close comparison to the Western Front of the Great War. This reflects the 
phycological effect that the narratives of the earlier conflict had upon soldiers in 
Korea. Because the touchstone of the First World War trenches was so potent in 
cultural memory even in the 1950s, soldiers of Korea overly emphasised the 
similarities in their experiences in spite of the differences.    
Dangers of the Environment Beyond the Trenches 
Adding to the sum of similarities between the Korean frontline environment and the 
trenches of the First World War was the very presence of a recognised ‘no man’s 
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land’ between the United Nations and North Korean lines. In keeping with its First 
World War predecessor, the no man’s land in between trenches in Korea could be 
just as harsh and barren as had the divide in 1914- 1918. Private Norman Woods 
having arrived on the frontlines just after the Battle of the Hook, in the last few 
months of the Korean War, described the sight over the parapet and towards the 
Chinese Positions: 
God it was barren. It was very barren indeed. A lot of mud and barbed wire in front 
of our positions, very barren. Again, something of a culture shock because I’d 
never seen anything like it with my own eyes before.43  
Sheffield briefly touches on comparisons to no man’s land during the Second 
World War, briefly covering how the language used to describe static warfare was 
very reflective of that used in the First World War.44 Phrases such as ‘Trench 
Raiding’, ‘Fighting Patrols’ and even ‘no man’s land’ were reused by men of 45 
Commando throughout static fighting during the Battle of Normandy.45 Conditions 
in Korea however, allowed for this concept to be significantly amplified. The 
language used to describe no man’s land in Korea is of the precise model 
Sheffield found occurring in the Second World War, except on a much wider scale 
than isolated moments in individual battles. Although the space between the lines 
occupied terrain very different from the battlefields of France and Belgium, the 
elements of the environment soldiers picked upon were very similar to that found 
in the First World War. On the lines for both the second and third Battles of The 
Hook, Sergeant Major Patterson had a great deal of experience dealing with the 
land between the trenches and described his key points of that environment: 
Forward of the lines was ideal for snipers and we took one or two casualties 
from that, but there were no hits in the trenches. It wasn’t just a question of 
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keeping your head down; it was a question of not moving unnecessarily, in 
between the lines it was just a maze of wire and mines.46 
Patterson highlights several of the dangers he and his men faced when out of the 
trenches. Primarily, Patterson was concerned with sniper fire. According to him, 
the environment forward of the British trenches was ideal for snipers to engage, 
stating that he only lost men to snipers outside of the trenches. This represents 
another continuity between the environment of Korea and the 1914- 1918 Western 
Front. In the earlier conflict, aside from artillery and shelling, the primary cause of 
wounding for infantry in no man’s land was from sniper-fire, which seems to have 
also been the case in Korea some thirty-five years later.47 Patterson commented 
further along these lines that ‘it was stupid of people to keep sticking their heads 
up’, also echoes frequent complaints made by men in World War One.48 He then 
goes on to discuss how moving unnecessarily not only made troops more liable to 
be hit by enemy fire, but also introduced the possibility of getting lost in the ‘maze 
of barbed wire and mines’. Although the barbed wire was something which very 
much links the two wars, the development of anti-personnel mines in the years 
since the First World War made for a new horror for British troops in the Korean no 
man’s land. Anti-Personnel landmines were deployed in Europe during the First 
World War but in relatively small numbers. However, their increased use by the 
1950s in combination with the barbed wire and trenches in Korea made them a 
very prominent part of the frontline environment. Most sections in the Army 
ensured a soldier who knew the location of the mines accompanied patrols.49 
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However, as Hiscox recounted it was still easy for men to get lost and wander into 
danger, especially as it was not always possible to know where mines laid by other 
armies were: 
There were always lots of mines and things, because the Yanks and 
Chinese used to lay mines and never knew where they were. Our officer 
tread on one. He tried to jump off of it and it took his leg off. If he’d have not 
panicked, I’m sure that if they’d have cleared it, but there you are.50 
Hiscox’s description of the wounding of his officer in amongst the maze of wire and 
mines highlights just how dangerous patrols in no man’s land could be even for 
experienced soldiers, however, despite the indiscriminate danger of the unmarked 
minefields and snipers, there was still a need for British troops to spend time in the 
environment between the lines. 
Activities in No Man’s Land  
Partially due to the increased dangers beyond the parapet, activities in the Korean 
no man’s land were mostly contained to raids and patrols. Private Page described 
the activities men patrolling no man’s land were expected to do during their time 
near Kaesong: 
We did various fighting patrols over the top. Fighting, raids, ambush, 
Reconnaissance. Fighting patrol was in force and the goal was to locate 
and engage enemies we found between the lines. Ambush was where you 
could hopefully get them in between your positions and deal with them, if 
you know what I mean. On one occasion we were surrounded by a Chinese 
patrol and Lieutenant Haw somehow managed to bluff the right phrase back 
to them and we escaped unscathed, not a shot fired.51 
Page outlines the various types of patrol British soldiers performed in between the 
trenches, noting how the parties could range from small reconnaissance patrols to 
gather intelligence, to large ‘in force’ raids to engage and in some cases trap and 
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ambush Chinese patrols. The description of ‘fighting patrols’ and ‘raids’ strikes 
immediate similarities with the terms Sheffield found used in static Second World 
War combat, which were in turn ‘straight from 1917’.52 However, language such as 
‘over the top’ to describe the space between the trenches takes the comparison a 
step further, being a direct reference to the First World War no man’s land. As 
Page notes, the environment of no man’s land was by no means uncontested and 
the fighting that could occur there was as much an echo of the 1914- 18 Western 
Front as could be. Patterson described how bitter fighting could become when 
British and Chinese patrols met between the trenches: 
Quite often the Chinese would hide in dugouts between the lines. We had 
cases of hand-to-hand fighting forward of the platoon positions. Which were 
a bit of a melee if anything else, but we gave as well as we got. It was all 
rifles, bayonets, picks, shovels, the whole lot, whatever came to hand.53 
Patterson explains how the continual raids and patrols by both sides could lead to 
savage encounters in no man’s land, with improvised melee weapons being used 
to engage the enemy in close combat. Amongst the weapons Patterson listed as 
being used in these situations are ‘bayonets, picks, shovels’ and ‘whatever else 
came to hand’, implying that these moments were improvised scrambles more 
than planned combat. The fact that he mentions it as occurring multiple times and 
that he and his men would ‘give as good as they got’, suggests that these 
instances were not uncommon. Certainly, the image of British soldiers fighting for 
a dugout with shovels, bayonets and entrenching tools is something one would 
associate more closely with the First World War than fighting during the atomic 
age.  
A common theme in depictions of the First World War is the act of common 
humanity in the face of wounding and death. Roper cites how national enmity was 
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often reduced in the face of wounding or death on the battlefields of World War 
One.54 However, this was already a popular theme in First World War Literature at 
a time when the Soldiers of the Korean War were young. All Quiet on the Western 
Front for example, contains a famous fictional example in which the German 
protagonist Paul Bäumer forgoes fighting and comforts a dying French soldier in 
no man’s land.55 Roper discusses how such encounters actually occurred in the 
First World War.56 An account from Corporal Leslie Winspear from the Duke of 
Wellington’s Regiment recounts how similar moments followed beyond the lines in 
Korea: 
We had to rescue a patrol from in between the lines, the Sergeant who 
knew the way through the wire had been wounded, as had a couple of 
others and they were trapped right in front of a Chinese position in broad 
daylight. The Chinese didn’t interfere at all. They could see the stretcher-
bearers and me but there was no action from them whatsoever. They could 
have wiped us out if they’d wanted. That was… well it was quite a 
moment.57  
Winspear details how he helped to rescue wounded men trapped in amongst the 
‘wire in between the lines’, the patrol being under the close observation of Chinese 
soldiers. Despite the opportunity to ‘wipe out’ the exposed British wounded and 
their rescuers, the Chinese did not interfere, allowing the evacuation. Winspear 
clearly recognised the human side of the interaction, remembering it with a pause 
as ‘Quite a moment’. While such instances must have been rare, it again speaks 
to the close relationship and continuity in the experience of British Soldiers had of 
the no man’s lands of 1914-18 and 1950-53. Evidently, the experience of British 
Soldiers in between the lines is analogous with the idea of a Korean no man’s 
land. 
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Coping with Extreme Conditions  
One element of the Korean War which sets it apart from the World Wars for the 
British Army was the extent to which British troops had to deal with climatic 
extremes. Dealing with the extremities of the weather systems in Korea was one of 
the aspects of their experience which veterans remarked about most often about 
their time in the war. Temperatures and local climates could vary massively across 
the geography of the Korean Peninsula throughout the year and became a key 
touchstone in veterans’ memories. High temperatures in the lowlands could easily 
reach the high thirties Celsius, bringing the possibility of sun burn, sunstroke, as 
well as encouraging insect infestations and a heightened risk of malaria. Winter 
temperatures could prove even more challenging with the infamous Korean 
winters bringing Siberian weather systems down the peninsula and dragging 
temperatures in the hills and mountains as low as minus forty Celsius. Lieutenant 
Richard Skinner, a tank commander with the King’s Royal Irish Hussars, spoke of 
the cold in terms fairly typical of British veteran’s recollections when interviewed by 
the Imperial War Museum: 
The climate I think, is the thing that one remembers most. The extreme cold 
in winter time and the relatively high heat, or humidity, in the summer. 
Certainly, the winter I think was the worst. If one put down a mug of coffee 
or tea on the tank or on the ground, it would probably freeze in about 30 
seconds, more than a few times one would certainly find a layer of ice on 
your tea.58 
What Skinner describes in his account is very common amongst veterans whose 
recollections of Korea uses the extreme weather as a touchstone for their 
experience. He remembered both the high heat and humidity of the summers 
contrasted with the extreme cold of the winter. These extremes were problematic 
for British troops as it was difficult to acclimatise effectively for the rapid onset of 
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these various weather patterns. Acclimatising men’s bodies to the weather 
conditions where they would be deployed was a major concern for the British Army 
throughout the Twentieth Century.59 Up to six weeks of a soldier’s early 
deployment was dedicated solely to acclimatising the body to the local weather. 
However, the acclimatisation techniques developed by the British Army during the 
Second World War could only go so far when the onset of the Korean winter was 
in mere weeks, when the outside temperature could freeze freshly boiled tea in 
seconds. The first encounters with the cold of the Korean winter came with a rapid 
change of weather in the November of 1950, when snow fell several weeks before 
expected forecasts. This initially caught both the British Army and the rest of the 
United Nations task force off guard as cold weather equipment had not yet arrived 
in sufficient numbers. Karl Werner, a U.S Army historian, noted that improvised 
tactics were initially the only way for allied forces to deal with this, observing how 
some men wrapped towels around their heads, or wore double or even triple 
layers of clothing beneath their uniforms.60 Geoff Holland recalled the extent of the 
problems the cold could cause from his duties as a radio operator during the night: 
‘I remember this particular night it was bloody freezing, minus thirty to minus forty 
and you couldn’t hold your rifle with your bare hands as it would rip the skin off’.61 
At such low temperatures, British and United Nations troops had to contend with 
frostbite, heavy snowfall and even weapon malfunctions. The problems caused by 
the cold were so extreme as to render artillery and armoured vehicles effectively 
useless as metal froze and cordite failed to ignite properly.62 During their first 
encounter with the Korean winter in 1950, British troops were left with little option 
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but to improvise solutions to the bitter cold. Ken Hawthorne recalled of the ways in 
which this was done: 
When the cold weather came towards the end of my time, we and the 
Americans made up these fires or stoves. They were run on petrol but it 
was just an empty stove with a chimney attached and you would just heat it 
up and it made it lovely and warm inside the hutchie.63 
Hawthorne’s account detailed just how troops on his part of the frontline resorted 
to using improvised petrol heaters in their sleeping ‘hutches’ to keep warm. It is 
worth noting that a ‘Hutchie’ was a nickname given by British soldiers to their small 
sleeping dugouts because of their resemblance to rabbit hutches. Burning petrol in 
these infamously small confined spaces was obviously very dangerous, however it 
demonstrates how desperate soldiers on the frontline were to keep the cold at bay. 
Part of the reason for this desperation and improvisation was because at first, 
British supplies of cold weather equipment were woefully inadequate and 
antiquated. Trooper Kenneth Black, spoke of his experience of the cold weather kit 
his unit had initially been supplied with when they first reached Pyongyang in the 
early winter of 1950:  
We’d been issued with ski boots before we got to Korea. They were 
supposedly made for British troops who were going to fight in Finland just 
after the First World War or something. They were in a right state, covered 
in grease and they told us to clean them off and start wearing them to get 
used to them. We hadn’t been in Korea all that long, maybe two weeks, 
when the soles started falling off. At that time, we got new boots off the 
Americans. While they were destroying their supply dumps at Pyongyang 
on their retreat, we got some lovely American clothing. Fur lined gaberdine 
suits like trench coats, these fur lined caps and that, jackets, socks 
trousers, shirts the lot. Apparently, the higher ups weren’t very happy about 
us taking American gear but they laid off because so many people were 
doing it and later on it came in useful.64 
We can see from Black’s description that the quality and age of the equipment 
British soldiers were issued left them with little confidence with what they had been 
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given. In particular, Black referred to how the ski boots he and his unit were issued 
with were of such poor quality and age that they began to fall apart within weeks of 
arriving in Korea. The fact that he and his fellow soldiers believed that the boots 
had apparently been made for troops preparing to fight in Finland as far back as 
the First World War demonstrates just how little confidence, they had in the kit 
they were issued with, regardless of whether this was true or not. Ultimately, Black 
and his unit became so dissatisfied with what they had been given that they 
resorted to taking equipment from condemned U.S supply dumps which were 
being destroyed as the Americans retreated. It would appear that this practice 
became quite widespread amongst British troops as the acquisition of U.S winter 
gear was so numerous that senior officers began to turn a blind eye to its use. 
Lieutenant Skinner also reiterated these points, demonstrating that the lack of trust 
in British Army preparations was not limited to junior ranks: 
The temperature was very difficult and we weren’t well equipped at any 
time, the only bit of winter equipment that we got initially was the issue of 
string vests. Our winter equipment was appallingly bad. I don’t think the 
British Army had any idea how cold it was going to be. I remember that I 
managed to get a parka from the Americans which I swapped from them for 
a bottle whiskey.65 
Skinner explained how one of the only effective pieces of winter kit that was issued 
to him and his men were string vests to be worn beneath their normal uniforms. 
Skinner is much more direct in his criticisms of the army’s readiness to fight in 
extreme temperatures, stating clearly that he had no confidence that high 
command had any idea how cold Korean winters could be. Clearly, the opinion 
and confidence soldiers had in their equipment and the army’s preparedness did 
not only extend to the lower ranks but was shared by officers in the field. The fact 
that British troops in 1950 held such opinions and were forced to take such actions 
 




as trading with other armies demonstrates how unprepared the British Army had 
initially been to deal with the harshness of the Korean winter. 
From examination of the official army records, it would seem that by early 1951, 
the British Army had made up for its lack of initial winter preparation. Better 
equipment was issued to British troops from commonwealth stores, rather than 
U.S acquisitions and steps were already being taken to ensure that supplies would 
be better prepared for the next cold season.66 This improvement in preparations 
for extreme weather also extended into the army’s policies towards extreme heat. 
By 1951 the army was far better prepared for the extreme weather patterns of the 
Korean summer than they had been for the previous winter. Rigorous guidelines 
were put in place to maintain soldier’s bodily health in hot weather and ensure that 
casualties as a result of hot weather were minimised.67 Similarly, anti- malarial 
courses were organised before the Korean summer with a goal to train non- 
commissioned officers in as many British units as possible before the malaria 
season began.68 Additionally, stringent malaria prevention procedures were put in 
place to limit the spread of the disease as much as possible. These included the 
mandatory consumption of paludrine tablets to be taken daily, the issue of 
mosquito nets and protective clothing, as well as DMP insect repellent to be 
sprayed directly onto the face, neck and hand at two hourly intervals.69 One of the 
more preventative measures to protect against malaria was the process of 
inoculation. By the Second World War the army regarded the process of 
inoculation as a vital way of protecting its soldiers and men were not allowed to 
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deploy unless they were fully vaccinated.70 This same policy applied to soldiers 
arriving in the Korean War, however, some attempted to use the situation to get 
out of fighting. Captain Charles Chester of the Northumberland Fusiliers found one 
of his men attempting to be sent home by refusing an inoculation: 
I had this one soldier who the doctor thought was trying to get sent home 
before Korea with imaginary headaches. Now when we got to Singapore, 
we had our last inoculations and this chap turned up and said to the doctor, 
‘No, I’m not going to have it’ and the doctor told him that he would get it or 
else he would have to be sent back and lose all his pensions. He replied ‘I 
don’t care, you know when I came up to you and you said I imagined those 
headaches? Well, you can bloody well imagine you’ve inoculated me!’ I 
thought it was rather amusing I must say. The doctor turned around to me 
and demanded that I arrest him but I said, ‘You arrest him, it’s your affair, 
but he’s coming either way.’ He decided to get the shot after that. It turned 
out that he was a good lad after all, stayed with us right to the end.71 
From what Chester describes, it appears that the soldier was malingering 
throughout his voyage to Korea in an attempt to be sent home. His final inoculation 
being required before he could be sent to the frontlines became the final chance in 
the man’s attempts to be sent home. It appears that he was using the mandatory 
nature of the vaccine as a point of negotiation in his goal to be sent home, 
leveraging the army’s policy against itself. Throughout the Second World War, 
Newlands found similar examples of men who tried and failed to use the army’s 
regulation of body as a negotiation tool to escape service.72 In these instances, 
men would attempt to ‘swing the lead’ by cheating doctors with fake symptoms or 
exaggerated ill health.73 Unfortunately for Chester’s soldier refusing his 
inoculation, his attempt also failed when the Captain simply stated that he would 
be coming to Korea regardless after which point the man gave in. It would seem 
that some men were willing to adapt the ways the army sought to deal with the 
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environment to their own ends, however, the army’s concern for the prevalence of 
tropical diseases in Korea seems to have indeed been well founded. Ben 
Whitchurch spoke of how even decades after the conflict had ended, veterans 
were still subject to concerns about what they may have picked up in Korea: 
Two years ago, I hadn’t been feeling too well and after a check-up I got a 
letter and I had to go away, up to London to have tropical diseases 
investigated, 50 years later! I said to this doctor ‘Why 50 years later are we 
going for tropical disease tests?’ He said ‘Well, Far East you get these 
diseases and they can lie dormant in your body and the area you were; you 
could’ve picked it up and if it surfaced it’ll kill you’. Fortunately, they said I 
haven’t got any, but was a proper worry at the time.74  
We can see from what Whitchurch told the Imperial War Museum that the 
conditions they had faced in Korea still cast shadows on their lives for many years 
to come after the conflicts end. In his case, he found that the diseases he was 
potentially exposed to fighting in Korea still had the potential to cause harm half a 
century later. Although he turned out to be free of any long-term illness from the 
conflict, Whitchurch admitted that he was very worried about the matter when the 
possibility of death was raised to him by his doctor. Whitchurch was not the only 
soldier to face long term effects from the extreme conditions of the Korean 
environment, nor were the lasting effects all physical. John Davison spoke of how 
he was still haunted by memories of the Korean winter during cold snaps back 
home in Britain: ‘Korea didn’t really have all four seasons like, it was more summer 
then straight into the cold. During the winter it was bad… very bad. I still think of 
the memories whenever we get a cold snap’.75 It is clear given the severity of the 
conditions British troops could face in Korea and the frequency that it resurfaces in 
their testimonies that it was a significant part of their experience on the peninsula. 
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Whether soldiers faced the sub-forty degree cold of the Korean Winter or had to 
cope with preventative measures for exotic diseases, it all formed an important 
part of their memories of the conflict.  
Conclusion 
What is apparent from recollections of the Korean frontline environment is that for 
the infantry on the ground, the physical characteristics of the frontlines and the 
activities carried out in them seemed to be a continuity of the First World War 
experience. Despite the many features of the Korean environment which 
distinguish it as a unique challenge for the British Army in the 1950s, over and 
over again, the men on the ground related their experiences through touchstones 
and concepts of the Great War. From this it would further seem that Sheffield’s 
model of the First World War’s influence on the lives of troops in the Second World 
War is indeed a model that can be applied to Korea. Especially given as the 
physical similarities of trench life appear to have been genuinely reflective of the 
First World War, from the point of view of the infantry in Korea.76 What this tells us 
about wider society at the time is that in 1950, the imagery of warfare was still 
overwhelmingly dominated by narratives of the First World War. Whilst fighting in 
Second World War, particularly in the Far East, may seem to better fit the model of 
Korea in hindsight and from a strategic point of view, it is clear that the cultural 
narrative of these more recent events had not yet developed in a way to sway 
wider societies perception of a ‘frontline’. The ways in which Korea veterans 
recount daily activities of life on the Korean frontlines, such as maintaining hygiene 
and maintaining their positions were almost exact parallels of First World War 
experiences described by Winter.77 They describe being made to ‘Stand To’ in the 
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way of soldiers in 1916, reacted to the presence of death in similar ways and even 
entrenched themselves using the same tools as would have been familiar to their 
forebears. Hygiene was maintained to similar standards as had been in both the 
First and Second World Wars and just as in the mythology of the First World War, 
British soldiers in Korea faced rats and vermin, down to the detail of killing them 
with bayonets. Soldiers in Korea even experienced the same fears and anxieties 
towards shelling and bombardment as had men in the First World War as 
described by Roper.78 As if to underline the similarities in recollections to the First 
World War front there was even a recognised dangerous ‘no man’s land’ between 
the opposing lines by 1952. In terms of physical attributes, the no man’s land in 
Korea was also very similar to that experienced on the 1914- 1918 Western Front. 
Soldiers raided and patrolled the space in the same way, encountered similar 
hazards and reacted in a similar manner. Although the Korean environment 
between the lines presented British troops with fewer dead bodies than the First 
World War, other elements pressed the similarity further. There could even be 
temporary truces and allowances made in the face of wounding as there had been 
in World War One.79 There were of course fresh challenges posed to British troops 
by the environment of Korea. Men had to face blistering extremes in weather 
conditions generated by Korea’s unique geography. Siberian storms forced men to 
improvise emergency ways of fighting off the effects of the extreme cold and 
summer heatwaves raised the threat of diseases which plagued soldiers for 
decades after the war’s end. Yet despite this, men still continually defined their 
experience of the Korean Environment in terms of the First World War. The 
environment therefore represents a key element of the Korean War in which the 
strategic view and old military histories have simply failed to convey the 
 





experience of the men on the ground fighting which they have portrayed through 
their testimony. Through this paradigm, although Korea was strange and new, it 
was seen by the infantry an element of continuation in soldiers’ experience 






Chapter 4: The Combat Experience in Korea. 
 
A New Perspective of Killing 
Perhaps the most definitive aspects in a soldier’s experience of warfare are the 
acts of combat and killing. This was a conclusion reached early on in the 
development of new military histories and since then a great deal of writing has 
been dedicated by many authors into examining just how the experience of killing 
impacted the soldier on the ground. John Ellis was amongst the earliest of the new 
military historians who examined soldiers’ experience of combat and fighting with 
The Sharp End.1 What he found in his examination of the Second World War, was 
that initially popular memories of the conflict at the time were shaped not by the 
minority of troops who had faced combat on the front lines but by the majority of 
men whose service had been in support and ‘impersonal’ combat roles. Therefore, 
where the memories of the First World War had produced connotations of the 
horrors of the trenches, those of the later conflict produced fonder allusions to 
overseas travel and recollections of excessive military regimentation. As Ellis 
himself put it, ‘World War I gave us Journey’s End, World War II gave us South 
Pacific’.2 Since then, with thanks to the efforts made by Ellis and many other new 
military historians, as well as a shift in pop culture depictions of the conflict that 
imbalance has largely been redressed in cultural imagery of the Second World 
War. However, his findings in the 1970s on the difference in cultural approach to 
the two World Wars are particularly pertinent to a study of the fighting experience 
in Korea. In this time, a considerable body of new military and oral history has 
since been dedicated to an examination of the soldier’s experience of killing. 
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Joanna Bourke’s works in particular are highly significant in this field. Bourke was 
one of the primary figures who drove the act of killing back to the centre in studies 
of frontline experience. Particularly with, An Intimate History of Killing, she 
highlighted the ways in which men responded to and coped with killing were 
central to military service and could be as bloody and horrific as the act of killing 
itself, coining the phrase, ‘intimate killing’.3 Of course, many others have also 
committed a great deal of research into this subject area. Indeed, with so much 
writing dedicated to this area of a soldier’s experience, why investigate killing and 
combat in Korea? Surely fighting the Chinese and North Koreans in 1951 cannot 
be so different from fighting the Germans in 1916? Yet for all the ubiquities of the 
experience, the Korean War does present a new perspective on this aspect of a 
soldier’s life, for similar reasons to those found by Ellis in 1980. Killing and the 
recounting combat experience are, naturally, quite difficult subject to broach in 
conversation, with an interviewer or otherwise. There are good reasons why the 
myth of the archetypical veteran never speaking about the war is so prevalent. As 
a species and a society, we are programmed to have certain views and 
apprehensions about killing another human. It is quite literally a taboo subject. As 
mentioned, there has been a great deal of work attributed to the study of soldiers’ 
personal experiences of fighting and killing. One of the primary findings of Joanna 
Bourke’s works has been the emotional weight soldiers can attach to the act of 
killing. 4 According to Bourke, combatants in the First and Second World War, as 
well as the Vietnam Conflict, often adopted some form of an emotional 
responsibility to those they have killed. In some instances, this was reflected by 
imagined relationships and fantasies, such as soldiers ‘seeing the faces’ of men 
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they had killed, real or otherwise.5 This emotional responsibility and personalising 
of the opponent reflected an apologetic guilt and was a key barrier from the full 
psychological effects of killing. As if by being remorseful for their actions, the 
soldier could be spared from their own judgement. Alternatively, soldiers studied in 
these conflicts could delve into a deep moral integrity to balance against emotional 
weight.6 In what was essentially an extension of the ‘just following orders’ 
rationale, combatants rationalised their acts of killing as a necessity on behalf of 
their own military institutions and thus distinguish the lives they took in combat 
from murder. However, there seems to be a difference in how veterans of Korea 
viewed the act of killing as opposed to how killing is spoken of in the European 
Wars of the Twentieth Century. This is because there is a cultural sanctity and 
reverence with which killing during the World Wars and other major conflicts must 
be approached. Dating back to what material reached the home front between 
1914 and 1918, killing and death were shown either as morbid horrors meant to 
shock through depictions such as poetry and paintings, or filtered and sanitised in 
footage reels. In this latter category, consisting of ‘socially acceptable’ deaths and 
wounding, a soldier would for example, simply fall down in the mid distance of a 
grainy shot, or a body would be seen with a clean shot to the heart. Even the 
language used by veterans surrounding death in the First World War became 
more sanitary and shied away from putrefaction.7 The Korean War on the other 
hand, is another story. As a result of the subsequent apathy towards the conflict, 
fighting there received no such cultural courtesy. For British culture and society, 
the Korean War has always seemed remote and far away. The result of this is that 
veterans are able to give their thoughts on killing and combat far more freely than 
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if discussing other conflicts. The Korean War is so culturally remote compared to 
the battlefields of France and Europe, that many of the taboos become less 
imposing.  
Views of the Enemy 
One of the other main reasons that soldiers are able to talk so openly of killing in 
Korea is because of the predominant views they held of their enemy at the time. 
As has been established, in the minds of most British soldiers heading out to 
Korea, the predominant popular imagery of warfare was one of a European World 
War. The North Korean and Chinese soldiers faced by the British Army in Korea 
represented a very different enemy to the archetypical white European opponent 
commonplace in imagery of the World Wars. This was a view predicated on the 
fact that the North Korean and Chinese soldiers they faced were in many ways 
alien to British troops. This was a multi-faceted view, influenced my many 
underlying elements, including racial prejudices, views on communism and 
general attitudes towards the conflict. Partially, this was driven by racial and 
colonial thinking. A reoccurring theme throughout the oral testimonies of veterans 
is the view that Asian people in general and the Koreans in particular were 
backwards and less advanced than the British. Ronald Larby, a British signalman 
with the Commonwealth Division Signals Regiment, summarised this view both in 
a written memoir and orally to the Imperial War Museum. When he described the 
city of Pusan where his battalion had disembarked, he attributed the state of 
disrepair to a lack of British influence: 
If you look at Hong Kong, Aden, Singapore, those places, with having the 
British influence, all the buildings were tidy and smart, the streets were 
white, but the thing that struck you about Pusan, it wasn’t like that at all. It 
was just a jumble, a mess, you know, dusty and dirty and dingy.8 
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The racial undertones are very clear from his description of white streets in British 
influenced ports, contrasting with the dust, dirt and dinge he describes Pusan. His 
view of Korea can easily be split into Britishness, which he considers clean and 
tidy and non-British, which was dirty and lesser. Larby was even more direct in his 
written memoir, ‘The Colonial Orderliness of the British Empire, on which the sun 
may be setting, was a damn sight more civilised than this hole’ as well as 
describing Koreans as ‘dirty and shabby’. 9 Similarly, many veterans of the Second 
World War were quick to point out the brutal reputation of Korean soldiers serving 
as Japanese Prison camps and remembered this through their time in Korea.10 
There were also many veterans of Korea who viewed the conflict and their enemy 
with an attitude fitting Britain’s colonial conflicts of the previous century. Contrary 
to views on European opponents who were intrinsically familiar and whose deaths 
in the World Wars were therefore a sad necessity, the colonial attitude reduced the 
North Koreans and Chinese to uncivilised barbarians, reducing their humanity and 
with it any remorse at their deaths. Many soldiers were sceptical of the enemy’s 
own agency in why they fought. Rumours were commonplace amongst British and 
UN troops that the Chinese and North Koreans were only able to motivate their 
men to fight through by drugging them or threatening them with execution and 
torture.11 Not only did this discredit any reasoning and agency the enemy may 
have had for fighting, it further aligned them with ideas of barbarity and incivility.  
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 Alexander Wilson, then Commanding Officer of A Company of the Argyll and 
Sutherland Highlanders and veteran of the Second World War, recalled his 
experience of the difference between the frontline and the rear.  
It was less than 24 hours difference between civilisation and the fighting on 
the frontline to the North, it reminded me very strongly of parachuting over 
Normandy, one night one was in a nice area with a good mess, the next 
you were under gunfire, it was very odd.12 
In his recollection, Wilson very clearly differentiates the ‘civilised’, ‘nice areas’ with 
the fighting on the frontline. By drawing this line, Wilson was implying that the 
South Koreans and the UN forces behind the frontline were civilised, and therefore 
that from the frontlines northward into communist territory was uncivilised. In this 
description we can see overtones of old imperial ways of thinking, including the 
notion of an uncivilised frontier being held back by the British. In this case, the ‘thin 
red line’ is between the civilised South and the uncivil North. This is noteworthy 
because Wilson is specifically equating uncivility with the ‘North’, i.e. the 
Communist forces, and not with the racial identity of Korea in general. This was to 
the extent that Wilson equated the difference between South Korea and North 
Korea to the difference between Britain and fighting during the Battle of Normandy 
during the Second World War. Given that this was not an uncommon view of both 
the Korean people and by extension, the North Korean enemy, it helps to explain 
why some veterans had relatively little difficulty in recounting killing and combat 
with such casual irreverence.  
However, it is worth pointing out that this mindset was not universal and racial 
thinking can only go so far to explain the view British troops held of the enemy. 
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Although many soldiers admitted there was little way for them to tell between a 
hostile North Korean and a friendly South Korean, many also viewed the Korean 
people with a great deal of sympathy and were careful to differentiate between the 
civilians they encountered and hostile military forces.13 Brigadier Kenneth Trevor, 
then a Staff Officer with the 27th British Infantry Brigade, was not unusual in his 
expressions of sympathy to Korean Civilians: 
The refugees came with only what they had piled on them and their 
children. It was very sad. it was the depths of winter when they came. I’m 
told some broke the ice and drowned with their children… Very tragic. They 
must have been in very dire straits. It was interesting to me why they were 
trying to escape from their own people, it certainly didn’t say much for the 
communists if they were all trying to escape them.14 
We can see that Trevor had a clear definition in his view between the Korean 
refugees, towards whom he shows a great deal of pity and sympathy and the 
communist forces driving them south. This differentiation demonstrates that it was 
not only a universal racial bias that shaped British troops views of the enemy, but 
that other factors must have been at play. A major component of this was way in 
which British soldiers were able to brand the enemy as ‘communists’, as Trevor 
stated. This is one of the few areas of the experience of the war where the Cold 
War rhetoric of capitalists versus communists is clearly presented. Leslie 
Winspear, reflected that he viewed the enemy purely in terms of a hostile ideology: 
‘I was very much in favour of the democratic principle and communism was 
certainly totalitarian, so as far as I was concerned it had to be resisted’.15 To an 
extent, this seems to have been both a political stance and an easy branding of 
the enemy. Communism represented an easy way to define an enemy composed 
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of two armies and sharing a great deal of culture with the civilian population. 
However, it also underpins one way in which veterans were more freely able to 
discuss fighting and killing the North Koreans and Chinese. By defining the enemy 
as representing a dangerous ideology, in a similar way to calling the Germans 
Nazis in the Second World War, Korea veterans can rationalise their actions as 
being for the greater good. In short, the Chinese and North Koreans were simply 
strange to British soldiers. They represented cultures, ideology and military 
practices which the average British Soldier had little to no experience of. Whilst a 
certain amount of the post-World War narratives focused on the similarities 
between British and German troops, the Communist Forces in Korea had no easily 
relatable touchstones for men to latch onto. Without any way to actively relate to 
hostile forces and coupled with a general distaste for enemy tactics and racial 
undertones, the view of the enemy presented by British troops makes it much 
easier to discuss the acts fighting and killing than with other more studied conflicts.  
Killing and the Dehumanised Enemy 
One of the primary characteristics of open combat in the Korean War, especially 
following the Chinese intervention, was that it was generally fought at long range 
across valleys, often at night. This meant that for the most part, British soldiers in 
Korea were less likely to see effects of their fire up close until after the fight, if they 
were able to bear witness to it at all. This is not to say that death itself was a 
distant concept, but rather that fighting in these circumstances took on a more 
impersonal characteristic. Private Charles Sharpling recounted a typical 
engagement of this kind with Chinese troops in 1951. His unit’s hilltop position was 
attacked multiple times by Chinese and North Korean forces, always at night: 
We were always having skirmishes at night with them. They’d try and slip 
through the lines. When they attacked, they just shouted to each other, so 
we’d fire at the noise and hope we’d pick them off. That night I think we 




leant up against a tree, the Chinese must have missed him. He was dead 
as a dodo but his eyes were still open. I stopped to look at him, he was just 
stood there; he had his blurp gun just like he was carrying his golfing bag 
and he was young too. He’d died so suddenly his eyes were still open.16 
Sharpling’s main recollection of combat with the Chinese and North Koreans 
shows how separate the individual soldier could be from the act of killing in 
combat. Because the enemy forces primarily attacked his unit’s position at night, 
Sharpling and his comrades resorted to firing at noises, rather than visually aiming 
for a human being. As a result, there is no way that Sharpling or any other soldier 
could be exactly sure how many people he had killed in the fight, if any at all. As 
Sharpling said, he thought that his platoon had killed ‘seven or eight’, but he could 
not be sure. This was partially compounded by the Chinese policy of removing 
their dead from the field when possible, meaning that British soldiers were another 
step further removed from the act of killing. As a result, when Sharpling did finally 
see an enemy he may have killed, his reaction was more curiosity than any kind of 
remorse or reverence, nonchalantly describing how the body carried its ‘blurp gun’ 
like a golfing bag for example.17 In other instances, it was simply the distance 
between the engagement which provided a separation between the act of fighting 
and the act of killing. This was especially the case in the latter stages of the 
conflict, a period characterised by static entrenched warfare reminiscent of the 
fighting on the Western Front of the First World War. In some places, the resulting 
‘no-man’s land’ extended for a considerable distance between United Nations’ 
positions and their Chinese and North Korean counterparts. Winspear, who had by 
this point been promoted to corporal, spend a significant portion of this time with 
an Intelligence and Sniping section. At some point during this period he was part 
 
16 Pte. Charles Herbert Sharpling, (IWM 18544), Reel 1. 
17 ‘Blurp Gun’ was a common slang term used by British troops in reference to the high 




of an impromptu experiment firing anti-tank rockets at Chinese positions across a 
valley and recounted the event in almost unconcerned terms: 
We were experimenting with our anti-tank rockets to see what the effect 
would be on the Chinese machine gun nests. The backwash made it 
impractical and because of all the smoke we could never really tell what 
effect they had, but given how accurate they were I’m almost certain that 
the rocket went into the embrasure and destroyed the gun, but you could 
never see for sure.18 
 
The technicalities of firing the rocket were of more immediate concern in 
Winspear’s recollection than the possibility of killing Chinese soldiers, which 
highlights the point that Winspear viewed the action as something cold and 
detached, with no reference to possible casualties. This is not necessarily 
crassness, rather that his recollection of the event was defined by what he could 
actually see as a target, that being an inanimate emplacement, rather than an 
occupied enemy position. The calmness of his reaction and the seeming disregard 
potentially killing demonstrates how the distance and the unseen nature of the 
enemy, made the concept of the individual opponent irrelevant. The gun’s crew 
became merely an extension of the physical machinegun, which was the only 
visible target. In these regards, the inability to closely visualise an individual 
opponent made the act of combat seem separate from the act of actively killing 
another human being. To an extent, the experience of the British soldier fighting in 
Korea in these circumstances becomes more similar to the fighter and bomber 
pilots of the Second World War who also fought at a distance to the enemy. Martin 
Francis’s work on the accounts of RAF aircrew in the 1940s, found that because 
their visualisation of the enemy was not human, but an aircraft or a distant ground 
target, they were often able to separate the act of combat from the act of killing. 19 
These pilots and bombardiers were able to reassure themselves that their targets 
 
18 Sgt. Leslie Maynard Winspear, (IWM 21593), Reel 3. 




were purely strategic and therefore distance themselves from the human cost. It 
appears from their testimony that a similar phenomenon was at work for British 
Soldiers in Korea.  
This would seem to suggest that in cases where the individuality of the enemy was 
stripped away, British soldiers became less prone to experiencing an emotional 
reaction. This was true of the effects of fighting at extreme range and at night, 
however it would also seem to be the case when combat occurred against visible 
enemy forces in overwhelming numbers. On many occasions, United Nations 
troops encountered ‘human wave’ attacks from Chinese and North Korean forces. 
The basic principle of the human wave tactic was a huge direct assault of densely 
concentrated infantry against an enemy position, without any attempts to shield or 
to mask the attacking force’s movement. The effectiveness of the attack was as 
much psychological as it was physical and it was typical of Chinese assaults 
following their entry to the war. To an extent, these massed attacks against UN 
trenches and defensive positions were reminiscent of the manoeuvres employed 
amidst the trenches of the First World War, however, no one in Korea glorified 
them as a ‘wild rush in the highland tradition’ as had happened then.20 John 
Grosvenor, a private who was with the Gloucesters during the infamous Battle of 
Imjin, fought against one of the largest waves attacks of the war and recounted 
that his unit ‘had to fire more or less continually at the attack, just as fast as you 
could kill them, there was just more and more coming’. 21 To soldiers like 
Grosvenor, fighting in the mountains and valleys of Korea, the sheer number of 
enemy soldiers made them seem more like a physical force or tide, rather than as 
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a mass of individual soldiers. This is reflected most clearly in how veterans refer to 
the attacks. Instead of referring to the enemy in human terms, the soldiers who 
faced wave attacks describe their enemy simply as ‘waves’ or, in Grosvenor’s 
case, simply ‘the attack’. All elements of individual humanity in the attackers were 
stripped away by the sheer volume of their numbers. In the desperation created by 
such an offensive, defending troops fought to survive as much as to kill. As a 
result, their reaction to the experience could become equally as detached. Fredrick 
Thompson recalled his reaction to combat and killing during desperate night-
fighting for a key position on the east flank of the Imjin battlefield: 
We manned a Bren gun and we used up all our ammunition, fourteen 
completely full magazines, in just half an hour. We counted at least thirty 
bodies on the forward slope. I don’t recall feeling anything else other than 
the realisation that you were a professional, doing what professionals had 
to do, given those circumstances. There was no time to think of the 
situation, or of the people behind and around you. They may all be dead 
and you are the only one in the world left in that slip trench, firing away.22  
Thompson, like Grosvenor, was faced with an overwhelming number of enemy 
combatants. He and a squad mate fired a powerful automatic weapon at the 
Chinese forces for a prolonged period.23 Thompson was not spared the results of 
his actions and witnessed a large number of bodies lying in front of his position as 
a direct result of his fire. Despite this, Thompson remained unemotional in his 
reaction and viewed his actions as strictly professional. His reaction and 
recollection of how he fought and killed in that battle, is highly informative of how 
British soldier’s experienced fighting against human wave attacks in Korea. 
Fighting against human waves became less about fighting the individual foes and 
became more about halting an impersonal wave of opposition. Both Grosvenor 
and Thompson’s reactions to the human wave was such that it became almost an 
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inanimate thing, not a force composed of human beings, but an abstract concept. 
What is more, Thompson further separated himself from the act of killing 
personally, by invoking the professional status of a soldier. By doing this and 
framing his combat experience as ‘a professional, doing what professionals had to 
do’, Thompson is reflecting a reaction found often in soldiers of other conflicts. 
Bourke and many others, have discussed how soldiers can enter into a cold 
‘agentic mode’, whereby a soldier places the barrier of their institution between 
their actions and moral or emotional responsibility.24 Soldiers ‘Do what they must’, 
just as Thompson ‘did what he had to do’. However, these cases all stem from 
conflicts with a much greater emotional expectation attached to them. In the World 
Wars and Vietnam there is an element of human tragedy produced by the cultural 
representations of these wars. Soldiers are expected to have emotional and 
human reactions in these cases. For British troops in Korea who fought at range, 
at night or against the sheer volume of the human wave, there was no individuality 
to the enemy soldier. Additionally, because of the disinterest society has shown to 
Korea in the years since the conflicts end, there is no perceived need to show an 
emotional attachment to the enemy either. Therefore, in these circumstances, the 
testimony of Korea veterans can provide new perspectives on the acts of killing 
and combat not seen in similar oral histories from more well studied conflicts.  
Killing and the Humanised Enemy  
One area of combat in Korea which generated a highly personal response to killing 
were instances of close-range engagements in which soldiers were able to 
visualise an enemy on an individual level. Although they were not the majority of 
engagements, close quarters engagements were not entirely uncommon for British 
 
24 J. Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, PP 203- 229; D. Mantell & R. Panzarella, 
‘Obedience and Responsibility’, British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 15:1, 




troops to experience throughout the conflict. Fighting on these occasions took 
place at minimal range and in some instances, in broad daylight. In such 
conditions, there were no situational circumstances to hide or otherwise diminish 
the humanity of the enemy from British soldiers. Fighting like this took place 
throughout the Korean War, in urban environments, in between lines on combat 
patrols and even in brutal trench fights reminiscent of the First World War. One 
such occasion of a close quarters melee was recounted by Private Robert Searle. 
Whilst serving with a mortar platoon of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 
Searle’s convoy accidentally ran into a lost North Korean unit in the village of 
Sariwon: 
We pulled into this village and it was full of North Koreans and we assumed 
they must be prisoners. We had a tank with this white star and the Koreans 
were pointing to it and saying ‘Ruskies’ and we ended up mingling. We 
were stood around trying to swap badges. In the end, our Sergeant clocked 
it and started telling us to get back to the Bren Carriers. They must have 
realised too because one of theirs pulled the trigger and killed the Sergeant 
and all hell broke loose, shots going every which way. Our tanks opened 
fire, they had about four machine guns each and it was just terrible. There 
was one Korean I remember, a huge hulking man, tried to dive away but my 
phosphorous grenade got him and he was just gone.25 
In instances such as this where the enemy were clearly visible, soldiers like Searle 
clearly had a more emotional reaction to combat. Not only was Searle faced with 
the death of his Sergeant and witnessing a volley from the tanks at close range, 
but he also saw the effect of his own grenade on a human being in very immediate 
terms. The boundary between, person, soldier and enemy had very much been 
diminished both in the physical sense of distance and in the emotional and 
personal sense. The man Searle killed with a grenade clearly stood out as an 
individual person. Searle was able to clearly recall details which made the man 
stand out from other North Korean soldiers, as well as the specific type of grenade 
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he threw to kill him and the manner in which the Korean had tried to dive away.26 
Unlike instances where troops had engaged at long range or with poor visibility, 
Searle had been in close enough to visually individualise the man and possibly 
even have tried to swap memorabilia with him moments earlier. The language 
used by Searle to describe the killing, as opposed to the combat, further highlights 
the effect the personalisation of the enemy had. He describes the close quarters 
fighting as ‘hell let loose’ and the effect of seeing the British tanks open fire on the 
massed North Koreans as ‘terrible’. He even recalled the absence of a body from 
his own grenade blast as if something was wrong or amiss, as if he were 
expecting more tangible results of killing a man. This is a tremendous contrast 
from words of men fighting in more impersonal combat settings, where upon the 
bodies of the enemy and the effects of fire upon them were a curious detail. 
Clearly, in cases of close-range fighting, with no way of obscuring the humanity of 
the enemy, veterans of Korea were more likely to have the same highly emotional 
reactions to combat and killing as seen in other conflicts.27  
Veterans of the Korean War could also display surprising reactions to killing 
enemies, even those who were individualised. Some of the men who spoke of 
their experiences even recalled feeling surprising emotional reactions such as 
feelings of intense thrill and pleasure. This may seem counter intuitive to 
commonly held notions of combat and fighting. It would be expected that entering 
into battle represented a wholly nightmarish experience in which men universally 
lamented their actions and regretted what they had done. However, the opposite 
was just what some individuals described. Ashley Cunningham-Boothe had 
volunteered with his friends to be deployed to Korea with the Northumberland 
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Fusiliers. When he recounted his record of the advance north in 1950, he suddenly 
confessed his feelings towards fighting and combat:  
I have to say that I discovered within my make-up an unpleasant part of me 
that enjoyed parts of the war… I enjoyed killing people. It was a good 
feeling. In fact, one of the strongest impressions I have, was once a battle 
was over and you’re sitting there having a mug of tea and a cigarette and 
you’re exchanging your experiences and the honesty that you find in that 
brief moment in time is incredible. The fact that there was enjoyment in it 
must seem to be extraordinary to one who has not been in a war situation, 
but to me it was just natural to be the way I was, because that’s the way we 
all were as soldiers. We were there to kill the enemy and we did it. The 
adrenaline rush and the sense of having been in a major battle and 
survived, it’s a shot like nothing, I imagine that even cocaine couldn’t vie 
with it for an experience. I imagine it’s a bit like being a gladiator, being in 
the arena and beating your adversary. My friends say they feel the same 
way, John and Martin told me how much they miss the adrenaline of being 
in action, they’d be back there tomorrow like I would.28 
The manner in which Cunningham-Boothe expressed his feelings implied that this 
was partly a confession and partly reminiscence. Whilst he expresses guilt for 
feeling the way he did, describing it as an unpleasant part of himself, he also 
admits to feeling a tremendous joy in the act of fighting and specifically killing. He 
describes it as being like a narcotic shot, addictive and a pleasurable experience 
from engaging in the fight itself, to the thrill of surviving and the joy of reliving it 
with his comrades. Cunningham-Boothe’s experience of combat may seem 
unusual and he even suggested himself that it must seem extraordinary, however 
it is not a unique phenomenon. Countless other examples of soldiers who enjoyed 
combat and killing have been collected throughout the course of new military 
histories. Bourke found many examples of men from all backgrounds in the First 
World War who found the act of killing an enemy to be ‘gorgeously satisfying’ and 
as late as Vietnam who described being ‘happier than they ever had been’ when 
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going into combat.29 Similarly to how Cunningham-Boothe suggested killing had a 
rush like narcotics, Bourke describes examples of soldiers who had intense highs 
from fighting, even in almost sexual terms, like how Cunningham-Boothe spoke of 
enjoying a cigarette afterwards.30 The immediate reminiscing of combat also has 
historic precedent. During their efforts to promote material related to Armistice 
celebrations, a German veteran of the First World War spoke to the BBC about 
how, after storming a French position, his comrades revelled in surviving and 
boasted of what they had done: ‘They were absolutely undisturbed by what we 
had done. One of them boasted that he had killed a Frenchman with the butt of his 
rifle, another laughed that he had strangled a captain, a third one hit someone 
over the head with his spade’.31 Cunningham-Boothe’s friends told him years later 
that they felt the same way and would gladly return to combat. For these men 
infantry combat was an exhilarating sport, like gladiatorial combat in which they 
pushed themselves to the physical limit and defeated enemies for the prize of 
living.  
Mechanised Killing  
The experience of the act of killing could be drastically different for British soldiers 
who operated in other combat roles. The infantryman’s perspective of killing was 
particularly affected by how they were able to visualise the enemy. The more 
individualised an enemy soldier became, the more intense the emotional reaction 
to the act of killing. Whilst this may be true for soldiers on the ground, it seems that 
the experience was very different for armoured crews fighting in Korea. British tank 
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crews fighting in the Korean War fought and killed their enemies through an 
entirely different interface to how infantry fought. Unlike infantry, they were not 
fighting on level terms with the enemy as but instead engaged in battle through a 
fully encased machine. They acted in technical roles as a part of both their crew 
and the tank itself. Unlike the fighting which had taken place between 1939 and 
1945, armoured warfare in Korea rarely involved engaging with enemy tanks. As a 
result, tank crews were more usually involved in either in-direct fire support roles, 
similar to mobile artillery, or in some cases, direct assault against enemy infantry. 
In these latter cases, the power afforded to British armoured crews against 
Chinese troops lacking any form of effective anti-tank weaponry, could create a 
drastically different experience of combat from the exposed infantry fighting on 
foot. Captain Dowling, who had served with C Company of the 8th King’s Royal 
Irish Hussars, told his regimental journal of his involvement in a relief action at the 
Battle Imjin in 1951:  
Infantrymen were falling like flies under the close quarters fire. The rest of 
our tanks had forced their way down the last lap of the valley through milling 
Chinamen. They reported that they could see an estimated two thousand or 
more, swarming down the western hillsides from the heights where they 
had been held up all day. Our Centurions came through, crushing enemy 
under their tracks. Sgt. Cadman found a Chinaman battering at our turret to 
get in and directed the tank straight through the wall of a house, to brush 
him off and then ran over an M.G. post beside the road. We then found 
what must have been three platoons of Infantry in parade-ground order 
coming out of the river bed and they were blown to confusion with some of 
the last ammunition our tanks carried. Some tanks took to the paddy and 
were ploughing-in communists, crouched under every bank. The firing was 
a continuous iron rain on the outside of the tanks.32 
There are two elements to Dowling’s experience of fighting at the Imjin which 
speak to the fact that his view of the enemy was notably different from that of the 
infantry who had fought the Chinese and North Koreans on foot. Firstly, is the 
extent to which fighting as part of a tank crew made the combat more impersonal 
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as a result of Dowling being just one part of a multi- person crew, all of whom were 
required to operate the centurion tank. When he talks of who was involved in the 
act of killing, he refers to the tanks themselves, not himself or the other crew 
manning them. He does not state ‘I’ or ‘we’ killed, but ‘the Centurions’ or ‘the 
tanks’. Evidently, in his mind, it was the tanks which were killing, not the people 
operating them. Naturally, this changed his perspective of his combat experience 
as it negated individual responsibility for the act of killing and made it a group 
effort. His actions were not his own as an isolated individual, but were taken as a 
part of a multitude, through a machine. In this way, fighting as a tanker Dowling 
was able to separate his own individuality from the act of killing. Bourke described 
how soldiers in Vietnam and the Second World War also behaved in this way, 
albeit on a wider scale. These men could kill with less emotional conscious when it 
was done on behalf of a group or institution.33 It seems that this was playing out on 
a smaller scale here, as Dowling viewed his actions on behalf of the tanks 
themselves, rather than as an individual. Secondly, there is the extent to which the 
technological nature of armoured warfare and the manner in which Dowling and 
his comrades fought made his view of killing Chinese soldiers much less personal 
and distanced from seeing them as human beings. He describes the killing that 
took place as if he viewed the attacking enemy as little more than a nuisance, 
graphically describing how they ‘fell like flies’. Similarly, the manner in which he 
describes his tank being driven nonchalantly through a building to clear off 
Chinese infantry highlights just how separate is role within the tank made him feel 
from the human element of the battle. The virtual invulnerability of the armoured 
crews and the technical way in which they faced operated allowed these men to 
approach the battle in practical, unromantic terms. In this regard, the tank crew 
 




fighting in Korea were similar to the aircrews who had fought in the Second World 
War. Their experience and engagement with combat was not done on the ground 
with a rifle, but through technology, machinery and science. Martian Francis 
analysed how this separation from fighting, through tasks and skills which were 
more akin to an engineer than an infantryman, produced a combatant with a very 
different take on traditional views of warfare.34 Similarly, Dowling talked about how 
his armoured squadron engaged a huge force of Chinese troops as if it were 
agricultural work. Although it is disturbing to see ‘ploughing in’ used as analogy for 
running down and killing enemy soldiers, it highlights just how far above the 
outside enemy tank crews could view themselves. As Bourke put it of the World 
Wars, technology provided a means to facilitate human destruction to such a scale 
as to reduce it to a business like a stockyard.35  
Reacting to Fear in Combat 
As much as the act of killing, fearing the potential to be killed or wounded was the 
greatest hallmark of the experience of combat. Reacting to combat through fear is  
well observed in the experience of soldiers throughout history.36 Accordingly the 
soldier’s experience of fear has been present and accounted for in new military 
histories since the school’s earliest days. John Ellis noted that fear was a constant 
presence in the Second World War combatant’s experience and that being ‘scared 
shitless all the time’ was a commonplace reaction for combat troops. In the pacific 
theatre for example, up to 84% of US troops reported feeling fear to an extent that 
it impaired their combat capability to some extent.37 Although there have been no 
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similar comparative studies to the ones quoted by Ellis done on Korea, fear is also 
brought often in the testimony of Korea veterans. More recently, Emma Newlands 
approached the experience of fear, wounding and death for the British soldier in 
the Second World War, mainly through the paradigm of the body. The primary 
themes Newlands uncovered in examining soldiers’ testimonies, was that in the 
face of wounding, death and fear in combat, men had no uniform reaction though it 
was experienced in some way by all combatants. Some soldiers suffered very 
negative emotions as would be expected and yet for a great many, the essence of 
combat activities meant either little, or in some cases became a source of joy.38 
Newlands’s work is an area of study aptly applied to the experience of men in the 
Korean War, who, despite fighting a different enemy in a different field, also 
exhibited similar reactions to combat, death and killing.39 Although the scale of the 
conflict faced by the British Army in Korea was much smaller than the events of 
the World Wars, it was still an intense combat experience, with a far higher 
percentage of troops deployed suffering casualties. It is difficult to come to an 
exact percentage figure of casualty rates, due to incomplete records of the number 
of British troops who served in Korea, however it can be estimated between 5% to 
10%, as opposed to 3.3% for the Second World War.40 In short, soldiers in Korea 
had ample reason to experience fear of wounding or death in combat, just as 
much as during the Second World War. British troops in Korea were clearly very 
well aware of the threat of wounding and death in combat upon their arrival to the 
frontline. Physical manifestations of fear in these cases were common 
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occurrences in soldiers throughout the war and were found in both new arrivals to 
the frontline and veterans of combat. Winspear recalled how one new soldier 
reacted to being picked to join the battalion’s intelligence section, a unit which 
often had to engage in highly dangerous operations between the frontlines:  
I was picking men for the intelligence section out of the reinforcements. I 
took a couple and as it came to be, we had this one man, a National 
Serviceman who used to be an engine driver, who was so afraid of his 
situation that he developed a severe bedwetting problem from that night 
onwards.41 
Winspear describes how the National Serviceman he had picked from a batch of 
new reinforcements reacted with a physical manifestation of fear as soon as he 
was picked for a combat intensive role. Intelligence sections of a battalion were 
often involved in highly dangerous roles on top of regular combat duties. This 
included activities such as mapping minefields and traps, scouting and patrolling 
between allied and enemy lines, often crossing the latter, sniping roles, conducting 
raids on enemy positions and investigating new enemy weapons and tactics. 
Suffice to say that a unit’s intelligence section had a very dangerous role in the 
field, with a high chance of wounding or death. This can have only served to make 
the National Serviceman’s feelings all the worse, having just arrived in Korea from 
a relatively safe profession, only to be immediately placed in such a dangerous 
position by Winspear. As a result, the National Serviceman began wetting the bed 
from that day onward. This was a typical bodily manifestation of fear as had 
occurred throughout previous conflicts. Newlands had noted that primary 
symptoms of severe fear in soldiers typically included instances of uncontrollable 
sweating, shaking and involuntary release of bodily fluids, just as happened 
here.42 The fact that such a severe episode of fear overcame the National 
serviceman as soon as he arrived on the frontlines clearly demonstrates that men 
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were keenly aware of the dangers posed by combat in Korea from the moment 
they were deployed. It seems clear that fear in combat was a universal part of 
frontline life in Korea. However, reactions to combat fears were not always as 
compromising as bedwetting or crippling anxiety. Some soldiers reacted to fear by 
doubling down on their combat roles and focusing on the mission at hand, in a 
manner similar to that observed during the Second World War.43 In these 
instances, some individuals were seemingly able to shrug off the effects of their 
proximity to the wounded and manage the dangers that had befallen them with a 
cool calmness. This was especially well observed behaviour in soldiers in 
leadership roles, particularly in officers and more junior non-commissioned 
officers. Undoubtedly, this was due in part to the expectation that leaders in a 
combat environment had to set an example, however it is still an interesting angle 
on reactions to fear. Lieutenant Millar, a soldier with the Royal Australian regiment, 
at the Battle of Kapyong in 1951, recalled watching a British officer’s deliberate 
and controlled reaction to danger whilst surrounded and under fire: 
Colonel Ferguson seemed very calm and acted like he was in total control 
of the situation. He showed a great concern for our wounded whilst 
encircled, with no apparent regard for his own safety. It was as if he was 
just in a practice drill.44 
Here we can see an example of how leaders in combat were expected to 
completely invert their reaction to fear and approach the situation with an 
exemplary calmness. Millar describes how despite being in a desperate combat 
situation, encircled by the enemy and under fire, Colonel Ferguson took deliberate 
steps to show a lack of fear. By acting as if it was no more dangerous than a 
practice drill, Ferguson was able to project an image calmness despite the 
ongoing combat around him. In other instances, soldiers became completely numb 
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to fear once combat had started, regardless of their feelings beforehand. Sergeant 
Fredrick Thompson, also recalled an absence of fear in combat during the same 
night of fighting in which he had fired the Bren gun: 
It was quite nerve racking but I think the thing that came across more than 
anything, was the negative feeling that it didn’t matter what you did, as long 
as you did something. The realisation that you were in the position that you 
were just didn’t seem to matter. I don’t recall any feeling of fear, just a need 
to act in some way.45 
For Thompson, his reaction to combat was not manifested in fear in a traditional 
sense but rather in a type of almost fatalistic anxiety which spurred him into action. 
He describes the need to simply do something as opposed to nothing, regardless 
of what it was, as more nerve racking than any actual tangible fear. Rather than 
resulting in hindering symptoms, Thompson experienced fear as a useful 
motivator. He was more nervous of not acting and failing, rather than being 
wounded by action. This too is a phenomenon which had been observed in 
soldiers from the Second World War. Newlands noted that whilst a soldier’s 
experience of fear in combat could indeed be paralysing, it could also prove to be 
a potent source of motivation, something which men could convert into aggression 
and spur to action, just as Thompson found in 1951.46 Often, fear as a reaction to 
combat experience did not manifest itself until a considerable time afterwards. 
Veterans of combat could be aware of the fact that they experienced no fear at the 
time, however they changed their opinions over the passing years. Private Ronnie 
Taylor was serving with the 1st Battalion of the Durham Light Infantry when he was 
deployed to Korea. Part of his duties on the frontline was to work with South 
Korean troops operating an overhead cable pully system to get ammunition 
supplies to men fighting from in elevated positions: 
I was up fixing the flyover and whilst I was balancing on top to fix the 
bearings, shots started whizzing past. I remember my Sergeant Major 
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shouting that I should be sectioned for what I was doing. Anyway, about 
then we started to come under shell fire and I remember at first thinking 
how distant that fire seemed. I just watched and looked down at the view. I 
saw two lads working on the bottom end, one of our chaps and a Korean 
and a shell hit them and like that they were both gone. I didn’t think 
anything of what I was doing at the time, but if you ask me now, I’d agree 
with the Sergeant Major and say yes, I should have been sectioned.47  
 
When recalling what he had done, Taylor seemed amazed at his own reaction to 
the danger he was in. At the time he had just taken working in that phenomenally 
precarious and extremely dangerous position as a part of his job, despite the 
protests of his Sergeant Major. He had little reaction to the danger he was in at the 
time even when being fired upon by the enemy. This was to the extent that he just 
watched enemy artillery fire landing near his position as if he was a passive 
observer. It seemed that Taylor recognised the potential of being wounded, but 
viewed it as something unlikely or impossible, perhaps as something that just 
happened to other people. It was not until he discussed the shell fire killing two of 
his comrades, did he concede that what he was doing was very dangerous and 
jokingly agreed with the Sergeant Major that he was mad for doing what he did. 
Taylor was not the most extreme case of this however. On other occasions, 
soldiers took their reaction to danger even further than a blasé attitude. In some 
cases, reacting to fear with overt demonstrations of bravado could prove to be 
even more dangerous than inaction. During the closing stage of the Battle of the 
Hook, fresh troops arriving to the front had to be officially warned in briefings 
against rushing back into fire to rescue the wounded and fallen.48 Clearly, 
concerns were being shown that men could react to far to fear by trying to show 
bravery, even to the point of putting themselves in unnecessary danger. These 
men exhibited behaviours and tendencies that deliberately exaggerated the 
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dangers posed to them in battle despite these warnings. One component of this 
group was composed of troops from both volunteer and National Service 
backgrounds, who developed lackadaisical attitudes towards danger and the 
threat of wounding. Examples of this ranged in scale. In some instances, soldiers 
would walk alongside their trenches to make travelling through the lines easier, 
despite the potential danger posed by enemy fire.49 Whilst this was undoubtedly 
dangerous, it was sometimes a necessity and a calculated risk on the part of the 
men doing so. In other cases however, a lackadaisical approach to danger was 
developed in spite of the chance of wounding rather than calculated against it. 
More surprisingly, this behaviour was just as common in more experienced 
soldiers as it was in new troops fresh to the front. Sergeant Major George 
Patterson of the Black Watch reflected upon how he encountered severe problems 
with the attitude to danger shown by longer serving troops when faced with new 
reinforcements: 
Actually, the volunteers who’d been with us the longest could leave a lot to 
be desired. They thought of themselves as the would-be all soldier types, 
despite being nothing of the sort. See, they would try to show off to the 
younger ones, which is not the sort of thing you want in positions of life and 
death. You suddenly had to continually be chasing them up ‘Wear your 
steel helmet, wear your flak jacket’ that sort of thing. They could be so 
unimaginative in that way. They didn’t think anything about it until someone 
was sniped, then they all think, ‘oh that could have been me’ and suddenly 
it’s all ‘best do what the Sergeant Major says’. The worst we had, was one 
of our highlanders, thought he was invincible just like all the other young 
lads. Anyway, he was killed by shrapnel because he didn’t have his gear 
on.50  
Here, Patterson recalled how some of his more experienced career soldiers began 
to show off a lackadaisical attitude to danger in front of new recruits. With the 
arrival of troops who could be viewed beneath them, some of Patterson’s men 
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adopted an almost fatalistic, devil may care approach to danger, projecting the 
attitude that they were invincible. Possibly, this could even be driven by an attempt 
to project a masculine bravado and toughness in the face of untested soldiers. By 
discarding lifesaving equipment like helmets and flak jackets, these men were 
pushing the idea that they are tough enough not to need such protection. To an 
extent, they were using the fear and danger as leverage to display their own 
masculinity and assert a confidence or even a superiority over new troops. 
Patterson himself attributed this to an arrogance of youth, almost as a rebellion 
against army authority in the face of new arrivals. This seems even more likely 
when we consider that despite Patterson’s repeated warnings of the dangers and 
‘chasing up’ of slacking men, some troops continued to do so. Patterson went on 
to describe how it was difficult to get men to face danger with a more serious 
attitude. ‘You had to do it in a particular way, not just shouting at them but telling 
them for their own sake to wear your tin hat’.51 The fact that ‘shouting’ at soldiers 
to improve their attitude to danger was apparently ineffective would further suggest 
that their reaction was partially motivated by a rebellion against authority. As 
Patterson stated men would improve and listen to him once the danger was made 
apparent and it was clearly in their own best interests to comply, but not when 
directed by naked authority. In a sense, soldiers rebelliously employing a blasé 
reaction to combat to spite army authority could be considered an expression of 
bodily control in the in the army’s frontline regime. By exposing their body to 
danger unnecessarily, soldiers were exercising a subtle rebellion against the 
army’s control of their person. Edward Bulley from the King’s Shropshire regiment, 
spoke to the Imperial War Museum of how in 1951 before being made an NCO, he 
 




and his comrades would continually place their bodies in places of mild danger 
precisely because they were told not to: 
We used to get in a lot of bother for not wearing our tin hats or for walking 
along the parapet of the trench rather than in the trenches and such. It was 
dangerous, we knew and there were miles of trenches, it was just like the 
14- 18 war, but we were just typical English people not doing as we was 
told in circumstances like that. So, we used to just keep walking around the 
top of it. We would even go sunbathing on the parapet in the summer 
without any problems.52 
We can see from Bulley’s testimony that he and the other soldiers in his unit were 
deliberately exposing their bodies to known danger purely because they were 
being told not to. Soldiers walking along the top of trenches and ditching helmets, 
were not only practical concessions to comfort, but were used as ways of exerting 
control over one’s own body. This was not just a relaxed attitude to bodily danger, 
but a leveraging of danger into rebellion. The clearest case of this was sunbathing 
on the trench parapet, exposing themselves to what they were told was dangerous 
not only without protective gear, but shirtless and bare skinned. As Bulley states, 
he and his fellows were well aware of the danger posed by their activities, however 
he attributes his actions squarely to being contrary to authority, more so than to 
make life easier. By deliberately and rebelliously placing the body in harm’s way 
on the frontline, these men’s reactions to danger represent a similar but less 
extreme form of bodily control than one observed by Newlands during the Second 
World War. Soldiers rebelling against army control and authority over their body 
could resort to physically damaging themselves, in some cases with minor 
superficial damage, such as deliberately cutting oneself whilst shaving, to serious 
cases of self-harm, wounding and even suicide.53 It seems from what Patterson 
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and Bulley described, men in Korea were expressing a similar rebellion on the 
frontlines. Sergeant Patterson himself represented a soldier who had been through 
the Second World War and who had learned to value the protection to his body 
offered by personal armour and the iconic steel ‘tin hat’ brodie helmet. In many 
ways therefore, his experience of fear in combat was quite the opposite of the 
soldiers who were slacking in the face of danger. Conversely, Bulley represented 
those who were able to leverage danger into a form of rebellion. By actively 
placing themselves in forbidden danger, these men were finding the only ways 
they could to defy army restrictions over their person.  
Non-Combat Troops in Battle 
Thus far this chapter has examined combat through the testimony of men who 
were present on the frontlines of the conflict. However, not every British soldier 
deployed to the Korean War experienced combat through the sights of a rifle or 
from behind a machine gun. Many soldiers were involved in fighting through much 
less direct means of battle. Artillerymen, support troops and all manner of 
administrative personnel were each key components of the British Army’s fighting 
force in Korea and although they were not all necessarily on the cutting edge of 
the battlefront, they had their own thoughts and experiences of combat. These 
men all reacted to the experiences of combat in their own individual way. Although 
this has been observed in oral histories from other conflicts and is not a unique 
phenomenon to Korea, the testimony of these non-frontline troops is still highly 
valuable as a representation of these groups. Their view of the enemy could be 
very different, both figuratively and literally, than the view of troops who had to 
face hostile forces in direct infantry combat. Their reaction to facing fear in combat 
could be different from that of men trained and prepared for it. How they reacted to 




Twentieth Century that many soldiers who had roles away from the frontlines were 
equally as likely to develop intense reactions to the experience of combat as 
frontline infantry. 54 There were occasions during the Korean conflict in which 
soldiers who did not normally serve on the frontline were placed in positions where 
it was highly likely that they would have to engage directly in combat. In these 
cases, some personnel from non-combat roles developed an intense desire to 
enter into combat and even took steps to transfer to frontline roles afterwards. 
Winspear recounted such a case during desperate fighting at the Battle of the 
Hook, in which a gap in allied frontline required clerks from a battalion 
headquarters to be rushed forward with the infantry: 
We grabbed every able body we could from headquarters to plug the gap in 
the lines, they even ordered the orderly room clerks up with us, despite their 
reservations. The Chinese could have walked through in broad daylight if 
they’d clocked the situation. I was very worried about taking casualties and I 
remember advancing through the mortar fire and looking left and right and 
just seeing explosions, all around us. The two orderlies who were with us 
had the widest grins and were thoroughly enjoyed the outing. After the 
whole affair one of them asked to be transferred to the rifle company, where 
he quickly became a section leader and corporal, but he never came home 
from Korea. He was killed shortly afterwards at another part of the Hook, 
covering his patrol’s retreat. 55 
Winspear described how, despite the Clerks’ initial reservations about being sent 
into battle, they ultimately enjoyed the experience and one even transferred into 
the rifle company to return to battle. It seems that the clerks went from being 
hesitant and fearful of entering combat, to finding it to be an adventure. The 
circumstances they were fighting in were enough to make Winspear, a veteran 
combat leader, nervous of taking casualties and losing men, yet the clerks still 
seemed to enjoy it. It appears that these men were reviling in the rare opportunity 
to become combatants. Similar to the manner in which Cunningham- Boothe 
described an enjoyment of combat, except that these men were experiencing up 
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close something which they had only been involved with indirectly from a distance 
beforehand. Surprisingly, this is something not uncommonly observed in previous 
new military histories. Bourke noted how soldiers from civilian and non-combatant 
roles often developed intense emotional desires to fight and kill, sometimes to an 
even greater extent than regular troops.56 It seems this is clearly the case here, 
especially as one man volunteered to be placed back into combat soon after. The 
latter clerk who became a rifleman would eventually go on to be a section leader in 
combat and ultimately die in an act of conspicuous bravery. From the manner in 
which Winspear describes it, it appears that it was because of the taste for danger 
and fighting he developed as a reaction to being suddenly pushed to the frontlines.  
It was not just encounters with direct combat which could stir such powerful 
reactions. To face wounding and death on the frontlines was a particularly deep 
and impactful experience, regardless of the conflict in which it was encountered. 
These encounters with broken bodies were always emotionally difficult.57 The 
ways in which troops from behind the frontlines reacted when presented with 
wounding and death was also more complicated. Under normal circumstances, 
these men operated with a layer of perceived safety between themselves and the 
nearest enemy troops. This was particularly the case for gunners and artillerymen. 
In instances where this perceived safety proved to be an illusion, these men could 
experience intense emotional reactions. John Davison, being a gunner with the 
Royal Artillery, only engaged in combat indirectly and as a result he was never 
confronted by death or wounding until he was injured in a vehicle crash: 
By this point in the war it was all pretty steady, we were behind our lines, 
the enemy were behind theirs. The lads in the infantry up on the front made 
sure none of them ever got through like, so it was all right for us. We felt we 
were safe back on the guns and we just used to fire over the top. I realised 
how bad it really were when I were in the triage, because suddenly you 
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were seeing what was happening to them infantry from the front. We never 
really saw anything like that but those boys got it bad like… Not all of them 
made it. It was horrible to see, made you realise how rough the whole thing 
could be like, you started to worry about yourself a lot more.58  
The visit to the hospital away from the fighting blurred the lines of safety for 
Davison was presented with the reality of wounding and combat in a manner from 
which he was normally far removed. He describes how experiencing the sight of 
the wounded infantry was one of the few sour memories he brought back from 
Korea and how it made him realise how bad the frontline could be. By the winter of 
1952 when Davison was injured, the frontlines of the war had become much more 
static than the rapid movements that had occurred earlier in the war. For the 
troops of Davison’s battery, there were very few instances by this point where they 
would be directly confronted by the threat of enemy infantry or being wounded in 
combat. Davison believed that his separation from the frontlines provided him with 
a degree of safety and to an extent this was true. However, it also meant that he 
was not faced with the dangers and potential of wounding and death and he 
reflected that it was rare to see injuries in his role. This was his view until he 
arrived in a field hospital and was confronted by it directly. The extent of his 
separation from the frontline is made all the clearer in that he received his wounds 
in a car crash rather than as a result of enemy action or fire. Chris Shilling 
highlighted how during the Second World War, encounters with wounding and 
death could prove to be particularly moving for soldiers who personally bore 
witness to dying men.59 This was even true in cases where soldiers were usually 
separated from wounding and death. When actually faced with the morbid results 
of frontline combat and the realisation of how brutal wounding could be, Davison’s 
view of his own safety and of the whole war changed. By seeing how bad the 
 
58 Gnr. John Davison, 14th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (Interview with Drew James 
Ryder University Hospital of North Tees, 7/10/2017). 




infantry on the frontline were being injured and the mortality rate that came with it, 
Davison developed a sympathy for these combat troops, reflected in his view of 
how horrible it was, as well as a new worry about his own personal safety. Ronald 
Larby was another serviceman who was presented with wounding and mortality in 
a role behind the frontlines. Speaking with the Imperial War Museum, he told of 
how during his duties as signalman and radio operator with the 14th Signal Troop, 
he witnessed the effect of Chinese artillery fire on a group of Australian soldiers: 
It wasn’t as bad as we first thought when we finally got to them, so only one 
of these three fellows had to stay behind in the end. Two men had to be 
treated for shock, but didn’t want to be relived but their radio operator had 
been very badly wounded, we had to help him to be evacuated. What had 
happened was a shell had burst next to the bunker and a shard of steel had 
gone right through the sandbag wall and hit him in the back while he was 
sitting at his set… His name was Scott. I wish I knew what happened to him 
afterwards.60  
Larby’s account of the experience is relatable to many of the reactions to 
wounding and death Newlands recorded of the Second World War, particularly in 
the examination of the effect of seeing the wounded and dead on soldiers.61 Just 
as these soldiers became fixated on the details of the damage to the human body, 
Larby was able to recall in precise detail exactly how the Australian radio operator 
had been wounded, as well as recalling the man’s first name and considering his 
fate. However, unlike the accounts used by Newlands and Shilling, Larby was in 
the particular position of being removed from the direct front line in this instance. 
Additionally, Larby was also acting in the same role as the wounded man. 
Doubtless, it weighed on him that Scott had been injured whilst doing the same job 
as Larby, in what must have seemed like a safe position, inside a sandbag 
emplacement and clearly, Larby was deeply affected by the sight of a particularly 
bad shrapnel wounding. Although he stated that he did not know the man’s 
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ultimate fate, he alluded to the fact that he ‘had to stay behind in the end’. 
Possibly, Larby was shielding himself from the very real possibility that he could 
have been in the same position and was assuring himself that he did not 
personally see the man’s death, leaving his fate uncertain. There are several 
things we can learn from these accounts. Firstly, was that men in positions behind 
the direct frontline fighting Korea were just as likely to develop emotional reactions 
to combat, wounding and death, as their counterparts who fought in an infantry 
role. Like the frontline troops, Davison and Larby were deeply affected by their 
encounters with wounding and death and it profoundly affected their experiences. 
Secondly, given the manner in which these men’s cases reflect what Newlands 
and Shilling found in the Second World War, it suggests that investigation of the 
experiences of troops behind the frontline in Korea can indeed yield important 
insight into the experience of Twentieth Century combat more generally. 
Conclusion 
It is impossible to fully appreciate the context of a veteran’s testimony of a conflict 
without acknowledging the importance of the experience of combat. Fighting and 
killing in Korea was one of the ways in which the British soldier’s experience was 
the most similar to their counterparts in other Twentieth Century conflicts and yet 
through subtle but important differences, we can enhance our understanding of 
combat experience in a wider sense. A soldier’s experience does not remain static 
and isolated in perfect memory from the conflict’s end through to its recollection 
and much can shape the manner in which troops viewed their experience in the 
meantime. In particular cultural narratives and expectations can limit how veterans 
feel they are allowed to feel about their memories. For this reason, it can be 
difficult for veterans to recount their true experiences as they actually felt about 




the same sense as better known conflicts, soldiers were able to more freely 
express their feelings on these matters. As has been made clear, British soldiers 
in Korea were able to view their enemy in terms which allowed them to recall 
killing with greater ease. Various accounts show that either through racial and 
imperialist biases such as those exhibited by Larby, as a political designation, as 
Winspear described or as a variety of other reasons, soldiers were able to 
separate their overall view of the enemy from that of individual people. This effect 
was exaggerated when combat situations reduced the individualism of the enemy. 
When the act of killing was performed over long range, at night time, or against 
such large enemy numbers that an individual was impossible to identify, British 
soldiers were less likely to incorporate emotion into their experience, over feelings 
of professionalism.62 Killing in these circumstances was impersonal and easily 
recallable by soldiers. This was more difficult for veterans who had fought the 
enemy at close quarters. When the enemy soldier was fought on terms where it 
was impossible to conceal their individuality, men such as Robert Searle had to 
recount their actions with much more intense emotion and regret.63 However, this 
was not universally the case. Echoing darker elements of combat experience from 
other conflicts, some soldiers found a thrill and joy in their recollections of killing 
and battle. Just like cases throughout the Twentieth Century, veterans of Korea 
such as Ashley Cunningham- Boothe admitted that they felt a terrific thrill to kill the 
enemy, regardless of whether they could perceive them as individuals or not. 
Reactions to death and fear were also a primary factor in the experience of 
combat and again, they are common factors to many conflicts. It has been covered 
extensively in conflicts outside of Korea and there are similarities in how British 
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soldiers reacted. Fear was a soldier’s constant companion, as Ellis and Newlands 
noted in the Second World War.64 As in the previous conflicts, soldiers in Korea 
exhibited many reactions to fear, some expected and others more surprising. 
Some men had immediate uncontrollable bodily reactions to the prospect of facing 
combat, including loss of bladder function, whereas others found it took years for 
fear of death to influence their memories of the experience, such as Ronnie 
Taylor, who was only able to articulate this after years of reflection.65 Some troops, 
primarily those in a leadership position forced themselves to react to the fear of 
death and wounding by focusing on their mission.66 These men faced fear with 
overt casualness in order to inspire their comrades. There was also a great deal of 
Soldiers who reacted to the experience of combat in ways that would have only 
been possible in the situation presented by the Korean War. Blasé reactions to 
danger, deliberate dangerous heroics and even an ambivalence towards personal 
armour became common in Korea. Volunteer soldiers were prone to acts of 
showing off in combat to exhibit their superiority to national servicemen.67 
Whereas, National Servicemen and even some experienced soldiers would often 
have to be hounded in order to keep even the most basic aspects of safety in 
battle, with many cases of shirking helmets and armour in favour of comfort and 
even in the extremes, men abandoning the cover of their trenches.68 Furthermore, 
it was not only frontline combat troops who experienced these complex reactions 
to combat, killing and death. Troops who rarely found themselves on the frontlines 
could be captivated by their brushes with combat, men such as the clerks 
described by Winspear enjoyed entering into combat and sought to return to 
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danger as riflemen.69 Others, such as Davidson, found their brief encounter with 
the consequences of frontline combat changed his attitude in entirely the opposite 
direction. Instead of seeking out danger, Davidson’s reaction to seeing wounding 
and death up close convinced him to be more worried about the threat it presented 
and to be more careful of himself in future.70 Reactions to wounding and death 
such as this could be just as strong in non- combat troops as in frontline forces. 
Larby for example, was deeply affected by the sight of a wounded radio operator 
behind the lines in a similar role as he.71 All of these men’s experiences are 
important for two reasons. Firstly, taken in their totality, the collective oral 
testimonies of these men’s experience demonstrate that the combat experience in 
Korea is largely reflective of the experience of Twentieth Century combat more 
generally, albeit with Korea’s own unique subtleties. What this means is that study 
of the largely untapped testimonies and collective memories of veterans of Korea 
can provide as yet unseen insight into the soldier’s experience of Twentieth 
Century warfare more generally. Secondly, they are important because the 
experience of combat was important to the soldiers themselves. Going into battle, 
whether as an infantryman or otherwise was a major element in their experience of 
the Korean War generally and as a part of their wider life experience. To engage in 
acts of war was the primary reason these men were trained, prepared and 
deployed to Korea in the first place. Therefore, understanding how they reacted to 
combat is of capital importance to framing the context of the wider human 
experience for British soldiers in the Korean War.  
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Chapter 5: Human Relations and Social Bonds Between Soldiers in Korea. 
 
The Social Lives of Soldiers 
Having been through a shared experience of training, deployment to Korea, 
adapting to the environment of the frontlines and surviving combat operations, 
soldiers in Korea often found that turning to one and other as human beings was 
their primary and most effective coping mechanism to the strains of life. In old 
military histories, the social lives of soldiers were mostly considered secondary to 
their role on the battlefield or their position on the campaign map, if indeed they 
were considered at all. However, soldiers are not machines, they are human and 
as such have complex needs and requirements beyond basic nourishment. To this 
end, one of the key features of the discourse in new military history was the 
recognition of the role social interactions and inter personal relationships played in 
the experience of soldiers. It is now widely considered that social interactions and 
group identities of soldiers are as relevant to their experience as any other 
element of army life. Although investigations into soldiers’ social bonds have for 
the most part focused on the First and Second World Wars, social interaction was 
just as important for soldiers in Korea as it was in any other conflict. Eric Leed and 
John Ellis brought these factors into the spotlight with some of the earlier writings 
in the body of new military history in the 1970s and 1980s. In terms of the social 
aspect of a soldier’s experience, Leed highlighted that war was an experience 
discontinuous from the social normalities of civilian life, yet still a highly communal 
affair within the ranks. Lives of soldiers on the front were extremely different from 
their civilian lives yet familiar social normalities were still important for all soldiers. 
Since Leed recentred these elements, no work on the individual soldier’s 




relationships affected their lives. Alongside Leed and Ellis, Joanna Bourke, 
Michael Roper, Emma Newlands and countless others have all examined and 
advanced the study of emotional wellbeing and social interactions in the 
experience of the serving soldier. Between them, they clearly demonstrate that the 
close emotional and social interactions as a wider aspect of group identity were an 
integral and vital part of soldiers’ lives in conflicts throughout the Twentieth 
Century.1 Just as the examining the recollections of combat experience from 
Korea veterans demonstrated that their stories are of tremendous value to further 
exploration of modern combat more generally, so to does the wealth of oral 
testimonies regarding their social experience of Korea reveal new insights into the 
wider military experience in the mid- Twentieth Century. The constant human need 
for social interactions is one of the prime examples of continuity between the 
experience of soldiers in the Korean conflict and those surrounding it throughout 
the Twentieth Century. The human requirement to maintain social interaction is 
especially important under the arduous and stressful conditions of war that proved 
to be invaluable to help soldiers cope with their circumstances. In absence of 
family and close friends from home, British soldiers in Korea had little choice but to 
turn to each other for friendship and social bonding. Of course, no two individuals 
share the exact same social needs and experiences, yet all soldiers in Korea 
sought social interaction in one form or another from a variety of sources, even if 
they were affected in a number of different ways. Many soldiers developed these 
social bonds with their fellow soldiers as coping mechanisms for the emotional 
strain of deployment. This was a process which had been encouraged openly by 
 
1 E. Leed, No man’s land: Combat and Identity in World War 1, (Cambridge, 1979); J. 
Bourke, Dismembering the Male, Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War, (London, 
1996), PP. 124- 170; M. Roper, The Secret Battle, Emotional Survival in the Great War, 
(Manchester, 2009); E. Newlands, Civilians into Soldiers, War, the Body and British Army 




the British Army from their earliest days of these men’s training. Emma Newlands 
demonstrated how thoroughly this bonding was encouraged in army life through 
the paradigm of bodily studies. The key element of Newlands’ work for the study of 
social structure is the extensive explanation of army training processes in the 
Second World War, which remained virtually unchanged by the time of the Korean 
War. It reveals how, the army had a well-developed process, designed primarily to 
foster specific social structures and group identities between groups of soldiers.2 
This co- dependence often developed into closely knit and emotionally strong 
friendship groups. One of the most significant examples of this behaviour was the 
close social and emotional care soldiers shared with each other. This could extend 
as far as men adopting traditionally parental and maternal roles in caring for one 
and other. This was first highlighted in soldiers in the frontline trenches of the First 
World War and was termed ‘mothering’ behaviour Bourke and Michael Roper.3 It is 
not difficult to find examples of this behaviour throughout oral histories and life 
writing throughout the Twentieth Century, with troops fussing over each other’s kit 
as might a mother insist upon their child wearing a scarf. However, as important as 
these bonds could be, they were not always as permeant as they appeared. Such 
bonds of friendship were important, but they could also be temporary and had the 
potential to evaporate quickly following the war’s end. More still looked to home for 
direct communication with family, friends and loved ones via a complex and 
efficient postal system. One of the main concepts which has permeated narratives 
of Korea as ‘the forgotten war’ was that it was a remote, isolated and far flung 
conflict. It is hard to imagine that social communication across the globe to a 
warzone could occur at any meaningful rate in this line of thinking, however, this is 
precisely what occurred in many cases. Following from experience gathered over 
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the previous century of engaging in large scale conflicts, the British Army went to 
great lengths to ensure this line of social communication stayed open to soldiers 
on the front. From the manner of surviving together on the frontline, daily 
necessities to learned behavioural traits and communal consumption of items such 
as alcoholic and caffeinated beverages, many factors contributed towards group 
identities and social bonds as coping mechanisms in daily life. 
Personal and Group Friendship  
One of the most obvious elements of social support in Korea which crops up in 
veterans’ testimony is the importance of friendship, on both a personal level and 
as a group. Friendship was one of the first and strongest ways in which soldiers 
learned to care for one and other and although this was not necessarily at a 
maternal or parental level it was none the less important. In the words of Private 
Peter Farrar, ‘One’s daily world was that of your company, your dugout and mostly 
your mates’.4 Soldiers in Korea naturally formed very tightly knit friendships with 
groups and individuals from their units, but the support and emotional care these 
relationships provided were essential coping tools for life on the frontline. Support 
from these groups came in the form of individual acts of care taken proactively 
between friends as well as passive support from the group as a whole. Groups of 
friends shared living spaces, food, luxuries and sought each other out whenever 
possible. Ronnie Taylor reflected on how important his immediate group of close 
friends in Korea were to his general experience of the war:  
I had some good mates over there, we were really close. Well it was just 
natural that you made friends, it happens in any walk of life, but it was 
closer over there, you know. A bit like school mates. We always stuck 
together when we could, sometimes we would all be off on different duties 
but otherwise we were joined at the hip so you could say. We were always 
there to have a laugh with and just to keep each other company I suppose. I 
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didn’t really get to know them until we were on the ship over, but once we 
were there that was it, the four of us thick as thieves. Well you couldn’t have 
made it through without having people there for you. I suppose we were 
supporting each other in a way like that, we always tried to cheer each 
other up and such, made sure you weren’t on your own. We’d always share 
a brew with each other and stuff like that. I still keep in touch with William 
because he lives not too far away and I used to see the others at the 
reunions, but not so much these last few years.5 
Ronnie’s recollection of his friend group revealed just a few of the ways in which 
close groups of friends could support one and other. He described his army friends 
as closer to him would have occurred in other circumstances, being almost like 
school friends than colleagues. This was to the extent that they actively sought 
each other out whenever possible and were practically ‘joined at the hip’ when not 
on other duties. Although it may seem like a perfectly ordinary thing for troops to 
form cliques and friend groups, the importance of them in supporting each other is 
clear in Ronnie’s statement, particularly in his belief that one couldn’t have made it 
through Korea without friends. He openly described the ways in which his mates 
interacted as supporting each other. The manner in which they sought to keep 
each other company, made sure ‘a brew’ was ready and helped to keep their 
spirits up was vital to maintaining morale and keeping each other going. Despite 
this, Taylor did not appear to feel that the emotional support he and his friends 
provided each other was quite at a parental level and from what he describes it 
appeared more fraternal for the most part. James Grundy was another soldier who 
recalled the importance of staying together in a friend group. He described how he 
and his close mates shared each other’s personal close space at all times: ‘There 
would be five of us in the tent, the team, we slept together, we went to the NAAFI 
together, we worked together, you kept together as a team’.6 Grundy, like Taylor, 
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expressed the importance of sticking together with friends and how they worked 
together to get through the experiences they found themselves in. They would 
share a sleeping space, eat together and worked with one and other whenever 
they could. This further reflects the importance of physical comfort shared between 
soldiers. The ways in which Grundy and Taylor would share space with their 
comrades, eating, sleeping and working in close contact with one and other, 
mirrors how soldiers in other conflicts would behave in order to find domestic 
emotional support. Bourke listed examples of how this close domesticity was a 
major emotional support to soldiers in the trenches of the First World War. Soldiers 
in their dugouts on the Western Front would spoon together in their sleep for 
warmth and comfort, would share meals together and read books together and 
generally looked to each other for close company.7 In her analysis of this, Bourke 
concluded that this was indeed a major form of support for those involved, both as 
a domestic comfort and as a form of physical intimacy in an environment lacking 
female tenderness. That being said, this analysis may be slightly overly gendered 
to fully extend to Korea, as the examples from the latter conflict do not make 
reference to it being a replacement for female compassion. Rather as Taylor 
states, it was simply very close friendship in what would otherwise be a lonely 
environment. Similarly, Newlands described such behaviour as being more 
brotherly in these cases than anything else.8 At any rate however, what can be 
drawn from all this observation is that brotherly or otherwise, there was a 
tremendous importance that friendships played in a soldier’s experience on the 
frontline.  
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Naturally, these relations within group friendship were composed of several 
interlinking individual friendships. These individual friendships were the working 
mechanics behind group friendships and were equally as significant to soldier’s 
experience. Bill Hiscox had been the only man from his regiment dispatched to 
Korea to help fulfil the urgent need for radio operators. He told the Imperial War 
Museum of how important to his experience a single particular friend could be: 
I was the only man from my unit sent out to Korea, so when I was in the 
docks, I didn’t know anyone. There was a great big fat bloke under my bunk 
on the troop ship, smashing bloke, but he was so fat that he couldn’t wear a 
standard issue army belt, so they gave him two with a buckle at the back. 
That was how I first met Jock, he laughed and said, ‘Bloody hell, they’re 
sending kids to die now?’ because I never looked my age. Anyway, he said 
‘If you want to go out when we dock tonight, I’ll look after your kit for you, 
‘cos I’ll not bother going anywhere’. See even on the boat you couldn’t 
leave you kit about because someone would nick it. And that was one of the 
first of the friends I made in Korea. I was with him the whole time I was 
deployed over there and on the way back actually.9 
Having been the only man departing to Korea from his home regiment, Hiscox was 
denied the chance to travel with a friend group he had already developed. 
However, he instead substituted this by finding a strong companionship in another 
soldier on the ship across. This case of individual friendship was clearly very 
important to Hiscox. He was able to remember in very clear detail about how he 
first met his friend Jock, as well as the interaction which sparked their friendship 
and how they remained close friends throughout the conflict. They were clearly 
good friends, being able to joke about each other’s physical appearance in such 
good humour, with Hiscox mocking Jock’s weight and conversely the older man 
mocking Hiscox’s youthful appearance. This also highlights another important 
point about individual friendships on deployment, it was not necessary for the 
participants in a personal friendship to be from similar backgrounds. Hiscox 
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represented an outsider, an artilleryman and radio operator with no social contacts 
in the infantry regiment that he was shipping out with. He became close friends 
with Jock despite the notable age difference between the two of them and evident 
difference in military experience. In spite of all this, the two had become close 
originating from a small act of kindness when Jock sacrificed his own leisure time 
to look after the new soldier’s kit, which was liable to be stolen if not guarded. This 
enabled Hiscox to have one last night in England before departing, at the expense 
of Jock not being able to. This act of looking out for one and other, even at the 
carer’s expense, was a significant step in soldiers’ social bonding and it was 
clearly meaningful to Hiscox. Again, like in larger social groups Hiscox and Jock 
spent a great deal of time close together once in Korea. This further demonstrates 
how significant having the support of even one close friend could be for soldiers on 
the frontlines. A major part of the support value offered by friendship groups was 
simply the removal of loneliness. Although soldiers were always surrounded by 
people from their unit, feelings of deep loneliness could occur if a soldier was not 
able to integrate into a group of friends. James Lucock described how he found life 
to be much more difficult after he was separated from the friends he had made in 
his battalion as they were sent into different new companies on the frontline. He 
struggled to make friends and make the same bonds he had, resulting in a feeling 
of overwhelming loneliness: 
They split us up into different companies. So, they put me in Charlie 
Company. It was so quiet there, you never heard birds. I was taken to a 
dugout on my own, given some wire and told to make a bed. It was a bit 
daunting being on my own like that, I’ve never felt so alone in my life all by 
myself. That was my welcome to the King’s Regiment, I was just left on my 
own. After that experience I made sure that anyone new who came was not 
left on their own, because I was alone for ever and a day, the whole time I 
was there and even when I became a Lance Corporal then a Corporal, I 
was always alone.10 
 




Lucock’s account of his experience demonstrates just how damaging social 
isolation and a lack of a friend group could be for a soldier on the front line and 
therefore just how important a healthy social life was to men in those 
circumstances. As social comradery was one of the key coping mechanisms for 
personal stress and difficulties on the frontline, feelings of social isolation and 
loneliness could render a soldier even more vulnerable to breakdown. During the 
early stages of the emergence of new military history and the refocusing on 
soldier’s individual experiences, Eric Leed analysed the phenomenon of social 
isolation amongst soldiers. He found that any number of reasons could contribute 
to social isolation in soldiers, from social status and levels of education, to whether 
an individual was a volunteer as opposed to a conscript or as in Lucock’s case, 
had simply transferred into a unit with already established social groups.11 
Prolonged social isolation on the frontline could lead to a rapid deterioration in a 
soldier’s mental wellbeing inducing feelings of intense misery and resentment to 
their comrades. Lucock exhibits elements of this in his description of the frontlines. 
In the midst of discussing his loneliness, he specifically references the cold, the 
lack of birdsong and other negative descriptors indicating how harshly his 
loneliness impacted his world view in this time on the front. Being alone was not 
just a social difficulty in its own right, but it also made general life on the frontlines 
harder and difficult for Lucock. Leed’s examples from German soldiers in the First 
World War further demonstrated that this could occur and continue to exist even in 
groups who had been through combat together and was in contrast to the 
generally held view that fighting alongside one and other made soldiers into 
proverbial brothers in arms.12 The example given by Leed ultimately culminated in 
a soldier’s breakdown and physical confrontation with his comrades, showing how 
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seriously damaging social isolation could be for troops on the frontline. Lucock 
also recognised this during his own service and set upon himself to ensure that 
other new arrivals were never left alone and isolated. This ensured that both new 
arrivals to the frontline, as well as Lucock himself did not have to face frontline life 
without the coping mechanisms afforded to them by a social group.  
Close Caring  
An important aspect of social bonding throughout soldiers’ accounts in Korea is a 
phenomenon of close and almost parental social care. This process has been 
described throughout the development of new military histories as ‘Mothering’ and 
is typified by behaviour in which soldiers learned to look after one and other, ‘as a 
mother might care for her children’.13 Though this is partly an extension of the 
British Army’s policy of fostering group co-dependence from training onwards, it 
can also be seen as a sign of the close social bonds men in Korea developed as 
coping mechanisms. Private Brian Hough told the Imperial War Museum of how he 
developed a rash from flea bites and of how his friends and his Sergeant showed 
a tremendous amount of concern over his personal health in a very parental 
manner: 
I developed a painful rash on my ankles. But how do you report sick with a 
rash when there’s fellas getting their heads blown off and everything? Not 
to be dramatic if you understand what I mean, but I felt ashamed of myself 
reporting sick with a rash. Anyway, I was changing my socks one morning 
and a couple of my mates saw the state of my legs and they went on and 
on nagging at me to report sick, so eventually I did. I went to Sergeant 
Blackmore, who was hard as nails but what a smashing fella. He said ‘let’s 
look Brian’ and when he saw it his language was very choice, he went up in 
the air, called me stupid this stupid that for not reporting sick before. He had 
me report straight to an American M.A.S.H for triage.14 
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Hough spoke about how he initially felt ashamed of reporting sick due to the rash 
he had developed. It seems that he felt obliged to remain quiet about the pain it 
was causing him because of a perceived social pressure not to complain whilst 
other men had been seriously wounded and, as he said, ‘had their heads blown 
off’. His self-imposed shame prevented him from reporting himself sick until two of 
his friends saw the state of his legs. These men then nagged Hough until he went 
to see his sergeant. This demonstration of deep interpersonal care by his friends 
reaction to his health shows the care between the social group. The way his 
friends ‘nagged’ Hough was almost parental in and of itself, however this social 
relationship becomes even clearer in Hough’s description of Sergeant Blackmore. 
Hough speaks about Blackmore in proud, almost fatherly terms, complimenting his 
firmness but also his fairness when calling him ‘hard as nails but smashing’. 
Clearly, Hough had a great deal of admiration for the sergeant. The Sergeant’s 
reaction also reflects an element of parent like care for Hough. This is shown when 
addressing him by his first name to assess his illness and then becoming angry 
that Hough had tried to hide his rash before immediately sending him for 
treatment. The behaviour of Sergeant Blackmore reflects descriptions of the 
behaviour Michael Roper analysed and termed ‘the Subaltern’s house wifery’.15 
Non- Commissioned Officers and senior soldiers would actively care for the men 
under their command in a very motherly or parental fashion, keeping an active 
awareness of their health and their personal hardships. In these examples we can 
see how men’s care was directly beneficial as a social bond. Mothering behaviours 
occurred in many ways in Korea, besides kindnesses shown by officers and 
NCOs. Men often took close care of each other’s welfare, from sitting down with 
each other for with tea, to men ensuring that their mates slept well.16 Mothering for 
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soldiers in the Korean War was much more complex than simple social 
motivations, yet it could have similar implications within social groups. However, 
there were other instances where parental caring behaviour could be both self-
serving and also support members of the social group. Kenneth Black, a tanker 
with the 8th Hussars, observed how the tank crews would ensure the driver got the 
best night’s sleep in bad conditions: 
We had the ‘bivvy’ tent, the engine cover and the turret cover, which were 
like green canvas and we used to make a thick pad of them and put four 
sleeping bags together. If we had to put up a guard at night, Fletcher, our 
driver, would go in the middle, so he could keep warm and get a night’s 
sleep because he was driving and he’d be the one to get you out of a sticky 
situation and the three of us would do an hour each.17 
Black gives an account of how he and his tank crew took to caring for their driver 
primarily as a survival means for themselves, because, as Black states, he was 
the one to get them out of trouble. This is not quite the motherly domesticity shown 
by Bourke of some men in the First World War, where soldiers would tuck each 
other in and otherwise ensure good sleeping arrangements, however it is quite 
similar.18 As much as Black and his crew ensured Fletcher was wrapped up warm 
in a motherly manner, their primary purpose of their behaviour was not on the 
surface socially motivated. The primary goal of their care for Fletcher was to 
ensure he was well rested for driving the tank. In this role, Fletcher was member of 
the crew who was most needed to ‘get out of a sticky situation’ and this was 
recognised by the group. It could therefore be argued that the group’s behaviour 
was not social bonding and mothering, but simply self-preservation. However, 
considering again the difference between intent and effect, Black’s crew was still 
performing a motherly role, even if they were acting selfishly, they still acted as if 
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they were mothering. Additionally, as much as they sought to act in a manner of 
self-preservation, they were also acting in the interests of the social group. Black 
and the others were not only protecting themselves, they were also protecting the 
entire group from danger, in a social manner.  
Keeping up Appearances  
As has been seen, social interactions were not universally helpful in allowing 
soldiers to healthily deal with stressful and dangerous situations. One of the points 
made by Eric Leed in his examination of soldier’s self-identity in the First World 
War was that men in the trenches internalised various conscious self-images as a 
reaction to the destruction and death surrounding them.19 Essentially, these men 
were consciously adopting warped self-views in order to better personify the idea 
of a soldier to themselves. This was also true of men in Korea, although this was 
not necessarily a reaction troops had in order to appease their own sense of 
identity, but rather to demonstrate it to their social group. One part of this which 
becomes apparent throughout veterans’ testimony was a commonly perceived 
need to project a conscious self-image to those around them and keep up a good 
appearance in the face of adversity. Be this in terms of maintaining an image of 
masculinity, individual pride, or one’s perception of their national image, many 
soldiers found that this need to fit an appearance dictated how they displayed their 
reactions in front of their comrades. This was certainly the case for Robert Searle 
when he was faced with a life or death situation as one of the few Englishmen 
serving with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlander’s Mortar Platoon. Only a few 
weeks after witnessing the gruesome effects of his grenades on a North Korean 
soldier, he was nearly killed by a similar weapon himself. He recounted as one of 
 




his clearest memories in Korea, how he felt obliged to react with feigned 
nonchalance: 
I’ve not been able to talk about it for so many years, but I can remember 
like it was yesterday. I was in a slit trench, only six feet long and just wide 
enough to get into. I was sat up one end and the lad that was with me was 
at the other end cleaning grenades. All of a sudden, the boy at the other 
end gave a shout, dropped a grenade and jumped out the trench. What 
he’d done is he’d taken the base plate out, left the detonator in and taken 
the pin out. I couldn’t get out, I thought if I try and get over the grenade, I’ll 
cop it, so I just put my head in the corner, screwed myself up as small as I 
could. There was an explosion. I couldn’t believe I was still here. What had 
happened was the detonator went off, but because the baseplate wasn’t on, 
it blew the detonator out the top and it didn’t go off. The whole thing really 
shook me but I tried not to let it bother me. I always felt that as an 
Englishman amongst Scots, I had to, I don’t know, set an example of sorts 
so I just more or less carried on.20 
From the start, we can see that this event was deeply impactful to Searle’s 
experience in Korea. He specifically mentions that this was not something he felt 
comfortable discussing for many years after the conflict, despite being able to 
clearly remember the event and that it was something that really shook him. It 
must have been particularly daunting for Searle, as he had clear recollections of 
the effect his own grenade had upon the North Korean soldier at Swarion and 
reflecting this, he uses visceral language to describe what happened in the 
following moments. For example, he does not say he just put his head in the 
corner, rather he ‘stuck’ it there, similarly, he was not just curling up but 
‘scrunching’ himself as small as he could, both terms more powerful and emotive 
than plain description. Similarly, he describes the desperation that went through 
his mind as he sought a way out and the relief that he was still there after the 
explosion. Evidently, this was a hugely stressful event to befall Searle, both 
emotionally and physically. Yet, despite the evident emotional stress he faced in 
the moment and in the years that followed, Searle found that at the time he felt the 
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need to mask his feelings. Rather than displaying the obvious distress caused by 
facing a live grenade misfiring in a coffin sized trench caused him, Searle instead 
focused upon hiding how much the event had bothered him as he felt that it was 
important to represent a particular example of nonchalance in front of his 
predominantly Scottish cohort. In a similar manner to what Leed found in 
examples from the First World War, Searle was taking a conscious image of how 
he believed a soldier or in this case ‘an Englishman’ should act in the 
circumstances and projecting that to the group, rather than show how he actually 
felt. The use of national imagery to hide personal pain was a common theme in 
writings from the French trenches of Verdun in the First World War.21 To an extent, 
patriotism and Englishness represents something of a moral armour behind which 
Seale could be privately shaken by his experience, without compromising his own 
self-image in front of his social group. Not only was Searle putting on a display of 
what he perceived to be ‘Englishness’, but he specifically uses the term 
‘Englishman’. For Searle, this was not just about portraying ‘English toughness’ 
but was also intrinsically tied to a projection of masculinity. Projecting a masculine 
toughness in response to death and near-death experiences was by no means a 
rare occurrence. John Davidson found that when he returned from field hospital to 
his unit that he felt he couldn’t discuss what the injuries of the wounded men he 
had seen for fear of compromising his appearance to his mates: ‘I didn’t really talk 
about it much with anyone when I was back with my mates. You couldn’t really 
like, they would think you’d gone soft or something.’ 22 To an extent, the boyish 
demonstrations of toughness and bravado outlined by Sergeant Major Patterson 
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as seen in the discussion of behaviour in combat could also be construed as men 
attempting to project a self- image to their immediate social group.23 
Bonding in Response to Battle 
It is clear that the social bonds which soldiers developed between close friend 
groups were incredibly important as coping mechanisms to the stresses of the 
frontline, as well as to their general social well- being. However, the question is to 
what extent were these bonds developed during or as a result of combat and 
fighting alongside one and other? The idea of ‘brothers in arms’ is a popular 
narrative in many portrayals of war and in principle, it is a potent driver of group 
identity, however the oral testimonies of veterans from Korea seem to suggest that 
in reality, the relationship between fighting together and forming social bonds was 
far more nuanced. Joanna Bourke suggested that social bonding over a shared 
combat experience was a major element of soldiers’ experience in conflict, as was 
submitting to a shared group identify during combat. 24 This is also apparent when 
examining sources from Korea veterans. For example, Cunningham- Boothe, as 
well as stating how much he enjoyed bonding with his comrades over the 
experiences of a battle, also described the effect it had on galvanising the 
relationship between older Second World War Veterans and younger National 
Servicemen: 
Initially we had a problem between the reservists, who were World War Two 
veterans to a man and the new National Servicemen. Particularly for the 
junior NCO cadre, these reservists who’d seen action and been through war 
would look at them and say, ‘What can you possibly tell me? You haven’t 
been in the army five minutes, you haven’t fought, just because you have 
that stripe on your shoulder you think you can tell us how to do stuff?’. But 
eventually, after we’d been through a few scraps, that modified and I think 
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we benefitted from having the reservists, they taught each other things 
about survival on the front. It was helpful.25 
It is clear from Cunningham- Boothe’s recollections that general group bonding 
between different age and experience demographics within his unit was helped by 
having been through combat together. Combat veterans from the Second World 
War who had initially been disrespectful of senior officers and NCOs who had not 
yet been in battle were able to repair the relationship between the two groups. 
Eventually this even developed into the older and newer soldiers mutually teaching 
each other techniques to cope with life on the frontlines which helped the unit in 
the long term. All of this speaks to wider groups and general approaches between 
soldiers. There are however, some limitations to this approach, as it is less clear to 
what extend social bonds between individuals were formed as a result of combat. 
Leed’s example of the First World War German infantryman Franz Schauwecker 
demonstrates that historically, close relationships between individuals and groups 
were not necessarily formed as an immediate reaction to surviving combat 
together.26 From what other veterans of Korea have described, it would appear 
that social bonds between individuals were not so much created afresh, however 
pre-existing bonds that had formed before combat were reinforced. One of the 
reasons for this could be due to the fact that in retelling their experiences of battle, 
the memories of most veterans tend to be focused around their own selves, rather 
than those around them. In recalling these memories, many veterans can describe 
their own actions in minute detail, however the way they describe other individuals 
can seem like they are passive parts of the environment or simply irrelevant details 
rather than the focus of the event. Fredrick Thompson, for example, who could 
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recount the fighting around the Battle of Imjin with remarkable clarity, struggled to 
remember the identity of the man with whom he shared a slit trench for several 
hours of ferocious fighting: 
Me and another Fusilier, I think he was called Geordie but to be frank I’ve 
forgotten his name, got up the hill and arrived amongst our companies who 
were already dug in, they were under such ferocious attack it was, you 
know, a question of down on your stomach and crawling forward. We just 
had to dump the supplies we had brought and crawl over to a Sergeant 
Major, who sent us to this small slip trench, just room for two of us. Propped 
up inside was a Bren gun, with a tripod and 27 magazines of ammunition. 
Suddenly, I found I was glad someone was with me and I said to him ‘How 
is your weapons training? Because here is your chance to learn!’.27 
We can clearly see from Thompson’s account of the fighting that the other man, 
who he believes to have been called ‘Geordie’, was both secondary to 
Thompson’s focus and that he did not develop any meaningful social bond with 
him as a result of surviving combat together. Although Thompson was very glad to 
have another soldier with him in the trench, the man himself was unimportant to 
his memory. Thompson was able to recall many other small details about the 
fighting, including precisely how many magazines of ammunition were provided 
with the exact model and set up of weapon, as well as his exact words to Geordie 
when he joked about the extent of the man’s weapons training. However, despite 
all of this Thompson could only just remember the man’s name and even then, he 
did not seem sure. It would appear that fighting together for such a prolonged 
period in a slip trench did not stir any kind of social bond between Thompson and 
Geordie. If there had indeed been a ‘brothers in arms’ reaction to fighting in these 
circumstances, one may have expected that Thompson would have developed a 
closer bond with the man going forward from the battle however, he did not 
mention ‘Geordie’ again in his recollection. This suggests that a major part of why 
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close social bonds between individuals did not develop directly as a result of 
combat, is that individuals had a tendency to focus on themselves and their own 
experience, rather than on others around them. It is also entirely possible that this 
is a result of how the memories of combat events have been shaped over the 
years. It is natural to expect that a veteran’s memory of fighting is more likely to 
centre around themselves than relationships with people they may not have seen 
for many decades. However, one manner in which interpersonal relations can 
surface in retellings of combat, is when veterans refer to fallen comrades and the 
emotional reaction this caused. This is in contrast to recollections of other soldiers 
who survived combat unhurt, in instances where a comrade was wounded or 
killed, soldiers develop an intensified sense of social connection towards the fallen 
individuals. Where the death of a fellow soldier is involved, the narrative of a 
retelling switches from the teller, to emphasise the link between the fallen and the 
survivor. It has been a common observation that soldiers in certain circumstances 
can develop deep emotional links with the dead, be they with fallen comrades or 
enemies.28 Bourke found it was often the case throughout the Twentieth Century 
that soldiers would become emotionally invested in the death of others from both 
within and outside their social group. Searle demonstrated this when he described 
the loss of two friends in combat with Chinese forces: 
The other platoon had come under fire. The Sergeant in charge of their 
section had been shot and killed and my two friends, Charlie Gordon and 
David Livingston… They were both killed… They were two really great lads. 
National Servicemen, same as myself. I think, if I hadn’t had been on the 
mortar course, I’d have been with them in that section and I’d have been 
killed too.29 
Searle clearly shows a great deal of emotion when his recollection reached the 
point during the battle when his friends Charlie and David were killed. The social 
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bonds he had with these men became the focus of his testimony, with their exact 
relationship and commonality with Searle being explicitly mentioned. He clearly 
links his shared social identity with both men emphasising how they were all 
National Servicemen, specifically stating that they were the ‘same as myself’. 
Extending this even further, he expects that even if he had just been in their 
section when they were killed, he would have been killed too. Through this Searle 
clearly demonstrates the emphasis death put on these men’s social bonds, 
highlighting what made them similar and reflecting on how he escaped their fate. 
From testimonies such as this, it would appear that whilst combat could not 
generate new social bonds in quite as spontaneous a fashion as might be 
expected, the death of a comrade could place a special emphasis on men’s social 
bonds. However, this seems to have only became apparent in veterans’ 
testimonies after the fact and upon subsequent reflection, rather than as it 
happened. Combat bonding therefore was not a natural and immediate way in 
which men became close, but rather an extension of a group identity. It was 
indeed capable of strengthening a bond between soldiers, but only once 
anonymity from the generic group had been removed, only once a soldier became 
a named person, such as in death, could social bonding then become emphasised 
on a personal level. 
Tea, Alcohol and Drinking as a Social Focal Point 
One of the most important aspects of social interactions between soldiers was the 
group consumption of drinks. Both in terms of alcoholic and non- alcoholic 
beverages, drinking in groups has provided a key component of social life for 
soldiers throughout the ages. Drinking had something of a special significance to 
the social lives of soldiers, Emma Newlands suggests this manifested itself in 




onwards. This is true for many conflicts, not just the Korean War and as such 
drinking represents yet another way in which certain themes carried on in soldiers’ 
lives throughout the Twentieth Century. One of the many tropes of life in the British 
Army was the prevalence of tea drinking. The act of making, distributing and 
consuming tea as a group was a valuable part of the social repertoire of British 
soldiers on the frontlines of Korea. It provided an opportunity to exercise caring 
behaviours for others by making and sharing it, as well as providing a moment to 
sit down and drink it with those around you. This is not counting the added benefits 
a warm caffeinated drink can have in a cold mountainous trench line. John Dutton, 
an American working with the Royal Engineers noted the response of the British 
troops after escaping a fire fight in which their vehicle was disabled, ‘As soon as 
we were clear, they immediately put the kettle on and started to make ‘gunfire’, a 
potent mixture of tea and their rum rations’.30 The sitting down with each other for 
a drink of tea, alcohol or in this case both, was a common socially driven coping 
mechanism for soldiers. It essentially calmed the air, bringing back a sense of 
normality following an abnormal shock. Of course, it was not simply the drink 
which proved valuable in this situation, but the social contact itself. It was primal 
group reassurance in the same manner as sitting around the fire at home. The 
alcohol it seems was used merely to give the situation an added boost of calm. It 
was a reminder of home and bringing that to one’s fellow soldiers could endear a 
man to the social group. Private Brian Hough of the King’s Regiment found to his 
surprise that he had developed a reputation for his tea making skills in Korea 
which endured many years after the conflicts end: 
This lad who was with me, Welsh lad, had been hit, I believe his last name 
was George… Billy George, I think. Straight away we knew he’d lost an eye 
and so he was evacuated. I didn’t see him again for forty years. Now, a few 
years ago, I had gone to a reception Prince Charles held in London and 
invited Korea Veterans and Billy George was there and he recognised me. 
 




It turned out that apparently, I had quite a reputation amongst all of the lads 
that wherever we were I could always knock a good brew together. Now he 
comes up to me and we were in St. James Palace in this bloody great room 
full of people and he stands just about my sitting room’s length away from 
me perhaps and he shouts ‘Isn’t it time you bloody brewed up!?’.31 
Hough’s meeting with George revealed just how significant tea making, or 
‘Brewing up’ was for soldiers on the lines. Despite not seeming to be particularly 
close whilst in Korea and then having been absent from each other’s lives for four 
decades, Billy was able to remember and recognise Hough immediately because 
of his abilities to make tea. Hough describes how he had apparently developed a 
reputation for being able to make a good cup of tea regardless of circumstances 
amongst many other veterans. This was the key thing Billy George and several 
other veterans remembered about Hough and the fact that they specifically 
remembered his ability to make good tea in bad situations is also significant. 
Michael Roper highlighted how in many of the ‘classic accounts of life in the 
trenches’, there was an especially valuable social bond focused on this very 
ability.32 For example, in Remarque’s All Quiet on The Western Front, the ability to 
provide food and drink in even the most unpromising situations granted an almost 
magical quality to the character Kat, which endeared him to his fellow soldiers.33 It 
would appear therefore, that even though Hough as not aware of it at the time, 
being a good provider of tea became an important social bond between himself 
and his fellow troops.  
 The drinking of alcohol too remained as a social focal point with little difference 
from how it had been in the Second World War. Alcohol was both a social tool and 
recognised vent, which officers would often turn a blind eye to, or even encourage 
as a way of coping with the general stresses of life on deployment.34 Even the 
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official administrative regulations of the British army recognised the importance of 
supplying its units with an adequate supply of alcohol. Companies were allocated 
a beer ration, which was tied directly to how many used bottles it returned to its 
allocated NAAFI.35 As much as general behaviour in the daily routine was 
conducted to strict rules, soldiers in Korea found release in drinking alcohol during 
free time and it became a valuable social coping mechanism. Aside from the 
standard rations of alcohol the British Army provided to its soldiers, there was an 
ample supply of unsanctioned alcoholic liquids available for purchase and as ever 
their consumption was central to many soldiers’ social experience. The use of 
these substances was observed frequently in Korea, with the Imperial War 
Museum describing them as key components of a soldier’s life.36 Winspear 
recounted how when the Duke of Wellington’s held a fete on the reserve lines in 
aid of flooding in the United Kingdom, the mere potential promise of alcohol could 
bring the men of his unit together: 
We had a fete to raise funds for the communities in East Anglia who’d been 
affected by flooding. I ran a hoopla stall with coconuts and such. The top 
prizes were a few bottles of beer. Unsurprisingly, our stall proved to be the 
most popular stall at the whole fate. At the end of the day I think we’d made 
something like three hundred pounds for the flood relief. […] That night I 
decided to do duty at the Intelligence office in case anything came in while 
everyone else was off and I ended up drinking my way through Jeff Cork’s 
bottle of sherry. Until the battle adjutant, Major Firth, came in who brought 
another bottle of sherry and we got fairly well through that one too.37 
We can see from Winspear’s memories that alcohol did indeed have the capacity 
to bring soldiers together. With only the promise of a few drinks Winspear’s stall 
was able to raise what would amount to around six and a half thousand pounds in 
today’s money. Thus, demonstrating just how much potential the mere promise of 
just a bottle of beer could have for soldiers on the frontlines. Just as it had been in 
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past conflicts, alcohol could be a release for men from the daily strict routine of 
military life and a strong bonding tool.38 Additionally, when Winspear’s superior 
officer Major Firth caught him drunk, instead of reprimanding him, the major 
actually joined in with the drinking, revelling in the release the inactivity on the line 
provided. We can also see from these accounts how important the consumption of 
alcohol could be for group recovery from stress. Major Firth, a Battle Adjutant, had 
a highly pressured job, from which he willingly overlooked punishment and joined 
in social drinking to escape. The importance of this effect on soldiers was well 
recognised by army authority in other ways in Korea. It was not uncommon for 
officers and NCOs to be more than willing to turn a blind eye to soldiers who were 
exceeding their officially allowed ration of alcohol. In some of these cases, 
superiors were not only tolerant, but were actively complicit in providing their men 
with additional alcohol in certain circumstances. Lucock described an officer’s role 
surprise gift of beer on his 21st Birthday: 
My Platoon Commander was a chap named Williams, a really nice man. He 
was handing out the post and these cards arrived for me on my birthday. 
He asked me ‘How old are you?’ and I said ‘Twenty-one today, Sir’. I was a 
corporal then and due to take a patrol out that night. When I went down for 
briefing, he sent me back to my hutch and inside there were two crates of 
ale, sixteen bottles in each and a note from the platoon saying ‘enjoy 
yourself’. I was still drunk the next day, the Sergeant wasn’t happy but 
Williams told him to give me the day to recover. I inquired after Mr Williams 
at a reunion. I was told he died of a massive heart attack shortly after the 
war. I was sad to hear that.39 
Even though this was not a case of direct group consumption of alcohol, it is 
undoubtedly evidence of the use of alcohol as a sort of social currency within the 
group. The communal gifting of alcohol as a birthday present was more than a 
token of wellbeing between troops in the field, but a prime example of the 
ritualised use of alcohol in group bonding described by Newlands40. Lucock’s 
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Platoon Commander, Williams, not only organised the platoon to provide him with 
the alcohol as a gesture of group celebration, but also suspended the Sergeant’s 
punishment for drunkenness. This provides further evidence that officers were 
willing to overlook and even defend alcohol consumption for the sake of men’s 
social and emotional welfare. The effect of this on the social group is traceable in 
Lucock’s fondness for Williams, describing him as a ‘really nice man’ and 
expressing sadness at the news of his death. In some circumstances, officers did 
not just overlook the presence of excess alcohol, but ensured the men had access 
to it. In this regard, alcohol took the form of a social currency, which could be 
traded and spent in times of stress as a coping mechanism. Ronnie Taylor 
recalled that when he was placed in charge of the Durham Light Infantry’s beer 
rations, he noticed the demand for alcohol went up after fighting: 
I was in charge of issuing out the drinks and alongside the NAFFI and 
whenever we had an excess, we were allowed to sell it on and there wasn’t 
a lot else to spend your money on. See, us Brits were the only ones who 
could get the stuff issued, but people would always want more. I mean 
everyone always found some, or we got the stuff from home, but there was 
always good money to be made selling it after the pay packets came in. 
We’d get Americans, Canadians, Australians, all sorts coming along and 
buying or trading for what they could. People wanted it especially badly if 
there had been a lot of fighting going on, I remember one night the 
Australians had been in some fierce fighting up along the line and these two 
lads came through and bought eighty quid of the stuff off us for their 
platoon, which was a lot of money in those days.41 
Taylor’s description demonstrated just how important alcohol could be as a social 
coping mechanism, not just amongst British forces, but for other troops stationed 
along the Korean frontlines. After what he described as particularly fierce fighting, 
Taylor recalled how two Australian soldiers bought eighty pounds of surplus beer 
from the Durham Light Infantry for their platoon. In all lightly hood the large amount 
of beer sold was to be used to help the men of the Australian unit cope with the 
strain of surviving a major fire fight. However, Taylor also recalled that men from 
 




many other national armies came to buy spare alcohol from the British. Clearly, 
drinking was not only an important social tool for the British to bond with, but was 
also common amongst other forces in Korea.  
Postal Communication and Social Connections Home 
One of the assumptions commonly made about soldier’s lives in Korea is that they 
were isolated and in a social vacuum away from home. It is understandable how 
this view became prevalent in the years following the conflict’s end. Across British 
society during and after the Korean War, there was a general apathy to the conflict 
itself and to the soldiers serving there.42 Korea did not occupy national headlines 
on a day to day basis and relatively few families had members serving in combat, 
especially in comparison to the Second World War. All of this, coupled with the 
fact that Korea was practically half a world away from Britain, makes it entirely 
understandable as to how the view that the Korea War was an isolated came 
about. However, examination of archives and oral testimonies shows that troops 
deployed in Korea were actually very well connected to the social contacts they 
had back in Britain. This communication with friends and family back home could 
be just as important a social mechanism for soldiers as the immediate 
interpersonal relations with their social group. For soldiers in Korea, postal and 
long-range communication was a very important element in their social routine, 
whether they were active letter writers or not. For some the very act of 
communicating with home provided valuable emotional links with their distant 
family, as Roper described of soldiers in the First World War.43 Others found the 
arrival of post became an opportunity for socialising amongst fellow soldiers on 
deployment. The value of the social support which contact back home provided 
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was clearly recognised by the British Army and at both an administrative and 
practical level, soldiers were encouraged to write or otherwise stay in contact with 
their families in Britain. Lines of communication were actively maintained right up 
to the frontlines and routine orders from Commonwealth Headquarters frequently 
updated battalions with the latest postal rates for a wide variety of delivery 
options.44 This level of encouragement was such that the ‘Forces Letter Card’ 
which was the most basic service offered by the army, could be delivered by air 
mail to anywhere in the UK, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Gibraltar or Malta, or 
wherever was listed as the sender’s homeland completely free of charge.45 Brian 
Hough described how effective this system of communication was for keeping 
contact with family members back home in England, recalling: 
There was no restriction on letters. I wrote home and got letters from my 
Mum quite frequently. I can’t remember how they were collected; I think 
somebody must have come along and taken them off us when we received 
the last mail. My mum always used to send me the Saturday night 
Manchester Evening Chronicle, the pink one with all the football results. By 
the time I got it of course it was about a month out of date.46 
Hough’s description gives a glimpse into how effective and valuable the postal 
system was for men on the frontlines. Hough was easily able to remain in close 
and frequent contact with his mother back in Britain and although there was 
around a month’s delay on the arrival of post, he was able to keep abreast of news 
and even football scores at home. The fact that communication between soldiers 
on the frontlines and families at home was so effective presents a different view of 
the Korean War from the idea of it being a distant and isolated conflict. It is true 
that for the general population in Britain, Korea was not their pressing daily 
concern and there was a general national apathy regarding the conflict. This was 
one of the primary contributing factors to the conflict earning the title of ‘the 
 
44 TNA, WO 281/2, Appendix J- Postage Rates. 
45 Ibid, Appendix J (A).  




forgotten war’ in subsequent years. However, we can also clearly see from 
veterans’ testimony that the families and loved ones of soldiers were actively 
engaging with them. The very fact that the postal links between soldiers and their 
contacts in Britain were so efficient demonstrate that Korea was not as isolated a 
conflict as has been thought. Roy Cox underlines this perfectly in his statement on 
keeping regular contact with his sister in Britain: 
My Sister used to write to me and I got a letter from my father about once a 
year, he was not a big letter writer at all, but my sister wrote regularly. I 
used to write home to my sister as well, more than I wrote to anyone else. I 
would write when I was looking after the wireless sets and the telephone 
lines. She was very good to me.47 
What Cox describes can be broken down into a few key points. Firstly, like many 
other soldiers he was keeping up social contact with individuals in the UK, 
demonstrating that at least for family members in Britain, the war in Korea was far 
from the peripheral edge of consciousness. More importantly however, he 
highlights that to soldiers on the frontlines, national news and home events were 
less important to soldiers in Korea compared to personal and family news. This 
shows that soldiers on the frontlines of Korea were not isolated, but instead 
prioritised intimate social links over news. The post for soldiers in Korea was as it 
always has been, more than just a morale booster. One of Roper’s key themes 
was the idea that even on frontlines of the First World War, the social experiences 
of soldiers were not isolated from the home front and further more they were highly 
important to the soldiers themselves.48 Many soldiers kept the more cherished 
letters close to heart in chest pockets and fretted over their condition. Although 
noted during the First World War, it was also a feature in the social lives of soldiers 
fighting thirty-six years later in Korea. In spite of the considerable distance 
between Korea and the UK, the soldier’s experience in Korea remained intimately 
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connected to the home front through social communication. Private Ivan Williams 
spoke of how writing home and the effectiveness of post as a social tool allowed 
him to stay occupied and how a fellow soldier allowed him into his social network: 
Any news from home was good. We felt forgotten and anything from home 
was good. The great unsung heroes of the war were the postal service. I 
was getting letters from the UK to the frontline within a week sometimes. 
They were airmailed to Japan, but the fact that they could find the unit and 
then find you on the frontline in less than a week was astonishing. There 
was post collection as well a couple of times a week so that you could 
always write home. You had a lot of time to do nothing so I wrote quite a lot 
of letters. In fact, I got a pen pal. One of the fellas I was with persuaded his 
sister and all her friends to write to us when we were in Hong Kong first, 
then Korea. It was nice to get letters from anyone, of course I had never 
met the lady I was writing to but I eventually married her. She was my pen 
pal and I only met her when I came home. Four years later we were 
married, so I have a lot to thank Korea for, I wouldn’t have met my wife 
otherwise.49 
Williams’s account illustrates several elements of how important the post was for 
soldier’s social wellbeing on the front. He discusses how positive an effect 
receiving post from home had on men at the front and reiterates the details of how 
effective the channels of communication back to the UK were, being able to get 
messages back within a week in some cases. Williams also clearly details how the 
writing of letters proved to be an important way for some soldiers to keep 
themselves occupied during period of inactivity on the front. Undoubtedly, this was 
one of the reasons why the army was so keen to promote writing amongst its 
troops, as it provided a break from the practical duties and strains of frontline life. 
In his testimony, Williams recalled how he first made contact with and developed 
feelings for his future wife through postal contact in Korea. He repeated several 
times how important and pleasant it was for him to receive post from home and 
clearly demonstrates the significance the social contact the post provided on a 
personal level. Contact from home made him feel remembered and socially cared 
for, as opposed to isolated and alone. Given what Williams describes and the 
 




accounts of other soldiers, it would suggest that the desire for and importance of 
social connections through the post was not one way. Families and friends back in 
the United Kingdom appear to have also been seeking to stay in contact with their 
loved ones in Korea as much as possible, writing back just as often as soldiers 
wrote home. Similar connections were noted in First World War accounts of 
families writing to the front. Using diaries and letters, Roper explained how 
relations in the UK treasured the social contact the post provided with their loved 
ones and used it to ease their uncertainties about not knowing the fate of the men 
on the front.50 Each letter assured them that their loved ones were still alive and 
thinking of them, just as Williams suggested he felt receiving post from home. This 
is further supported by events recalled by William Hurst, when he incurred wroth 
from his mother and commanding officer for not writing home: 
I wasn’t one for writing. My mother actually wrote to my company 
commander saying that she had not heard from her son for so many 
months and I had to go in front of the Commanding Officer and he said 
‘We’ve had a letter from your mother, she says you’ve not been writing 
home, why is that? I said ‘Well I’ve nothing to say, sir’ and he said, ‘well 
you’re writing tonight and I want it on my desk in the morning’. I didn’t want 
her to worry so I couldn’t tell her we’re being bombed and shot so I just 
wrote: ‘Dear Mam, hope you are okay as it leaves me, Bill’. I took the letter 
to the CO the next morning and he read it and just laughed and shook his 
head.51 
Clearly Hurst’s mother was worried and keenly desired information about her son. 
Similarly, it seems his commanding officer was keen that he write home too, 
apparently for his mother’s sake as much as his own. From this we can see not 
only how senior officers were keenly aware of the effect writing could have not just 
on the soldier’s but, as Roper described, how important it was for men’s families 
back home. The unwillingness of Hurst to write to his mother does not necessarily 
show a lack of care, but rather the contrary. He explained how the brevity of his 
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letter was due to him not wanting to worry his family with news of him being in 
danger. What this instead shows is that Hurst was exhibiting a behavior of 
concealment, whereby soldiers writing home were very attuned to the impact such 
bad news could have on family back home. Roper describes this as having such 
an effect in the First World War as to effectively become a form of self-driven 
censorship.52 The fact that Hurst did not wish to tell his mother of the danger he 
was in, was far more a sign that he was still being kind and considerate to her, 
rather than being socially isolated. What is also made evident is how the officer 
cared for the emotional welfare of fellow soldiers. Perhaps it was for a similar 
reason why Williams’s friend sought to use the post to intertwine his own personal 
social connections with the other men in his unit. Williams told of how his friend 
had made arrangements for his sister and her friends to write to the other soldiers 
in his unit when they arrived in Korea. As Williams stated this provided them with a 
welcome channel of communication and gave them more to write about as coping 
mechanism during down time. More than this though, it allowed the social lives 
men developed in the frontlines to flow back along the channels of communication. 
Williams’ friend used the connection provided by the post to bring his social life in 
the UK and link it strongly with his social group in Korea. This demonstrates not 
only the significance of postal communication, but also how soldiers recognised it 
and used it as an act of care and kindness to their companions on the frontline.  
Social Activities on Leave 
Although soldiers still on duty in Korea were by no means isolated from their 
relatives and friends back home, leave in Japan provided even greater access to 
their home social lives. This was especially helpful for soldiers who had been sent 
back from the frontline in Korea to recover in Japan. Private John Sykes was sent 
 




for recuperation in Kure after he had suffered a shrapnel wound to his arm. In his 
recollection to the Imperial War Museum, he explained just how effective channels 
of communication home to Britain could be and how well connected the Korean 
theatre was as a whole: 
They sent us to Kure in Japan and in the Australia ward they had to redo all 
my arm. I got to stay in Kure quite a long time. While I was there, my sister 
knew a friend of ours was in the Pay Corps, so she wrote to him to say I 
was in recuperation in Kure and so he came down and saw me. My time 
there with the care they showed me was unbelievable, brilliant.53 
Sykes’s description of his time in Kure demonstrates just how effective 
communication with the UK was from Japan compared to Korea and how 
beneficial it could be. Whilst he was recovering, he was evidently able to write 
home and inform his sister of his predicament, who was in turn able to contact 
their old friend in the Pay Corps in time for him to meet Sykes in Kure. Additionally, 
we can see how much of a positive effect having a friend close at hand was for 
Sykes while he was recovering. Despite the severity of his injuries, which were 
substantial, Sykes reported that his time in Kure was in his opinion brilliant. 
Doubtless the social support from his friend and contact with his family was a 
major factor in how he felt about this.  
Time in Japan was not always dependent upon being wounded and recuperating. 
All British troops stationed on the Korean peninsula were allotted up to five days 
leave from their time deployed. If granted, soldiers would travel via U.S logistical 
channels to either Tokyo or Kure, depending on the circumstances of their 
departure.54 Social time spent in Japan was much different for British troops than 
what they were allowed in Korea. There was a wealth of activities open to allied 
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troops in Japanese cities, whereas access to towns and cities on the war-torn 
peninsula was strictly limited for UK personnel. Amongst other activities such as 
cinema trips, restaurant eating and even a sailing club, British and commonwealth 
personnel were offered the opportunity for trips to visit various cultural sites around 
Japan while on leave.55 Whilst most excursions proved relatively minor 
distractions, some of these trips could include harsh reminders of how recently the 
Second World War had ended and in some cases, revealed stark dangers of 
escalation in Korea. The stand out memory Brian Hough recalled from his time in 
Kure was a tour he and various other members of commonwealth forces were 
given of Hiroshima:  
The Sergeant came up to me and said ‘have you ever flown?’ and I thought 
they might be sending me home, but I said no. He says ‘Well you are 
tomorrow; you’re going to Japan’. While I was there, they asked a load of us 
if anyone would like to go and visit Hiroshima, it was only seven years after 
the bomb but they’d started to rebuild. They took a coachload of us, 
Australians, Canadians, British and oh dear me the devastation was 
enormous, particularly near the epicentre. Our guide was a survivor of the 
bomb and the stories that could tell us, by God it was horrifying, people with 
radiation burns dying in the river and all sorts. I thought that there’s no 
defence against this, I was worried that it might escalate to that in Korea 
where we were fighting, but of course it was never something I talked about 
though, we had more immediate things to worry about.56 
While there had been fear of the Korean War escalating to a nuclear conflict in 
Britain during the early days of the war, this was not something which extended to 
troops on the frontlines.57 Most British soldiers generally were more concerned 
with their immediate tasks at hand rather than the risk of a global conflict. 
However, Hough’s trip into Hiroshima changed his view of the threat the weapons 
posed. Visiting the devastated remains of the city and speaking to a survivor about 
the aftermath of the atomic blast seems to have deeply concerned Hough. As a 
result, he became very concerned with the lack of defence against nuclear 
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weapons and worried that Korea might escalate to a nuclear conflict. Despite this 
however, this was not something he discussed with fellow troops once he returned 
from Japan. It is surprising that the army would allow its soldiers to visit the 
remains of Hiroshima given the effect it had on Hough and doubtless the soldiers 
of various other nationalities who joined him. The fact that tours to such sensitive 
areas could take place demonstrate just how much more freedom troops who had 
been fighting in Korea had whilst in Japan.  
Unlike Korea, where British troops were confined either to their frontline positions 
or to guarded transit camps, Japan offered men the ability to more or less go 
where they wanted and do what they pleased, albeit with some caveats. Leave in 
Japan did not completely free a soldier from the strict control of British Army 
regulations. Personal activities were limited to authorised areas and pre-approved 
establishments. Every action British soldiers undertook had to be accountable 
back to the Commonwealth Headquarters. This even extended to which taxi 
services British personnel were authorised to employ whilst in Japan.58 One of the 
primary motivations behind the army’s continued regulation of the soldier’s body 
once on leave was an attempt to limit what Newlands termed as contact with 
‘dangerous others’.59 This was army shorthand for the dangers soldiers incurred 
by seeking sexual relations with prostitutes. As one might expect, this was not 
something commonly discussed by veterans when recounting their own personal 
experiences of the serving in Korea or on leave. Perhaps more so than discussing 
killing and even admitting to feelings of fear or enjoyment in battle, sexual infidelity 
whilst on deployment carried a very real stigma, especially in the society of the 
1950s, which means that very few veterans were willing to discuss the matter in 
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years following. That being said, there are some rare instances of its mention, as 
well as official actions taken by the army itself, which indicate that it was a 
common enough activity to require regulation. It was identified at the time that 
rates of venereal disease cases amongst U.S troops were up to three times higher 
in the Korean War than they had been during the Second World War, and that 
rates of infection amongst Commonwealth Forces, particularly the Canadians, 
were even higher.60 Although it was clearly something that many soldiers engaged 
in, sexual activity, particularly engaging with prostitution, was not something many 
veterans admit to of their own experience. Perhaps more so than discussing 
killing, discussing sexual activity was considered taboo and stigmatised throughout 
the Twentieth Century and still to this day. For this reason, very few veterans of 
the Korean War were willing to discuss the matter at all. Where it is spoken of in 
recollections, sexual activity is referenced through implications or in discussing 
men’s colleagues, rather than a direct admission that they themselves engaged in 
sexually promiscuous behaviour. Private Joseph Strode was one of the rare 
veterans who directly discussed engaging in prostitution whilst on leave in Japan 
and recalled the great deal of difficulty it caused him and a friend. 
When we were in Japan, me and this other fellow Dempsey his name was, 
he was a bit of a lad, stayed one night in a hotel and the manager comes up 
to us and says do we want a girl because he can sort it all out for us. 
Anyway, the next morning we had to pay and we didn’t have enough 
money. So, he said that Dempsey should have to go back to camp and get 
more money and I had to stay there as a sort of hostage I suppose and we 
had to hand over our paybooks. You couldn’t do anything without those 
paybooks so when we got back to Korea, we had no paybooks so we 
couldn’t get paid. This went on for about three or four weeks so we paid 
someone to forge new ones. An officer caught us and got us confined to 
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barracks for three weeks, he said we were lucky because we could have 
got five years for forgery outside the army.61 
Strode’s account demonstrates firstly one of the many reasons why the army was 
keen to prevent its soldiers from engaging with illicit relations and secondly the 
extent to which prostitution carried a stigma in the ranks, despite evidence to 
suggest it was commonplace. The way in which the hotel manager was able to 
lever the situation over Strode and Dempsey by holding their paybooks hostage 
shows just how vulnerable solders could be in these situations, embarrassing 
themselves and potentially the army itself. Secondly, the lengths Strode goes to 
tiptoe around the issue of prostitution, even after having discussed losing his 
paybook and several weeks’ pay, reveal just how sensitive an issue it was to 
discuss. Although that it is heavily implied that Strode or Dempsey ‘the lad’ 
engaged in sexual activities with a prostitute, Strode does not openly or explicitly 
state that he and his friend actually hired the prostitute, only that they did not have 
the money to pay the hotel manager in the morning. The fact that Strode choose 
his words so as not to directly discuss the hiring of the sex worker further 
demonstrates just how awkward a topic this was for veterans to discuss in their 
subsequent testimonies. Partially, the reason for this stigma, especially amongst 
British Soldiers, was that there was still a lingering attitude in the British Army of 
1950 that signs of troops engaging with prostitutes, and especially V.D cases, 
represented a moral failing and an associated lack of willpower.62 This was despite 
a general softening of attitudes on this matter since the First World War and that 
morale and discipline amongst the Commonwealth Divisions in Korea was 
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consistently high.63 A partial explanation for this was the ideal of the post-war 
British soldier in wider society was portrayed as ‘a typical British male, free and 
self-directed, but his freedom (including his sexual freedom) was bounded by a 
sense of responsibility, moderation and “good form’.64 Additionally, since the end 
of the Second World War, there had been several high-profile cases brought to the 
attention of the media of British and Commonwealth troops engaging in sexual 
activity with prostitutes or ‘Diggers’ whilst stationed abroad.65 With the moral 
outrage that followed, it is not hard to see how and why wider societal 
expectations of how a British soldier should behave were effecting the attitudes of 
soldiers on the ground in Korea.  This is even evident in Strode’s actions, given 
that he and Dempsey preferred to forgo pay for several weeks and risking forging 
documents rather that admit to their seniors that the books were lost whilst in the 
pursuit of sex. It is also fairly easy to conclude that having soldiers practically held 
hostage as a result of hiring a prostitute and resultantly forging paperwork was not 
something the British Army would be keen to promote. Short of confining all 
personnel to barracks in Japan, an act which would render the whole point of 
leave redundant, it was very difficult to prevent instances like this from occurring 
off base in practical terms. One way in which the army could limit, if not prevent 
this from occurring was to increase restrictions on who British soldiers were 
allowing or bringing back to their officially designated areas, which is precisely 
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what was done. By the spring of 1951 Commonwealth Headquarters had been 
forced to issue explicit guidelines on which civilians were permitted into these 
British troop areas, as well as much stricter regulations on how passes and 
permissions were granted.66 The nature of these new guidelines makes it clear 
that only contractors and labourers were to be permitted in areas occupied by 
British Army personnel unless expressly permitted by the areas adjutant or 
commanding officer. The implications of this are clear in that the regulations would 
specifically exclude female company and sex workers from entering British bases. 
Similar measures were taken to regulate sexual behaviour on bases throughout 
the Second World War.67 The effectiveness of these measures in the 1940s was 
limited, as for all the education and efforts the army put into limiting men’s sexual 
appetites, records of venereal disease always seemed to escalate when troops 
were on deployment.68 Given Strode’s testimony, it would appear that this was 
also the case during the Korean War. We know from Private Roy Martian’s 
account of his journey to Korea that the army was still investing serious effort in 
warning soldiers off sexual activities whilst on active service. However, as the 
account of Strode and the measures the army was forced to take indicate, it 
seems that sex and prostitution was still a major part of soldier’s release whilst on 
leave.69 
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Social connections and bonding were clearly a major coping mechanism for 
soldiers on the frontlines of Korea. Social behaviours therefore were central to the 
day to day experience of these men and were just as much a part of their lives as 
any other aspect of the conflict. Just as the wave of new military history showed 
that this was true of soldiers in the World Wars and other more well recognised 
conflicts, oral testimony has shown that this was equally true of Korea. These were 
real people with real human needs and social interactions were tremendously 
important to each and every individual. One of the primary forms of the social 
support network soldiers provided for each other was simple, person to person 
friendships. Be this in the form of close individual friendships or webs of groups, 
friendship provided the backbone of social lives in Korea. Individual friendships 
were highly important to men on the frontlines. Individuals maintained contact with 
one and other as often as possible and would extend great acts of kindness to one 
and other. These friendships could transcend demographics such as age and 
background and allowed soldiers to look out for one and other during times of 
stress. Group friendships were just as close as individual relationships. Men would 
seek the comfort and support offered by a close social group as often as was 
possible when not separated by their duties. This extended to sleeping alongside 
one and other in groups, eating together and receiving post as a group. All of this 
reinforced interpersonal connection and provided a comfort throughout difficult 
times spent on the frontlines. The closeness of these social groups allowed 
soldiers to participate in acts of very close caring with one and other. In these 
cases, men took to behaviours which represented an almost parental level of care 
for one and other. This extended to looking after each other’s health and well- 




soldiers as individuals and in the interests of the group as a whole. The potency of 
these behaviours for helping soldiers cope with life on the front is clearly seen in 
testimonies in which soldiers were not able to develop bonds a close social group. 
Social isolation proved to be a horribly diminishing experience for soldiers in such 
an unfortunate circumstance, as they were effectively denied any of the benefits a 
close social group could bring. The results of a soldier’s social environment were 
not always beneficial however. In an effort to project what they perceived as an 
image of a good soldier, be this through the lens of masculinity, nationality or 
otherwise, soldiers would attempt to conceal their stresses and true reactions to 
danger from the wider group. One of the strongest bonds between soldiers was 
the group acquisition, making of and consumption of tea and alcoholic drinks. Tea 
in particular was valued as it provided a welcome reminder of home and a 
comforting break from the stresses of warfare. Men cherished those who provided 
them with ‘a good brew’ sometimes even years after the conflict’s end. Similarly, 
alcohol provided an opportunity for men to bond both interpersonally and as a 
group. Alcohol represented both a social currency for bringing troops together and 
a tool to help cope with stress. This was particularly true after a period of fierce 
fighting. After which, both tea and alcohol were used to help soldiers calm their 
nerves and bond over what had happened. Away from home, soldiers also used 
the postal service to tap into their original social sphere of family. Troops 
maintained complex social and emotional links with loved ones back in Britain, 
defying the notion that Korea was an isolated war, on the far edge of public 
consciousness. Both families at home and the soldiers themselves were keenly 
aware of each other and kept up close communication. The post could also be a 
valuable social tool for soldiers to link their emotional connections with home, to 




powerful link with home was a potent way of cementing group bonds in Korea. 
Soldiers shared packages from home and every newsletter and comic would be 
passed around and shared. This social inclusion was an excellent demonstration 
of how men connected their home life with their immediate social bonds to the 
extent that men recommended each other pen pals and helped forge future long-
term relationships. Such was the value of the postal communication with home for 
men’s social and emotional wellbeing that the army staunchly encouraged men to 
write as often as possible. Men also found opportunities to relax and unwind whilst 
they were on leave in Japan. The relatively greater freedom afforded by their time 
in Japan allowed soldiers to engage in a wide range of activities otherwise 
unavailable to them in Korea. This was partially made up of more mundane forms 
of entertainment such as boating and cinema trips. However, men could also 
travel on cultural visits to sites around Japan, including more controversial sites 
such as the ruins of Hiroshima. The greater freedom, though not absolute, also 
allowed men to engage in more promiscuous social activities, including 
prostitution. Although it was widespread enough to have been noticed by the army 
and warranted official regulations be put in place to limit it, the attitude held by 
general society in Britain towards it proved to hold say even in Korea. All in all, the 
social experience of soldiers in Korea was central to their experience generally. It 
came from many motivations and was expressed in a great manner of ways, 
however, the presence of a social group and the need to maintain bonds and 
integrate with within said social group was present in soldiers experience at all 




Chapter 6: Being Forgotten First-hand and the Post-War Experience. 
 
The Forgotten Army 
Although combat operations in Korea ceased in 1953, the experience of the 
conflict for its veterans was far from over. What we can see from their testimonies 
of their own post-war experiences reveals a great deal, not only about how the 
men themselves reintegrated into British Society, but also we can gain a 
tremendous insight into that society itself and how it allowed Korea to slip from its 
popular memory. During his interview with the Imperial War Museum in 2003, 
former Lance Corporal Benjamin Whitchurch suddenly raised his opinion on the 
government and British society’s reaction to veterans of the Korean War: 
Talk about the Forgotten War. We were National Servicemen, being paid as 
National Servicemen, but we still went to a warzone. They only paid us a 
lump sum, because we were one point short of pensionable. The forgotten 
army that was us. King George and Elizabeth recognised what we were 
worth, but the government wouldn’t and that’s been it, we get nothing.1 
The Korean War is by no means unique in its common description as being 
‘forgotten’. Countless other conflicts, events and armies in modern history can 
easily be called forgotten. Indeed, there has been considerable study applied 
towards just how the Korean War entered into this category. Yet, still there is a 
facet of the Korean War in society which remains under explored. This exploration 
has been the first-hand experience of being forgotten in itself. Veterans of the 
Korean War have been keenly aware of the experience of being forgotten, since 
their own return from the conflict which has shaped their identities and memories 
of the war ever since. For the soldiers who went to Korea, their lives post-war were 
marked by a duality in which the Korean War was for them unforgettable and yet 
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their experience was disregarded by society. In recent historiography, ‘forgetting’ 
has been a hotly debated topic. Even defining what ‘forgetting’ means and in what 
context to use it can be difficult. In its simplest terms, ‘forgetting’ can be largely 
defined as a failure, deliberate, or otherwise of remembrance, the opposite of 
being deliberately remembered.2 Defining who is ‘forgotten’ is equally complicated, 
however, it can generally be said that the ‘forgotten’ are those whose story is 
broadly excluded from, or at least not yet included in the dominant historical 
narratives.3 The Korean War and the soldiers who fought in it most definitely meet 
these qualifications. This is to the extent that forgetting has become a vital element 
in understanding the post- war histories of Korea and the wider Cold War.4 Yet, 
this was a process which occurred throughout the post-war years for the conflict’s 
veterans. The legacy of the Korean War is a prime case in forgetting first-hand, 
even before the signing of the armistice. From the very moment soldier’s boarded 
transports bound for home, their story was inevitably overshadowed by the events 
of the Second World War. Confused war goals and general apathy within the 
population meant that the Korean War never did invoke the ideals of patriotism 
and global emergency as had been raised during the Second World War. The 
experience of men on the ground never captured the post-war imagination in 
popular culture in the same way as the First and Second World Wars. This has 
resulted in the irony that the Korean War’s place in British History is most notable 
because of its view as being forgotten. The further irony is that the individual’s 
experience of being forgotten has also been overlooked. A key element in the 
post-war experience of Korean War veterans was a lack of commemoration and 
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remembrance. The process of forgetting the Korean War was a prolonged process 
that has no easily defined start point, however, the seeds of collective forgetting 
most definitely have their origins during the Korean War itself. For example, there 
is the extent to which Korean War commemoration has always been side lined by 
the proximity to the Second World War and the efforts of remembrance directed 
therein. This goes hand in hand with a general apathy to the Korean War within it’s 
time which contributed to a prolonged period of little interest in the war’s individual 
narratives. 
Post- Second World War Weariness and Apathy to Korea 
One of the most notable reasons why the Korean War failed to ignite the same 
commemorative spirit as the Second World War was the lack of a perceivable 
national struggle in the eyes of British society, especially in comparison to the 
latter. The common reception to the conflict in the public’s eyes ranged mainly 
between perceived fears of unwanted escalation into a full-scale World War to 
passing disinterest. The result was that unlike the First and Second World Wars 
where the burdens of the conflict were endured with a kind of national spirit, the 
military exertions required for the Korean War were never really ‘celebrated’, or at 
least recalled in the same manner.5 Society at large in Britain met the initial news 
of the conflict’s outbreak with both a weariness of war and a general lack of 
knowledge towards the situation.6 When paired with the unclear war aims for 
Britain and the impression of ‘remoteness’ from the conflict, the general public’s 
perception of a Korean War only grew more apathetic. At the initial outbreak of the 
war it proved a difficult task for the Foreign Office to explain Britain’s involvement 
and aims of the reasons for war to the public. This was primarily because there 
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was no immediate or widely perceived threat to Britain’s strategic or economic 
interests in Korea.7 At the time even Winston Churchill, for many still the 
embodiment of Britain’s Second World Wartime spirit, quipped of Korea that he 
had ‘never heard of the bloody place’.8 Mass Observation articles from the start of 
the Korean War echo this sentiment, alongside that of indicating a fear of a wider 
war escalating from this minor conflict.9 In short, the conflict was seen as an 
indirect and not immediate problem, unimportant to Britain’s interests, but with an 
alarming potential to drag a war-weary society back into a state of total war. For 
these reasons Korea simply did not enter into the public’s imagination in the same 
way as the Second World War and as a result was unlikely to garner much 
enthusiasm from the start.10 With the end of fighting in 1953, very little in public 
opinion had changed. Partially due to the fact that the Korean War had remained a 
distant and increasingly unthreatening conflict which was partially due to the 
unedifying, indecisive ceasefire, there was never any great attention payed to the 
conflict’s ending in Britain. It has since become a point of notoriety that the Ashes 
cricket matches of 1953 had garnered more attention from the British public than 
the end of fighting in Korea. Public apathy had been more or less maintained 
throughout the previous years as peace talks and stalemate fighting had 
continued.11 Ivan Williams stated of the time, ‘If you said to people that you had 
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been to Korea, they would say where?’12 What is often overlooked in this narrative 
is that these feelings were not entirely unique to the home front. The soldiers who 
had been, or at the time were still fighting in Korea held mixed views on the war. 
Although most now believe they had done a good and important job at the time, 
many were not quite as invested in the cause. Terry Moore recalled of how the 
ceasefire was met with a general disinterest not only by the public, but also with a 
lack of purpose on his own part: 
I don’t think people were interested when we got home. My family was at 
the docks, but no one else I knew really cared. No one else I knew had 
been out there fighting. Today, when I think back, I didn’t really feel 
anything towards it. I was glad when it stopped, but I didn’t know if it was 
worthwhile.13  
Moore describes how universal the lack of awareness about Korea was outside of 
his immediate family, but also how his own feelings at the time were more centred 
on simply being glad to be home. Many soldiers echoed Moore’s words and were 
more relieved to simply be heading home rather than celebratory of the war’s 
conclusion. Colonel John Lightley, then a subaltern with the Durham Light Infantry 
remembered that ‘More than anything, I was just glad to be going home in one 
piece’.14 Even during the war, soldiers in Korea could have a certain apathy 
towards the prospect of peace. Corporal Edward Curd recalled how troops in 
Korea held a half-hearted interest in the peace proceedings. He said ‘We’d hear 
talk of the peace talks, but we didn’t really pay attention to it all’. He then went on 
to say ‘They’d already went on for years and whenever there was news we’d just 
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think ‘oh no here we go again’ and carry on what we was doing.15 Surprisingly this 
apathy towards the peace talks was not without precedent. Some Royal Air Force 
combatants met the end of the Second World War with similar hesitation and 
disinterest.16 The difference in this case was the lack of an edifying victory in the 
war. The veterans of the Royal Air Force and other forces of the Second World 
War were able to watch through the years as their role in the conflict and its 
subsequent victorious ending were celebrated and commemorated. On the other 
hand, commemoration and representation of Korean War veterans did not share 
this position in the national psyche.  
Post-War Representation of the Korean War in the UK 
One of the main themes of the history of the Korean War is its lack of 
representation in its own right and this has been a significant part of why the war is 
far less commemorated than other conflicts of the Twentieth Century. Unlike the 
individual’s experience, this element of the Korean War has been explored at 
length. Huxford’s work on the Korean War for example details thoroughly the lack 
of representation the Korean War garnered in post-war Britain. Following on from 
the general apathy the war garnered during its course and immediate aftermath, 
the lack of a decisive and edifying end point also gave little reason for subsequent 
cultural celebration.17 In short, Korea did not neatly fit into a usable past of Britain’s 
military traditions, nor did it represent a positive sign for the future. The 
overwhelming cultural impact of the Second World War was one of the major 
contributing actors to the lack of cultural representation. Korea was buried under a 
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saturation of material about the Second World War. The scale of this is evident in 
the number of movies produced about the Korean War in comparison to the 
Second World War. In Britain for example, there was only one single major movie 
produced about Korea in the immediate post-war decade, this particular movie 
was produced in 1956 and the name of the movie was A Hill in Korea.18 In 
contrast, within the same year there were twelve British movies released about the 
Second World War. This included the much more culturally significant and critically 
successful, The Bridge over the River Kwai.19 It was not just in terms of motion 
pictures where, despite the cultural significance of the military in post-war Britain, 
the Korean War remained drastically underrepresented. This was until the time in 
which it could be contextualised as a wider part of the Cold War. The role of the 
Korean War in wider narratives of the Cold War is also a strong factor in its lack of 
representation in its own right. In both fiction and non-fiction, the Korean War 
became merely a chapter in the wider histories of the fight against communism. 
The 1959 Novel, The Manchurian Candidate by Richard Condon and the following 
1962 movie are perhaps the most well-known work regarding the Cold War politics 
to do with Korea.20 In both cases, the plot features a group of United States 
Soldiers during the Korean War who as Prisoner Of War were brainwashed and 
released as communist sleeper agents. Though the work is loosely based on the 
experience of British Prisoner Of War in Korea and possibly specifically defector 
Andrew Condron, the plot has little else to do with the Korean War than as a 
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background setting.21 The focus of the movie is far more to do with anti-communist 
zeal in the Cold War United States than the war itself. As subsequent adaptations 
set in different conflicts and political intrigues have shown the use of the Korean 
War in the original is of small consequence.22 That is not to say that the 
subsequent anti-communist narratives of the Korean War have not had an impact 
on the personal views of British veterans. As the scale of the Cold War can be 
retroactively appreciated by veterans, many began to shape their view of the war 
as a part of that wider struggle. Raymond Todd, who was coincidentally a part of 
the same unit as Condron, was one such example who retrospectively adopted his 
view of his service as that of a Cold War warrior:  
I was delighted to have been able to have done my part. I believe it was the 
first occasion where the communist expansion was actually stopped. 
Admittedly we were not able to take back the whole of Korea, but that was 
because of the Chinese intervention.23 
Todd frames his memories of Korea into a fitting much more to do with the wider 
Cold War than just the Korean War conflict itself. His framing of his service as 
having done his part is also reminiscent of the manner in which First and Second 
World War veterans speak of their roles in the earlier conflicts. Similarly, Colonel 
Jeffes also came to this view in the years following the war, believing that Korea 
became an early bulwark against later communist aggression:  
I think we had to stand up against the Communists, because if we hadn’t 
stood up in Korea, I think it very possible that the East Germans would’ve 
attacked the West Germans. It would’ve spread to Europe, if they got away 
with it in the Far East. And Stalin was involved, I gather, much more than 
we thought at the time, he gave Kim ll Sung the go-ahead.24 
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Again, like Todd, for Jeffes the Cold War perspective of how Korea came to be 
represented enabled him to claim a part of a larger struggle in the same way as 
better commemorated, past generations of soldiers. Jeffes came to view his role in 
Korea as a part of stopping a wider communist threat to the entire world by 
standing up to them. However, the subsequent adoption of an anti-communist 
narrative of Korea is not universal. Many veterans refute the idea that the Korean 
War was a specifically anti-communist war and many soldiers simply did not care 
about the subsequent politics of the conflict.25 Lieutenant Richard Skinner, for 
example, held a more pragmatic view of the situation than a politically motivated 
struggle: ‘It wasn’t an anti-communist war, it was just against the enemy, against 
China’.26 Clearly, the acceptance of Cold War narratives is not universally 
accepted amongst Korea veterans and although it enable some veterans to claim 
a place in a wider better remembered struggle, evidently, there is still a disparity in 
experience and representation. 
Entanglement with Vietnam in Popular Culture and Remembrance 
Remembrance and forgetting were not processes which occurred solely in Britain 
and the international aspect of the Korean War played heavily into this. In the 
United States like Britain, the Korean War is markedly less well remembered than 
the Second World War and the later conflict in Vietnam. Similarly, American 
popular culture, has spent much less coverage on Korea than the aforementioned 
wars. This is revealing of how important representation in popular culture is for 
events in popular memory and across society. Notable representations of the 
conflict where they exist are also problematic. Where the Korean War is prominent 
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in American popular culture it is often used as a foil, prelude or metaphor for the 
later Vietnam War. For example, In the 1972 novel First Blood, sympathetic 
antagonist Chief Wilfred Teasle’s Korean War service is primarily used to give a 
stark juxtaposition to the rogue Vietnam veteran John Rambo. This was an 
element entirely left out of the later movie adaptation.27 Also notably is the 1969 
movie M*A*S*H, this movie covers the escapades of a United States Mobile Army 
Surgical Hospital throughout the Korean War and subsequent long running 
television series which followed.28 M*A*S*H is problematic as a remembrance of 
Korea for many reasons, primarily as it portrays a highly fictionalised version of the 
conflict by extending it for several years. It depicts it as having taken place 
amongst jungle settings not found in Korea. It is also widely regarded as a thinly 
veiled critique of America’s role in Vietnam, rather than a true representation of 
Korea. In short, the Korean War in the United States, just as in Britain, became 
hugely under-represented and muddied in popular culture. The reasons for this are 
as varied and complicated as the reasons for forgetting the Korean War in Britain. 
However, there are some elements which become significant for the experience of 
the individual soldier. One of the major driving factors cited as being behind this 
absence in United States popular culture is the undistinguished combat record of 
the United States Army in Korea, especially in comparison to its comparatively 
successful record during the Second World War.29 On two occasions in Korea, the 
United States led forces were on the brink of total rout and the conflict lacked a 
meaningful resolution or victory for the USA or for Britain. This view further 
entangled Korean remembrance with opinions of Vietnam, as seen in First Blood 
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and M*A*S*H. This process was not solely a matter of broad cultural histories 
regarding Korea. The very trend can also be traced in British Soldiers’ subsequent 
experience of remembering their time in Korea. Captain Charles Chester of the 
Northumberland Fusiliers, who served in both the Second World War and Korean 
War interpreted the situation in just this way and was highly resentful of the 
Americans in his memories as a result:  
I hadn’t realised yet just how much the Americans ran the whole show that 
came later. The whole thing was a shambles. I feel very critical of the 
Americans at that time. It wasn’t the fault of the individual American, they’re 
as good as anybody, but it’s the way their army was put together, the way 
they organised themselves. They were fighting a war which should have 
been fought on their feet, same as Vietnam. If they’d fought on foot like us, 
they’d have done a damn side better. In Korea and Vietnam, they should 
have been up on the mountaintops, where the enemy actually were, not 
driving along the plains.30  
Chester’s glib memory of the war is rooted in his criticism of how the American 
troops fought tactically. He very specifically differentiates between his disapproval 
of American tactics and the role of individual United States troops. He labels the 
entire war shameless on account of the Ame1ricans approach to battle. His 
implications are that because the United States Army wasn’t fighting on its feet as 
he believed British troops were, the war itself would have gone more successfully. 
His critique of poor American tactics ties into C. Young’s arguments as to why 
Americans have difficulty in remembering Korea. The similarities between 
Chester’s account and the United States popular cultural references of Korea do 
not end there. Just as became the case in post- Vietnam representations of Korea, 
Chester equates his own memories of Korea with what he believes happened in 
Vietnam. Just as United States media began to entangle memories of Korea to the 
war in Vietnam, Chester also applied his own views of United States forces in 
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Korea to the later war. What we are seeing evidenced in the experience of British 
veterans is the sheer impact of global popular culture on their own memories. 
Chester linked his own memories and recollections of how the Korean War was 
fought to how the Vietnam War is represented to have been fought nearly twenty 
years later. Thusly demonstrating the extent to which subsequent portrayals of 
international media have impacted the experience of remembering for British 
Soldiers.  
Issues Reintegrating into Civilian Life 
Of course, the wider phenomena behind the forgetting of the Korean War is not 
relegated to matters of popular culture. For the veterans who fought in Korea, 
being forgotten was a process they experienced first-hand, revealing just how 
numb society in 1950s Britain had become to the plight of returning soldiers.  
Just like the soldiers of the century’s previous conflicts, those servicemen not 
wishing to remain in the Armed Forces now faced the task of reintegrating back 
into civilian life. As it had been previously, this was no small feat and for some it 
proved much more difficult than others. In the cases of the First and Second World 
Wars, the experience of soldiers’ attempts to re-enter civilian society have been 
well accounted for and form an important part of the conflicts’ respective 
narratives. Once again, the same cannot be said of the soldiers who returned from 
Korea. The experience of re-integrating to civilian life after having served in Korea 
shares many similarities with what had occurred following the First and Second 
World Wars. Men not only had to re-join the civilian workforce, but also had to re-
integrate with their families, friends and a wider society which had grown accustom 
to returning soldiers. This was the frontline of forgetting Korea. The experience of 
men in these circumstances was like the war itself, viewed with apathy and 




experienced issues re-adapting to civilian life. Of course, the majority of soldiers 
who did leave the army following their return from Korea were indeed able to re-
integrate without too many problems. An example of this was Bill Crook who had 
helped rescue Bill Speakman when he won his Victoria Cross. Bill returned from 
Korea having himself been wounded fighting at the Battle of the Hook in 1953. 
Despite his injuries, Crook found it quite easy to resume civilian life and was 
recorded as saying:  
It wasn’t too bad, I got home to England to be demobbed. I didn’t have any 
trouble getting back into civilian life really. I went back to the taxi garage 
where I’d worked before and went straight back to it. I had to go to the 
hospital a few times to have my arm checked but that was all, it didn’t give 
me much trouble. Mentally being wounded didn’t really affect me either, I 
suppose I was just glad to get home.31  
Crook was amongst the fortunate number of soldiers who were able to return 
straight into a line of work and life, in his case to the same garage where he had 
worked prior to his National Service. The ability to step straight back into work 
seems to have eased the transition for Crook, who aside from minor troubles with 
his wound, was mainly unaffected by his experience and was certainly happy to be 
home. Some troops suffered only minor anxieties upon returning. One of those 
who suffered minor anxieties was Marine John Underwood who found any food 
made with rice made him feel sick, even though it was very different from what he 
had in Korea.32 Although cases such as these form the majority of the experience 
of men returning home, they remain the lucky ones. A significant number found the 
transition from soldier to civilian to be jarringly difficult. There are various reasons 
and common themes throughout the experiences of those who found it difficult to 
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re-adjust to civilian life. It has been noted in men returning from the First World 
War that particularly those who were suffering from battle stress, the point of 
mental breakdown could be at the point where they finally felt liberated. They felt 
that having left the army’s social structure there was no need to withhold 
weakness.33 Social anxieties, drinking problems, difficulty in holding down a job 
and a general difficulty in accepting they no longer had a military structure around 
them were all compounded by a lack of adequate support for ex-servicemen in the 
post-war era.  
Nightmares 
One of the most common forms of difficulty faced by Korea veterans upon their 
return to the United Kingdom was the re-occurrence of nightmares and night 
terrors. Nightmares and similar neurosis have been common in many military 
groups following the dawn of industrialised war and are still prevalent in the post- 
service experience of British Forces to this day. 34 William Clark of the Gloucester 
Regiment who had been captured at the Battle of Imjin experienced continual re-
occurring nightmares that were typical of anxiety attacks of many veterans. In his 
case, Clark believed Chinese soldiers were still coming to get him and was 
reported as saying: ‘I still have dreams now at times and nightmares, about the 
imprisonment mainly. I used to dream that Chinese would come in, pick me up and 
say ‘you’ve got to come back’’.35 For the most part, ex-soldiers suffering 
nightmares were able to recover with time, however, in a society still recovering 
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from the after effects of the Second World War, some veterans of Korea could 
often find little sympathy for their own plights. Leslie Winspear, despite stating ‘that 
serving in Korea had given him a wonderful sense of perspective in life’, 
nonetheless experienced terrible night terrors for years after returning home: 
I had nightmares for a few years afterwards. It was a response mechanism 
that we were under attack and I had to get into action quickly, brief but 
violent. When I came out of the Army for example, I eventually found digs in 
Rotherham, with a couple. The husband had been a Bevin Boy in the 
(Second World) War and I was eventually asked to leave because he and 
also his wife said they heard me crying out in my sleep. I used to have 
these nightmares infrequently but they eventually became less and less 
over the next few years.36 
Winspear was not the only veteran to suffer nightmares once back in his home 
country, however his case is a particularly poignant one as it demonstrates how 
deeply such a seemingly common thing could affect the life of a returned veteran. 
The description of his nightmares seems to be a typical case of chronic traumatic 
nightmares experienced by combat veterans and the symptoms began to cause 
him problems in his everyday life.37 His shouting as a response to the extremely 
intense anxiety created by his terrors caused him to lose his lodgings as he was 
upsetting his host family. It is not explicit why precisely the family were so 
unsympathetic to Winspear’s crying out. Certainly, there would be an element to 
which it would simply have been disturbing to hear a man crying out at night, 
however there is also the possibility that the non-combatant viewed the ex-soldier 
in a negative light on account of his service. There were noted instances following 
the First and Second World Wars where veterans were viewed with suspicion and 
 
36 Sgt. Leslie Maynard Winspear, Sniper and Intelligence Section, 1st Battalion, Duke of 
Wellington’s Regiment, (Imperial War Museum interview recording, 6/2/2001, Conrad 
Wood, Imperial War Museum, catalogue number 21593), Reel 5. 
37 B. Van der Kolk & E. Hartmann, ‘Nightmares and trauma: A Comparison of Nightmares 
After combat With Lifelong Nightmares in Veterans’, The American Journal of Psychiatry, 




in some cases open hostility on account of their involvement in the act of killing.38 
It is entirely possible, especially given Winspear’s need to include the fact in his 
recount, that the man who had served in wartime as a non-combatant, was all the 
more uncomfortable housing a serviceman who had evidently participated in 
violence. Winspear’s nightmares were a point of military action confronting the 
very centre of the family’s civilian world. Therefore, it would seem that the family 
rejected Winspear similarly to how in the Inter- World War period there was often 
unwillingness for civilians to share and explore the experience of combat 
veterans.39 We can see from this at least one aspect of how even seemingly minor 
and common psychological hang overs as nightmares from serving on the front 
line could have a profound effect on a veteran’s ability to re-integrate into society. 
Fortunately for Winspear, he eventually found new accommodation and his 
nightmares eventually abated, however, psychological issues from serving could 
create much more complex social problems for other Korean War veterans.  
Social Isolation 
Almost as prevalent as nightmares and much more difficult to adjust, was the 
common reoccurrence amongst Korea veterans of social isolation and a perceived 
loneliness. This is borne out by initially having been removed from their friends 
and families for so long during service and then secondly being removed from their 
military friends at de-mobilisation. Many ex-servicemen found civilian life to be 
socially isolated and lonely. Ben Whitchurch described the difficulty of civilian life 
in similar terms: 
I couldn’t settle, it took a long time. I’d say years to really come back into it, 
the world of living again. It was a vacuum of emptiness, not being in the 
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army, not knowing all my friends, I had no friends in Civvy Street, other than 
family. 40 
For Whitchurch, leaving the army meant abandoning the social structure of friends 
he had built around himself during his service and this was something he clearly 
felt he lacked as a civilian. He directly links his feelings of emptiness with not being 
in the army and not the comradeship of his army friends. The desperation of the 
situation is evidenced by how he describes his experience without friends as 
hollow and separate from the real living world. David Green described having 
similar feelings of emptiness once he returned home:  
It was like staring into a bottomless pit of nothingness. Sleep had not been 
easy for some time and I found that lying in bed each night, in the peaceful 
surroundings of my own home, the silence was deafening. I longed to throw 
open the window and shout out ‘Wake Up!’.41 
The men’s description of their situations as hollow and outside of the living worlds 
demonstrates how they felt directionless and without purpose outside of the 
structures of army life. Veterans of Korea were in commonality with the experience 
of many Second World War veterans, adrift in post-war Britain, who also felt 
feelings of social disorientation and restlessness having returned to civilian life.42 
David Green’s own brother Eric, a veteran of the Navy during the Second World 
War was still having problems settling down when David had returned from 
Korea.43 The feelings of isolation could be made all the worse by how some 
veteran’s interactions with families, relatives and friends was portrayed. Most 
soldiers found discussing their experiences with loved ones difficult, however, 
there were circumstances in which the conversation was much more distressing, 
which could push veterans into further isolation from their immediate social group. 
Whitchurch had this problem because throughout the conflict of the Korean War, 
 
40 L/ Cpl. Benjamin Whitchurch, (IWM 26098), Reel 6. 
41 D. Green, Captured at the Imjin, P. 179. 
42 M. Francis, The Flyer, P. 182.  




burial and commemoration of the dead proved difficult for British and 
Commonwealth forces. The reason for this was because during the course of the 
war, the United States Army was primarily in charge of logistics that included the 
handling of deceased British Soldiers. The burial of deceased British Soldiers was 
the responsibility of the United States Grave Units rather than by their British 
counterparts.44 As a result of the burial policies in place, the majority of British war 
dead were interred at the United Nations Memorial Cemetery at Tanggok in Korea 
and were never re-patriated to the United Kingdom.45 This proved to be a difficult 
issue for families of the deceased in Britain, who, having often received only the 
scantest news of a loved one’s death felt they lacked satisfactory closure. As was 
the case following many conflicts, some bereaved families would seek any source 
they could in order to better take ownership the memory of their loved ones.46 
Several encounters of this sort proved to be highly distressing for Whitchurch, who 
was questioned by the families of his friends after his return: 
People were asking, wanting to know and it just wasn’t something you 
wanted to talk about, but people still wanted to know. I walked into my 
Uncle’s pub, shortly after coming home and Andy Maurice’s mother was in 
there, with her husband. She almost broke my ribs and eventually she said 
‘how did my boy die?’ and I said ‘I’m sorry I don’t know, I don’t know’… 
Again, with a family from up the top of the road, Ginger Bishop’s mother, 
wanted to know how their son was killed, I said ‘I’m sorry Mrs. Bishop, I 
don’t know’… Friendly fire killed him. But you can’t tell people that. It was 
horrible I couldn’t talk to them after that. Same with Harvey, when he 
brought the men out, Americans thought they were Chinese. 
Unbelievable.47 
Whitchurch’s case is an extreme one, but it demonstrates how in the news 
vacuum about Korea in the United Kingdom, veterans could be forced to confront 
their experience in terribly difficult positions as the bearers of bad news. It is 
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obvious Whitchurch was placed in an uneasy position by the situation, he did not 
wish to discuss his experience. Whitchurch was time and time again confronted by 
families and friends of the deceased wanting to be informed of what had 
happened. Given the obscure view of the Korean War in the United Kingdom and 
the lack of detailed news about the situation, Whitchurch became the focal point 
for news about his fallen comrades, despite him not wishing to discuss the war. 
Even with the tenderness of his meeting with Maurice’s parents, the emotional 
impact of having to discuss their son’s death was clearly difficult for Whitchurch. 
Similarly, having to lie to the Bishop family about the fate of their son proved to be 
a struggle and eventually drove Whitchurch to break off contact with them. Such 
difficulties are just one example of how a Korean veteran’s post-war experience 
could lead to further strained social relationships.  
Alcoholism as a Coping Mechanism 
All of these various social issues could in turn lead to another common problem for 
ex-servicemen which are alcohol dependency. Alcohol has always been an easy 
vice for soldiers under stress to turn too. Alcohol abuse as a form of post-war 
stress relief is by no means unique to veterans of Korea, or other British conflicts 
that have occurred with veterans of most military forces throughout history.48 
Within the British Army throughout the course of army life, alcohol had offered a 
coping mechanism to the strains and difficulties of military service. Naturally, the 
army has done its upmost to prevent drunkenness in men on active duty, however, 
when released from duty at all points in their service, men would quickly find an 
opportunity to drink alcohol as a release.49 Emma Newlands had outlined how 
some new recruits of the Second World War had rapidly turned to drinking alcohol 
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in their free time to help absorb the stresses of their new life. It would appear that 
the same was true of ex-soldiers turned civilians. Once ex-servicemen were 
completely free of military restrictions and without any wellbeing services to turn 
to, history informs us that a struggling veteran’s solution to their feelings of 
isolation and inability to find peace, was to turn to alcoholism. In these instances, 
drinking became almost a kind of self-medication for the stresses ex-servicemen 
now faced in civilian life. This pattern of using alcohol to cope with stresses in the 
short term could lead to a dependency and long-term alcohol abuse lasting for 
months or even years.50 Whitchurch was a part of this group and recognised how 
he had fallen into a pattern of alcohol abuse by saying ‘I couldn’t cope. I started 
having drinking binges … stoned out my eyeballs. There was a street that housed 
about twelve, thirteen pubs and I’d just go from one to the other, until I couldn’t 
stand. That went on for quite a long time, months’.51 Similarly, Green described 
how drinking quickly became his only way to relax: ‘The only relief from the stress I 
could find was to tour the local pubs, which really only made things worse. I just 
couldn’t handle my beers’.52 In the case of both Green and Whitchurch and 
doubtless many others, their use of alcohol started as a way to manage their new 
found stresses. This escalated into major drinking problems as a result in a 
typically recognisable pattern symptomatic of men suffering from untreated Post 
Trauma Stress Disorder.53 The immediate emotional impact of difficulties such as 
these in re-integrating was felt foremost between families and loved ones. Again, 
this was not unique to the veterans of Korea. Michael Roper described how the 
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same impacts were felt by families of men returning home from the First World 
War.54 Without any proper social or medical care it was up to loved ones to 
support battle stressed veterans as best they could. For Whitchurch, his problems 
readjusting and the dependency on alcohol they caused lead to a very emotional 
confrontation with his mother: 
I stopped the drinking over about six months. Mum had an influence in it, 
because I used to come home, stoned to my eyeballs, in as much that my 
first Christmas home, I didn’t come home. Eventually when I came home on 
Christmas morning, she stood in the doorway, breaking her heart, she said 
‘I went in your bedroom with all your presents and you weren’t in bed’. I’d 
been so drunk the night before; I couldn’t get home… That stopped me 
then.55 
Whitchurch’s case is just one example of the need for external influence to come 
out of his post-war haze, however he was most certainly not alone.  
Lack of Veterans care  
In the years following their return from the Korean War, British veterans found 
themselves in what should have been a much better environment for healthcare 
and wellbeing than had existed after the Second World War in 1945. There had 
been a significant interest in mental healthcare throughout the inter World War 
period and the National Health Service had become well established by 1953. 
Following the Second World War and the lessons learned about military and 
civilian health, greater emphasis was being placed upon recognising the 
importance of mental health. However, the British Army itself lacked any real 
capabilities to deal with mental wellbeing and the National Health Service in the 
early 1950s failed to provide any real emphasis in this direction. It was not until the 
reforms ushered in by the Mental Health Act of 1959 that mental health became a 
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major concern of national infrastructure.56 The result of this was that for men 
returning from active service in Korea they had to wait at least six years before any 
meaningful professional support structure was in place for them. As such, veterans 
were forced to rely upon the support of family and friends where ever possible. 
This was in an environment of disinterest in their experience and a time when 
great stigma was still attached to mental health issues, if indeed they were 
recognised at all. Edwin Haywood, a veteran of the Middlesex Regiment, who had 
himself witnessed his unit’s chaplain suffer a mental breakdown in Korea, began to 
exhibit signs of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression in himself shortly 
after being demobilised: 
My problems started, the nightmares, which I experienced, started about six 
months after my demob. I don’t know what triggered them. I went from 
about thirteen stone, down to about nine, through terrific perspiration from 
these nightmares, lack of sleep, lack of energy, poor outlook generally on 
life. And it really does pull you down. This continued for probably two years 
or more, but there was no counselling in those days, just a few pills from 
your doctor and you just had to work your way through it, which I did… it 
was a very traumatic experience.57  
Haywood’s description of his nightmares and general post-war experience match 
closely the more severe types of anxiety disorders and depression that are 
commonly associated with Post Trauma Stress Disorder. Like Winspear and many 
others he suffered from terrible nightmares, however the flashbacks, insomnia and 
depression were all more severe and major symptoms of the disorder. Ideally, 
men in these positions required a complex support structure in order for the 
condition to improve. However, we can see from Haywood’s testimony that such a 
support structure did not exist and besides the prescription from his doctor of pills, 
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he lacked anything that would be considered adequate help today. Haywood’s 
experience of Post Trauma Stress Disorder lasted for many years after his 
demobilisation and his having to face it alone as he describes was a traumatic 
experience in itself. Others, like Whitchurch, were able to face the phycological 
impact of their service with the help of their families, however even in these 
circumstances, the experience could be tremendously difficult and painful. Veteran 
of commando operations and former prisoner of war John Peskett suffered terribly 
from anxiety issues after returning from Korea and found that the only support he 
could get was between his wife and a sympathetic officer:  
I had to get over it on my own… correction, I got over it with the help of my 
wife. I had got to the stage where I would not go out during the day, I 
couldn’t go shopping with her, only in the darkness. I had a drinking 
problem. I tried going back to the marines, I hadn’t washed or shaved, I was 
a scruffy devil. An officer just said he wanted to talk with me and I cried 
coming away from that meeting for about twenty minutes. He just said to dig 
in and let it all out. They gave me time and that’s what I needed, time. A few 
months later I had re-joined and had Sergeant stripes on my shoulders.58  
Haywood, Clark and Peskett all exhibit the most common mental health disorders 
found in British forces after returning from deployment are depression, alcohol 
abuse and anxiety disorders.59 Although he is quick to credit his wife in helping 
him through his post-war anxiety, Peskett’s first thought on the matter shows he 
very clearly felt elements of being alone in his experience. Again, like Haywood 
and Clark, Peskett’s symptoms indicate a case of Post Trauma Stress Disorder, 
which severely affected his abilities to function as a civilian in society at home. 
Even with the support his wife was able to offer him, it would seem he still could 
not open up to her fully in the same way he describes with the Marine officer. His 
return to the Royal Marines would indicate that Peskett felt unable to resolve his 
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issues in civilian life and it is possible he felt that only other marines could 
understand his situation. It seems he was very glad to have an emotional outlet in 
a military setting as evidenced by how he felt able to openly cry in front of the 
officer. The very act of being given the time from a fellow serviceman seems to 
have greatly helped Peskett as he was able to improve his outlook and eventually 
rise to the rank of a Sergeant. Evidently, the importance of a military structure and 
having fellow servicemen who could understand is a key part of the post-war 
experience. This goes someway to outlining the wider importance of veterans’ 
associations and organisations in the post-war veteran’s experience.  
Veterans’ Organisations in the Post-War Experience 
Veterans’ organisations form a special bond in the post-war experience of the men 
who fought in Korea. The Royal British Legion and other similar regimental 
associations such as The British Korean Veterans Association (BKVA) and its 
successor, the British Korean War Veterans Association (BKWVA) assisted. 
These organisations exist to help structure a support network around veterans to 
assist in commemoration of the war. So much is stated in the still live introductory 
page of the BKVA’s official website.60 Though the BKVA officially disbanded in 
2014 with the ideal of ‘going out with heads held high’, its role in the lives of 
veterans over the previous thirty years was hugely important, as its successors 
continue to do so.61 William Crook reflected on how the BKVA helped reconnect 
him with his old comrades for decades: ‘I joined the (British) Korean Veterans 
Association about twenty odd years ago now. I get the regular newsletters and it is 
good hearing about everybody and how they’re getting on’.62 For William Clark, 
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being a member of a veterans association allowed him to explore many more 
benefits of being a veteran. ‘I’m making the most of it. I was invited to Buckingham 
Palace and the United Nations’ 50th Anniversary, I’ve re-visited Korea. I was 
invited to the amalgamation of the Gloucester regiment’.63 Alongside supporting 
veterans, the role of veterans associations in the field of commemoration such as 
in Clark’s example, is also particularly important for veterans, given the adverse 
feelings of Korea being a forgotten conflict.  
One particular element to the role of Korean War veterans associations, is the 
extent to which they have as a community accepted the forgotten nature of the 
Korean War as a strong part of their sense of identity. Huxford argues that the 
forgotten status of the war did in fact, give it a special and significant status 
amongst the veteran’s community.64 Throughout the various ranks of Korean 
veterans, the concept of being ‘forgotten’ is a prominent part of how they articulate 
their post-war identity. This is borne out by General Sir Anthony Farrar Hockley a 
notable Korea veteran and military historian who summarised the Korean 
veteran’s community at an address in 2000. He described it as ‘veterans who may 
have been overlooked, but were none the less part of an exclusive club’.65 
Whitchurch reflected on how Korean veterans viewed themselves as forgotten, yet 
remained a closely-knit group: 
We’re always called the forgotten army, but the comrades that I’ve got now, 
you couldn’t buy that. In fact, we keep saying the comradeship and the 
comradery, even now, we’d do anything for each other.66  
For Whitchurch, being a part of the forgotten army was a proud part of his identity, 
in resistance to the prevailing narrative of apathy and lack of remembrance to 
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Korea. The closeness of his comrades and their level of commitment to each other 
in spite of society’s perceived lack of interest in them, are typical of the somewhat 
unique self-memorialisation of Korean veterans’ communities.67 This is to the 
extent that since the 1980s, with help from each other and the BKVA, Korean 
veterans were able to create their own distinct body of literature. This they 
dedicated either to their individual experiences of the war as ‘extra chapters in the 
history books’ or as a general addendum to mainstream histories of Korea.68 The 
reasons behind the effort made to generate this body of work were summarised by 
veteran Ted Stokes in his own memoir in the BKVA’s newsletter, Morning Calm 
as: ‘We all have moments in history that at the time were just events and only later 
blossomed into significant experiences’.69 It is evident that to veterans of the 
Korean War, associations clearly play a hugely important part in their post-war 
experience, both as a support structure and as a mechanism of directly 
memorialising the Korean War. The BKVA and similar organisations played a huge 
role in physical commemorations and remembrance for Korea. A part of this was 
the funding and organisation of smaller scale physical memorials across Britain. 
From the late 1980s, the BKVA has helped in the installation of various memorials 
that include the planting of memorial fir trees and accompaniments to older 
cenotaphs. Other mementoes are memorial plaques in the National Arboretum, 
the crypt of St. Paul’s Cathedral and a larger memorial in the Bathgate Hills in 
Scotland, in the style of a Korean Pagoda.70 In 2014 with substantial funding from 
the Republic of Korea the BKVA was able to achieve its ‘final fight’ of recognition 
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of those who gave their lives in Korea. This was in the establishment of the Korean 
War Memorial at London’s Victoria Embankment.71 The cooperation between 
veterans associations and the South Korean Government was not only limited to 
funding and is another major part in the various organisations efforts to self-
commemorate the Korean War. The role of both veteran’s organisations and the 
Republic of Korea has been especially prominent in international commemorations 
of the Korean War. Many veterans reflect positively upon the gratitude shown by 
the Korean Government, in particular their emphasis on anniversaries. Roy Horn, 
described his views on the Republic of Korea’s efforts to commemorate the 2010 
anniversary in a letter to the Morning Calm, following his own experience of the 
event: ‘The Koreans are treating 2010 as a key war anniversary, whilst the British 
Government is not’.72 Clearly, the difference of perceived levels of commemoration 
and remembrance in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Korea has been 
keenly observed by veterans over the years. This leads into another major part of 
the role veterans associations and the part that the Republic of Korea contributes 
in the post-war experience. Their joint experience is shown in their joint emphasis 
on helping veterans to return to Korea itself. 
Importance of Revisiting to Remembrance 
One of the most profound experiences in the post-war experience of British troops 
who fought in Korea is the subsequent return of many of them to South Korea. 
Although veterans revisiting the sites of past conflicts is not a unique feature of the 
Korean Post-war history, there is an element to which it is significantly different. 
Contrary to the narrative of forgetting prevalent in the United Kingdom, the Korean 
War remains prominent and important in South Korean society. As one may 
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expect, commemoration of the war is much more prominent in general throughout 
South Korea than it is in the United Kingdom. This is quite understandable, as the 
war is much more significant to the Korean People than it is to British Society. This 
is shown by efforts to commemorate the war by funding war memorials in Britain, 
including the Korean War Memorial at London Embankment as well as routinely 
sending thank you cards to British veterans.73 Physical examples of this in Korea 
itself include the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul, which is home to a permeant 
and large exhibit dedicated entirely to United Nations forces. The exhibition 
consists of six separate zones showcasing images of United Nations troops that 
include those from the British contingent. Amongst the exhibits are the United 
Nations Flag and a large art piece called Tear Drops to commemorate the United 
Nations soldiers who died heroic, noble deaths.74 Additionally, United Nations 
troops who died during the Korean War are given inscriptions in the National 
Memorial Hall. Similarly, the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Busan is 
described as the only United Nations cemetery in the world, This is a highly 
significant memorial site to South Korea because it prominently features the 
graves of Major Kenneth Muir (Victoria Cross) and Lieutenant Philip Curtis 
(Victoria Cross), who died fighting at the Battle of Hill 282 and the Battle of the 
Imjin respectively.75  
It is therefore not surprising that allowing veterans to revisit Korea has also a 
symbolic act of remembrance for the soldiers, their families and the wider 
veterans’ associations. These visits are with the Korean government officially 
promoting and encouraging such visits. William Clark for example listed re-visiting 
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Korea as one of the highlights of veteran’s activities he had taken part in. 76 
Kenneth Black felt his view of the war improved vastly because of his return to 
Korea: 
I’ve been back three times and it’s changed for the better. I feel better now 
than I did then for it. Because we were given no choice in it, we didn’t know 
what it was about. In fact, we didn’t even know where the damn country 
was. When you go back and see it now, the way that it’s grown up in the 
last few years, their healthy economy, it’s brilliant, it was all well worth it.77 
We can see from Black’s experience that the very act of re-visiting itself can prove 
to be a hugely significant emotional experience that forms a key element in their 
own personal remembering of the War. Black’s impression of how South Korea 
has ‘improved’ since his time of serving there, was certainly a major element in 
believing that the war had become worthwhile. Similarly, James Lucock had his 
views on the conflict totally changed by his experience of re-visiting South Korea 
after the war: 
I always thought that the war had been a terrible waste of time, a terrible 
place to have been, but having been back to South Korea, I now feel 
differently about it all. I’ve seen a country with children well fed, people well 
educated, well dressed and they were most humble to me, always wanting 
to shake your hand. They were so generous, it’s really nice. If that’s made 
them people in South Korea happy, then I accept that my time there was 
worthwhile.78  
Lucock’s recollection is reflective of many trends in the experience of British 
veterans on their return to Korea. Like Black, his return to Korea kindled a feeling 
that the efforts of himself and Britain in Korea had not been a waste of time, but 
rather had been a worthwhile endeavour. This is a wide spread opinion, as many 
other veterans have expressed similar views following their own re-visits.79  
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Henry Ponsford, who had served with the Gloucesters during the war, also 
reflected how the attitudes of the Korean people towards United Nations veterans 
helped him feel positively about his own service. Ponsford, who had initially stated 
‘Thank God I ain’t out there’, when he first heard news of Korea he went on to say 
the following having visited the place since: ‘I feel it was a good job done for the 
people out there. They appreciate what we did and they couldn’t do enough for 
us’.80 Kenneth Black stated something along the same lines, ‘The Korean people, 
when you go back are so grateful when they find out you’re a veteran, they’ll come 
up and shake your hand in the street and give you a little bow’.81 Similarly, 
Raymond Todd recounted how he had a very public thanks for his service whilst 
on holiday in the United States:  
If you look at North Korea today, it’s just an ant heap and you look at South 
Korea which is a prosperous, modern, industrial nation. I feel very proud 
indeed to have had some small part in it. To give you an example, two 
years ago, we were in San Francisco for a veterans’ reunion with George 
Company (U.S Marine Corps), who we had been on the road with us over 
there. At the fisherman’s market my wife and I were talking to a seller who 
told us he was Korean and when I mentioned I’d fought there, his face lit 
up. He took a hold of both my hands and in the middle of this market he 
said ‘I want to thank you, because of what you did, my family are able to do 
what they do’! If nothing else, that one moment made it worthwhile. The 
other thing is of course those people who were my comrades during the 
Korean War, British and American, they are still my very good friends to this 
day.82  
In all instances, the veterans’ views of their service in Korea were distinctively 
shaped by their encounters with Korean people and the way in which they showed 
appreciation. Ponsford particularly reflected upon how many Korean people he 
had met went above and beyond his expectations to make him feel appreciated. 
Whereas Todd was moved by an individual act of gratitude. Todd heavily implies 
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that his view of having served in the Korean War is partially shaped by the view he 
has of North Korea, especially in comparison to its southern counterpart. 
Describing North Korea in derogatory terms and drawing a comparison to an ant 
heap, Todd is not alone in viewing the nation with some disdain.83 Similarly, his 
contrasted opinion of South Korea the modernised South, is quite widely shared 
amongst British veterans. William Hiscox quipped of the situation ‘The South 
Koreans are doing much better now, but the North? I don’t believe in Father 
Christmas anymore, but I do believe that North Korea is as poor as it is’.84 Clearly 
an awareness of the general recovery and social improvements in recent decades 
in South Korea is important to British veteran’s experience of life post-war. 
However, it is the specific acts of gratitude which seem to resonate most. In 
Todd’s case it was the thanks he received from a Korean in the United States of 
America which he describes as having the biggest effect on his view of the war. 
The importance of the moment is demonstrated by how clearly Todd recalls the 
man’s joy and thanks towards him. That and his description that the single act of 
thanks made the whole endeavour worthwhile shows how important he felt the 
appreciation to be. On a similar note, Ponsford completely reversed his position on 
having served in the war based on the way he was treated by South Koreans. It 
would seem that to an extent that this is due to the different attitudes held towards 
United Nations veterans in Korea compared with the United Kingdom. Where as 
many feel their stories are not important in British Society, in Korea, they feel as if 
they are listened to with greater interest.85 To the veterans, the acts of 
appreciation shown by the Korean people are a kind of active, first hand 
remembrance which can seem lacking in British Society. Even in cases where 
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veterans still retained negative feelings towards having served in the war, 
subsequent revisits with the BKVA and the attitude of the Korean people could 
prove to be hugely rewarding experiences. Roy Rees was one such example, who 
did not change his views, but still found revisiting hugely significant: 
I still feel bitter about it, having served. I suppose it destroyed my belief in 
democracy […] I’ve tried to go back to see the hill on the Imjin a number of 
times but you’re not allowed there. I have been back to South Korea several 
times. We always get a very good reception, very good, they couldn’t do 
enough for you. I actually ended up adopting our girl from Korea, she’s at 
university now. 86 
For Rees, revisiting was a more nuanced matter. He still felt embittered about 
having fought in the war to the extent that his opinion of democracy itself was 
shaken, however, he still viewed his revisits to Korea with the BKVA fondly. 
Though Rees regrets not being able to revisit the site of the Battle of the Imjin 
which now lies in North Korea, He shares the experience of having a positive 
reception from the people of Korea on each subsequent visit. This led to him and 
his wife adopting his daughter from Korea, which is undeniable a significant life 
experience. Yet for all this benefit, Rees’s view on having served in Korea did not 
change and he remained bitter about the war. This goes to indicate that re-visiting 
was not always a simple matter, but could be more nuanced in the range of a 
veteran’s post-war experience. Though it was almost universally felt to be a 
positive act of both commemoration and appreciation, it could often change a 
soldier’s view of the war, some men kept their own personal and complex views on 
having served.  
Conclusion 
The post-war experience of the Korean War is a microcosm of the war itself. In a 
society which remains to this day uninterested and apathetic, it has been left to the 
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veterans and their families to be the bearers of the memory of the Korean War. 
From the moment of the ceasefire, sounded by a bugler of the Durham Light 
Infantry shortly after Ten o’clock on July 27th 1953, Korea was already consigned 
to a watered-down place in British military history.87 In a way, the date is oddly 
reflective of this. Unlike VE- Day, or the famous 11/11 armistice of the First World 
War, the end of the Korean War was not memorable or celebrated. There was no 
concise, easily remembered time nor date, just as there was no concise, edifying 
ending to the war itself. In both time and space, Korea came to be viewed as 
unremarkable.88 This national apathy came to manifest itself in a lack of 
representation, further driving a lack of remembrance. Unlike the First and Second 
World Wars, which took place again and again as representations of the conflicts 
in the cultural canon, Korea ‘never really happened’ in the national psyche.89 
Korea became the typical ‘forgotten war’ in culture and remembrance, as did the 
veterans become the typical ‘forgotten soldiers’ underrepresented at every level. 
The shadow of Vietnam in narratives of late Twentieth Century conflict also 
obscured Korea as United States popular culture came to dominate. Even as the 
Cold war progressed, Korea remained culturally insignificant. The war was a 
backdrop to intrigue or a footnote in fictional veterans’ characters. For the 
individual veteran, these wider cultural phenomena helped frame their experience 
of the war, yet they continually reinforced their place outside of popular memory. 
This was a process most veterans went through first-hand. Re-integrating to a 
society which had seen the return of 4.4 million Second World War veterans in the 
previous eight years proved to be a difficult and unsung process for many Korea 
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veterans.90 Ex- servicemen faced all of the same issues as their predecessors, but 
without the sense of achievement and purpose bestowed on the previous 
generations of British Soldier. However, Korea veterans also had to share the lack 
of support in the same way as past soldiers, leaving it up to the individual or 
immediate social circle to resolve their issues. This is perhaps part of the reason 
why veterans themselves came to be the primary caretakers of remembrance for 
their experience. Like their post-war social issues, it was left to the veterans and 
their families to be the bearers of the memory of the Korean War. Veterans’ 
associations proved to be vital in supporting veterans on an individual level and to 
reclaiming the memory of Korea overall. Groups such as the BKVA allowed ex-
soldiers to come to terms with their service, changing their views from the wide 
spread apathy, into a proud memory with purpose, like the voices of their 
predecessors. Veterans were able to revisit their experiences and were shown the 
appreciation many felt they had lacked in Britain over the years. Veterans were 
able to adopt the forgotten moniker as a part of their identity and in doing so, 
became the custodians of their own memory, in a narrative in which they are 
largely left out of remembrance. Ultimately, the post-war experience was not only 
shaped by cultural narratives and representative apathy, but by the individual 
veterans themselves as they defended their memory and ensured that their 











Chapter 7: Conclusion. 
 
Private William ‘Bill’ Speakman V.C.  
In February 1952, the usually calm village of Altringham, Cheshire was enraptured 
in patriotic celebration. Private William ‘Bill’ Speakman, a soldier with the King’s 
Own Scottish Borderers Regiment had returned to his home town a war-hero, 
having earned the first Victoria Cross of Queen Elizabeth’s reign. The Mayor of 
Altringham described both the occasion and the man as ‘truly unique’ and indeed it 
was, for Bill Speakman had just become the only member of the British Army to 
receive a Victoria Cross for action in the Korean War and survive. It had been on 
the Fourth of the previous November on a freezing Korean winter’s night, in a 
scratch line of trenches designated ‘217- United Hill’ when Speakman and his 
platoon had stood in a desperate defence against an overwhelming Chinese 
attack. Despite being wounded, Bill led multiple counter attacks against the 
enemy, stalling their advance and allowing the Scottish Borderers to withdraw 
safely. Bill Speakman was at the time the soldier most famous for serving in the 
Korean War within British society. Though Michael Caine would later go on to earn 
fame for his acting career, Speakman was famous for his actions on the battlefield.  
In many ways, Bill Speakman’s experience of the Korean War and the years 
thereafter was the inverse of the experience of Sir Michael Caine. Speakman had 
been a career soldier since the Second World War and had volunteered to go to 
Korea. Whereas Michael Caine, then Maurice Micklewhite, had entered the 
Korean War as a National Serviceman and was merely sent there with his 
battalion. Speakman had his moment in the national spotlight during the war, only 
to be forgotten as time went on. Michael Caine on the other hand was just one of 




when Sir Michael Caine, recalled his return home, he spoke of how he felt 
forgotten and seeing his efforts uncared for by society. He wrote in his memoirs: ‘I 
know what it feels like to be sent off to fight in an unpopular war, that no one at 
home really understands or cares about and then to come back and meet a 
complete lack of understanding or worse indifference’.1 On the face of it, 
Speakman’s return home could not have been more different. The mayor of 
Altringham as well as a large press gathering met Bill on the tarmac at Manchester 
Airport. Thousands of people lined the streets to watch a special motorcade 
convoy through to the town hall, before Bill was presented to the crowd by the 
Mayor on the balcony of the town hall. Between the crowds, flag waving, bunting 
and cheers, the scene was more than reminiscent of the V.E day celebrations only 
a few years earlier. Yet, the creeping sense of national forgetfulness was already 
clearly present in Speakman’s experience. Just as Micklewhite’s return was 
defined by feeling forgotten and uncared for, Bill Speakman’s only official quote to 
the press that day was simply: ‘Don’t forget the boys in Korea, they’re doing a 
tough job and they’re doing it well’.2 Maurice Micklewhite left Korea as someone 
typical of the average British soldier but went on to become someone of exception. 
Whereas Speakman returned home as the exceptional soldier, to go on to a post 
military career that was somewhat less glorious. Bill Speakman’s eventual return 
to civilian life was more in line with what many Korea veterans experienced, 
especially in a post-war society. He found returning to civilian life difficult and 
struggled with various jobs as well as an arrest for theft, eventually being forced to 
sell his V.C and other medals to raise money. Bill emigrated and returned to the 
UK various times, before settling down and becoming a Chelsea Pensioner. He 
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remained an active member of the British Korean Veterans Association and 
representative of the Royal British Legion until his passing in 2018.3 Like Sir 
Michael, most British troops who served in Korea received no victory parade, no 
memorialisation and no newsreels. Like Bill Speakman, their experience of the war 
was forgotten, along with the war itself in British collective memory. Hence, the 
importance of both men’s words on being forgotten. It did not matter the fame any 
one man had from the conflict; their collective experience was largely ignored. 
While Caine had the typical war experience, Speakman had the typical post-war 
experience. However, both highlight key aspects of the experiences of British 
soldiers of the Korean War.  
Through a rigorous analysis of the oral testimonies and life writing from veterans 
such as Speakman and Sir Michael, this work has shown that the recollected 
experience of these men not only allows for a reassessment of narratives of the 
war itself, but it also opens a window into 1950s Britain and society’s attitudes the 
Korean War, both then and since. By creating a piece to restore the soldier’s 
experience to the centre of narratives of the Korean War, this work has also 
revealed how the experience of these men were shaped by society around them. 
This work has shown how veterans’ recollections of Korea could be shaped and 
formed in the context of previous conflicts, demonstrating the power held by these 
events in popular memory, then and now. This further demonstrates how the 
failure of the Korean War to develop its own narrative tropes in popular memory 
and to create a lasting impression with wider post-war society led to the trope of 
Korea being a ‘Forgotten War’.  
 




The processes and events that have led to this are evident in several key areas of 
soldiers’ experiences of the conflict. These began before the war itself, before men 
even reached the Korean Peninsula, they had to experience the change from 
civilian to soldier. Despite any changes to society and politics or even to the 
motivations behind the army’s recruitment and training policies in the 1950s, both 
new recruits like Micklewhite and experienced soldiers like Speakman had their 
own agendas and views of being soldiers in post- Second World War Britain. For 
some new National Servicemen, it was a begrudged interruption to their planned 
civilian lives, whereas others welcomed the change and opportunities army service 
represented, showing that there was no blanket reaction to enlistment. Reservists 
too had mixed views about being returned to active duty following their previous 
service. This thesis has thereby demonstrated that through these recollections, it 
is evident that men maintained their own agency and opinions throughout the 
recruitment process and that individual goals were central to the experience. Here 
is shown the first indication that the Korean War was not due to enter collective 
memory, as without a wider societal goal as motivation, the experience of soldiers 
in training does not fit neatly into either a Cold War narrative or as a continuation 
of the Second World War. Regardless of how men felt about joining or re-joining 
the ranks, the methods employed by the army to instigate control over their 
physical and mental beings were in place from the second they arrived on base 
and in some cases earlier. It appears that in terms of individual experience, these 
methods of implementing control over soldiers’ minds and bodies were mainly a 
continuation of what had occurred throughout the Second World War and did not 
reflect any social or political changes in post-war Britain. It has also been shown 
how throughout the training process a wide diversity of men from various social 




sought to project their masculinity and dominance, as well as friendship and 
comradery into their new environment. From this, this study has shown that ideas 
about self-image in 1950s society found ways to manifest themselves in an 
environment in which the army sought to create a uniform image. Additionally, the 
experience of deploying to Korea and the voyage itself, an element so often left 
out of military histories in general, is also shown to have been a significant part of 
the experience of all soldiers who were sent to Korea. The voyage itself proved to 
be a microcosm of army life, with strict elements of army control being applied to 
men’s lives as well as all of the same social tensions that were found in other 
areas of men’s experience. However, men’s reactions to being selected or even 
volunteering for service in Korea challenges the notion that Korea was universally 
regarded as an unpopular posting and shows that not all men who served in Korea 
did so reluctantly or without choice. These soldiers had their own agency and 
formed their own opinions and reactions to their deployment. 
 
This work has also demonstrated the importance of the frontline environment 
beyond strategic thinking and has recentred it to where it belongs within a soldier’s 
experience. For soldiers on the ground, the environment of Korea was both alien 
and different whilst at the same time being a reflection of the trenches of the First 
World War’s Western Front. This is how men chose to frame their views of the 
environment, the similarities were such that Korea’s frontlines could fit neatly into 
troops’ popular memories of the First World War. Repeatedly, veterans related 
their experiences through touchstones and concepts of the Great War. What this 
demonstrates is that from the point of view of the Poor Bloody Infantry, the 
physical characteristics of the frontlines, from the mud logged trenches to the 




experience. This is despite the many features of the Korean environment which 
distinguished it as a unique environment. This clearly demonstrates the 
dominance of the tropes and imagery of the First World War in the collective 
memory of the 1950s and in subsequent years. Even areas of the Second World 
War such as the Far- East Theatre, which may in hindsight be a better fit for the 
model of the Korean War, had not yet developed a strong enough narrative to 
influence wider societies perception of frontline environments. This also leads into 
one of the reasons why the Korean frontline environment never developed its own 
cultural imagery. Unlike, the World Wars and other conflicts such as Vietnam, 
there is little in the way of popular cultural depictions of Korea and so there is no 
common touchstone veterans can use to relate their experiences of the Korean 
frontlines. For these reasons, the Korean frontline environment has continually 
existed in the shadow of the trenches of the First World War which in turn 
becomes a key factor in the process of Korea becoming a ‘forgotten war’. 
In terms of the British soldier’s experience of combat and fighting in Korea, this 
work has demonstrated that men predominantly viewed their enemies in coldly 
distant and impersonal terms, unlike the soldiers of the World War’s European 
battlefields. As is clear from soldiers’ testimonies, these views were driven by both 
the conditions in which combat usually occurred as well as racial views of the 
Chinese and North Koreans. Veterans of fighting in these scenarios were less 
weighed down by the emotional strain of killing someone they perceived as an 
individual and were therefore able to discuss their combat experiences more 
freely. Of course, this was not always the case, as several accounts have shown, 
men could see past these factors to have very humanised views of their 
opponents. In these scenarios, British troops were much more likely to develop a 




those who had been unable to see their enemy. Evidently, British troops views on 
killing depended less upon their personal views of the enemy and more upon how 
the combat took place. It has also been shown that troops on the frontlines were 
also very aware of the dangers posed to their own selves in combat. Accounts 
show that some soldiers were overcome by their fears in the face of battle. In other 
cases, some soldiers used whatever means they could to distract themselves or 
show a lack of fear. Even more unusual reactions were deliberate nonchalance 
about the dangers posed to their lives and limb, though these behaviours became 
less common as casualties occurred within a unit. This work has also taken into 
account the experience of what combat was like for non- combat troops, who had 
equally complex reactions to combat as their frontline counterparts. In some 
accounts, non-combatants found fighting to provide a release and they sought to 
re- enter battle as soon as possible. Others were more subject to their fear for 
facing the consequences of battle. In all these cases, a new deeper understanding 
of fighting has been revealed by the oral testimonies of the soldiers who fought in 
Korea, which will help to shed light on the wider experience of fighting troops 
throughout the Twentieth Century. 
This work has also demonstrated the importance of soldiers’ social lives on the 
frontlines of Korea and how interconnected soldiers were with society back in the 
UK. Though the social spheres of soldiers’ lives have been considered at length 
for other conflicts, new military histories have yet to fully address the absence of 
this vital part of life on the frontlines of Korea. This work has taken to this 
challenge and has highlighted the importance of these social behaviours for troops 
in Korea. It has demonstrated how the social lives of the soldiers, their shaped 
group behaviour, group identity and human bonds, were a highly significant part of 




at the time influenced men’s behaviour in Korea. Soldiers developed an intricate 
structure of social support amongst their ranks on Korea. This was based around 
strong interpersonal bonds of friendship and group social support. Individual’s 
testimonies have shown that personal friendships and close groups of mates were 
a key centre point of all this. Bonds between friends were amongst the most 
important social mechanisms for dealing with the stresses of life in Korea. Friend 
groups and mates were as much a part of soldier’s lives as their dugouts and daily 
routines and soldiers ensured that they remained close to their friends whenever 
possible. By living, eating and sleeping alongside each other, soldiers in Korea 
were able to provide each other with constant social and emotional care. This 
ensured that soldiers within these friend groups could keep each other from 
despairing, make sure they were all fed and were well slept. This work has further 
highlighted the importance of these social groups by demonstrating the difficulties 
faced by men who could not integrate into a close social group. These individuals 
found day to day life in Korea to be much more isolated, lonely and as a result 
more difficult. In terms of social caring behaviours on the frontlines, this work has 
shown that social care could be highly paternal as well as brotherly. Accounts 
show that patenting and ‘mothering’ behaviours were just as common in Korea as 
they have been in observations of other conflicts throughout the Twentieth 
Century. This was particularly common amongst troops in leadership positions 
who would behave towards their underlings in a similar manner to parents. They 
scolded poor behaviour, looked out for younger troops and ensured care was 
distributed. Resultantly, many soldiers viewed their leaders in parental terms and 
described them similarly to father figures. Although close care was often for the 
benefit of the whole social group, these social support structures were very 




social groups also provided men with an opportunity to project their self-image as 
it was defined in societal architypes, however this was often an unhealthy 
tendency. English soldiers in primarily Scottish units overemphasised behaviours 
they identified as belonging to society’s definition of ‘English’ and similarly, soldiers 
often went out of their way or placed themselves in danger to project an image of 
‘masculinity’. These projections could be warped and used to cover over how 
soldiers truly wanted to react to their situations in order to reinforce an imagined 
self-image to their social group. Additionally, this work has also demonstrated the 
continued importance of tea and alcohol within the lives of British soldiers and its 
role as a bonding activity in society. The communal acquisition and consumption 
of which provided both a direct coping mechanism to provide a comfort from the 
more difficult aspects of frontline life and also worked as social currency, allowing 
men to interact with the social structures that developed on the frontlines of Korea. 
Additionally, accounts have also shown how postal communication was a very 
important element in soldier’s social routine and how it allowed society in Britain to 
remain connected to soldiers on the frontlines. The methods of communication 
home and their respective importance to both soldiers and their loved ones in 
Britain formed an important part of the wider social experience, which the army 
encouraged. The post not only provided a social lifeline to families and friends, but 
its arrival prompted an opportunity for communal gathering as well. The 
importance of post as a social tool in Korea both emphasises the ways in which 
elements of society, such as following sports and family connections, influenced 
everyday life in Korea, as well as challenging the concept that Korea was a remote 
and isolated war.  
Lastly, this work has also shown the extent to which the post-war experience of 




in retrospect. This work has analysed veterans’ own accounts and provided a first-
person view of the process of the Korean War becoming forgotten by wider 
society. As has been shown, the Korean War was already overshadowed by the 
Second World War at the time of its conclusion. British society remained apathetic 
to Korea and the experience of its veterans throughout the post war years. Given 
what this work has shown, it is perhaps unsurprising that even Bill Speakman, 
once paraded through his home town, fell upon the hardships he did. As indicated 
by the accounts in this work, it would appear that Bill’s situation was far from 
unique, as many veterans of fighting in Korea found similar difficulties readjusting 
to life as civilians. Many faced the consequences of untreated social disorders 
symptoms of what would be today classified as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). Similarly, many veterans suffered from horrific and violent nightmares for 
years and even decades after the war’s end. These issues only compounded 
social difficulties and isolation for many veterans, which in turn led many to alcohol 
and substance abuse. This all occurred without any formal support structures or 
assistance available outside of family and friends. Lastly, this work has also shown 
the importance of veterans associations and similar organisations to individuals’ 
experiences in the post-war years. Through organisations such as the BKVA, 
veterans were able to not only defy, but also reclaim the narrative of the Korean 
War and its participants being forgotten. This is evidenced by both veteran’s own 
accounts and their own body of published works, which allowed them their own 
say in commemoration of Korea. The final point this work has covered is with 
regards to veterans’ opinions of having fought in the conflict and how revisiting 
Korea has shaped their view of the war. the effect of revisiting Korea was profound 
for many veterans, who having had little care for their initial reasons to go to war. 




meaningless war, with nothing to do with British interests, revisiting has allowed 
them to see the difference their actions helped to make retrospectively. Having 
seen that their actions were indeed meaningful and the efforts of fighting were not 
in vein, most veterans of Kore were much happier for it.  
As the 70th anniversary of the Korean War draws near, the conflict seems more 
distant and remote than ever. Over 80,000 British soldiers served and fought in 
Korea for a cause many did not understand or accept at the time.4 1109 of these 
men were lost or killed in action.5 Despite Korea’s moniker as a ‘forgotten war’, this 
work has shown that through the memories, recollections and works of these men, 
there is ample evidence and material available to recentre the experience of 
soldiers as individuals to their rightful and important place in the conflict’s histories 
and to shed light on wider British Society of the 1950s. Similarly, this research has 
shown through individual accounts just how Korea came to be ‘forgotten’ though 
its interactions with the popular memory of British Society and how veterans were 
highly aware of society’s regard for them. More than that however, this thesis has 
been able to use the recollections of veterans to shed light onto both these men’s 
own experiences and highlight how ‘the forgotten war’ has become an intrinsic part 
of how British Society interacts with the concept and experience of Korea. The 
ways in which society ‘forgot’ influenced how veterans framed and remembered 
their own experience. These soldiers made their own narratives, woven against 
the flow of popular memory. This shows that they were not merely notes on a map 
or footnotes to the campaigns of the conflict, but rather that they are the forbearers 
of the memory Korean War, more so than society’s memory and are deserving of 
 
4 Anthony Farrar- Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Volume II, An Honourable 
Discharge, (London, 1995), P. 420. 
5 British Casualties in the Korean War, (Archived), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20090105162147/http://www.uk.or.kr/wargrave/], last 




their place now recentred in the narratives of the war. In turn this may help bring 
studies of the Korean War more into line with the wider body of new military 
histories and potentially allow the conflict to become a more major part of studies 
of Twentieth Century warfare. This builds upon the work of others done in the 
same vein of thought regarding soldiers’ experience and opens the door for an 
even greater understanding of the most significant conflict of the early post-war 
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